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# THE GREAT GAME;

A P L E A

FOR A

BRITISH IMPERIAL POLICY.

BY

A BRITISH SUBJECT.

LONDON :

SIMPKIN, MARSHALL & CO.,

STATIONERS' HALL COURT.

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1875.

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TO  
THE ROYAL COLONIAL INSTITUTE  
**THIS WORK**

IS RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED

*By the Author,*

IN THE HOPE  
THAT IT MAY HELP ON THE WORK  
WHICH THAT SOCIETY IS DOING.



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## ERRATA AND ADDENDA.

Page 8, *for* is determined, *read* has determined.

Page 21, *after* Newfoundland moreover, *for* need *read* needs.

Page 26, *after* Europe, *for* has, *read* have.

Page 44, *for* 25,000,000, *read* 250,000,000.

Page 46, line 2, *for* cannot, *read* can.

Page 48, *after* sentence ending with open rebellion, *read* The maintenance of native states is compatible with no other policy than that of ultimately withdrawing British control from all India. If the British rulers have such a policy in view, they ought to say so frankly and forthwith to their master, the British nation. If they have in view, as we have better reason to believe, a policy quite opposite in character, they need to be warned that by allowing an unwise tenderness to lead them into a suicidal error, they are diligently defeating their own wiser intentions. The continuance of native rule cannot but stultify their general policy by helping on the consummation which they wish to avert. It will not merely smooth the way for withdrawal. It will soon make withdrawal necessary."

Pages 49 and 54, Jhānsi is mentioned as if still British.

Page 52, *for* Pāshawar, *read* Pēshāwar.

Page 54, Kachār is mentioned as if it were not now part of Assam.

Page 56, *for* betwen, *read* between.

Page 57, *after* though they are, ! *for* ?.

Page 71, *after* has been tried, *read* at all.

Chapter III., in various places, *for* Marattas *read* Maharattas.

Page 94, *for* Méwar or Udiṭpur, *read* Méywar or Udaṭpur.

Page 101, *after* need to raise money by an income tax, *read* as for instance, in order to have an army of respectable married soldiers.

Page 124, *for* "narratur," *read* "narrabitur," and *for* appearace *read* appearance.

Page 126, *for* which, above all things alone perhaps, *read* which above all, things which perhaps alone.

Page 129, *for* immoral, *read* hurtful to the morals of society, and *for* immorality, *read* hurtfulness.

Page 192, *After* sentence ending with sovereign powers, *read* "A sentiment of respect for large, highly-organized, enlightened governments, which know their duties and make considerable efforts to fulfil them, and for large, well-defined, advanced nations, which would suffer long and keenly if suppressed, is indeed a wholesome sentiment worthy of careful preservation and encouragement. But indiscriminating respect for everything called a government, and everything called a nation, merely on account of some superficial resemblance to things worthy of these names, is utterly irrational and extremely mischievous.

Page 195, *for* 1871, *read* 1870.

Page 199, comma after "at least," at bottom of page, ought to be after "intelligible."





# THE GREAT GAME.

## CHAPTER I.

### DARKNESS BEFORE DAWN.

“It is the wish of Her Majesty’s Government to abstain from any territorial acquisitions and from contracting any new obligations.”\* It was sadly surprising to hear Her Majesty’s Secretary of State for the Colonies repudiating the course of action which has made Her Majesty the greatest sovereign whom the world has ever seen. It was hardly possible to believe that he had become a pervert to the Manchester School of Radicals. When Cheap John comes forward to peddle his bits of Brunmagem political economy, no one expects anything but nastiness puffed with “vehement shallowness.” Mr. Gladstone’s frenzied hatred of everything Imperial, is well known as the last and worst infirmity of a noble mind. Familiarity ought, at this time of day, to have bred general contempt of the windy philanthropy and high-flying philosophy of Sir Charles Dilke and Sir Wilfrid Lawson. We all know

\* House of Lords, May 12, 1871.

how delightfully cheap and easy it is to be a dispassionate cosmopolitan, above the narrow prejudices of national ambition, delicately considerate of the "natural right" of "men and brethren" to abuse themselves and their neighbours, looking down with serene disdain on the childish pride of conquest, and the vulgar lust of territory. "Stay at home and let things take their course," naturally seems the golden maxim of statesmanship to that pestilent brood of pretenders to wisdom, who look upon the political art as nothing but the art of keeping out of trouble while keeping in office. But, *et tu Brute!* In Carnarvon, at least, we had some right to expect that there remained a sympathy with the grand, masterful, and adventurous in the relations of England to the world : a willingness, an eagerness to make strong England play a father's or an elder brother's part in the family of mankind, taking the weak and ignorant by the hand, striking terror into evil doers, giving protection and encouragement to the beginnings of good, causing the wilderness to blossom as the rose, and sending forth the light of religion and civilisation into those dark places of the earth which are still the habitations of cruelty. But the fires of hope were almost extinguished by that speech. The hero seemed to have joined himself to the ignoble chorus of repudiator of national duty. He seemed, like a famous Laodicean of old, to have "caught the Whigs bathing," and run away with their livery of dishonour. In that garb he seemed to be coming forward as chief priest to sacrifice national honour at the

altar of the great god *Laissez-faire*. It was the latest and most alarming symptom of growing virulence in that epidemic of insular churlishness, which had during many years been raging amongst English public men. Half of our leading statesmen had already delivered speeches under its debasing influence, and the rest, with the noble exceptions of Earl Grey and Sir Bartle Frere, had shown no signs of healthy resistance to the infection. Public opinion had indeed become grievously emasculated. Everywhere the valetudinarian theory of British policy commanded the assent of safe mediocrities and stolid Philistines. The *Times*, after its kind, dealt out "practical" commonplaces, sicklied over with the colour of the reigning disease. Even the *Standard* seemed inclined to follow the multitude to talk evil. Everybody was informed that he knew "that England had given up business as a conquering and aggressive power." In the whole fourth estate the quasi-Radical *Spectator* had the doubly singular honour of upholding an imperial policy. The creeping palsy of cynical self-abasement had become so powerful, that its cant had almost taken the form of established maxims of English public conduct. The dogma of non-interference was constantly alluded to as an incontrovertible first principle. Argument in favour of increasing or consolidating the empire, was quietly sneered down as dreamy nonsense, needing no refutation beyond some off-hand phrase, such as "we have enough already to bother us." The hole-and-corner politicians were masters of the situation, and answered

their adversaries with little but brow-beating ridicule. Foreign nations exulted in the belief that England was allowing her sun to set. She would not only take no more business into her hands, but be thankful to get rid of what she had, and would retire as soon as she could into a comfortable shell, there to undergo a quiet and natural decline into a power of the third or fourth magnitude. There can be little doubt that many Englishmen had begun to acquiesce quietly in this degrading estimate of their state, urged persistently by a small but noisy set of crazy economical doctrinaires. Reaction from those extravagant delusions about the pecuniary value of colonies, which Adam Smith exposed, had given birth to a more unreasoning passion of depreciation. Because some supposed benefits of colonial relations had been shown to be imaginary, men jumped into the opposite belief that there are no benefits at all. Sometimes, indeed, the dislike to foreign possessions rose, or was professed, from a maudlin kind of democratic and cosmopolitan philanthropy, little more indeed than sympathy with the crass selfishness of other human beings. But more often there was no redeeming feature, real or apparent, in the mutual attitude of the dominant sect. Colonies were assumed to be unprofitable, and isolation thus appeared to be dictated by an enlightened self-interest, scorning equally the grasping rapacity and the sentimental love of grandeur supposed to characterise the advocates of imperial policy. Then this self-interest was assumed to be the one guiding principle which ought to regulate our conduct

beyond the four seas. The practical mind of this commercial age rejected with a superior sneer all Quixotic notions that we owe more than merely negative duties to our inferior fellow men. There was for them one God: Let Alone was his name: and this was his commandment, that we mind each man his own business.

All this was, and is; but, thank God! not in all its former strength. The dawn of a better day began to glimmer when the Earl of Carnarvon showed that he had uttered the Shibboleth of the day merely in thoughtless imitation of the fashion, by showing an evident anxiety to annex Fiji. Close upon the heels of this first word spoken for the right, came Mr. Disraeli's noble declaration of determination that Her Majesty's dominions should not be diminished under his stewardship, and of hope that they would be increased. Then followed the debate in the House of Commons under circumstances exceptionally favourable to the party of progress, and resulting in the ludicrous defeat of the obstructives. Nothing tends so much to promote the growth of an infant tone of thought, or line of policy, as accordant action under circumstances which prevent the employment of most hostile arguments, and offer few points on which the animosity of most enemies can fasten. As a result of this happy event, a change in the style of public talk about colonies has already become apparent in many public speeches, and in many of the public prints. Doubtless, also, the Earl of Carnarvon's unexpressed mental tendencies in favour of extension and con-

solidation have received such confirmation and impetus from practical success, that we may reasonably cultivate hopes of a further prosecution of his career of imperial improvement. Not that one can safely say that a revolution in public sentiment, or anything like it, has yet been accomplished. We have only the opportunity of organizing forces for a victorious advance. The process of conversion has fairly begun, but the good cause still needs all the help which any ready tongue and any willing pen can render. One influential newspaper has been found to declare that the certainty of ruin to the white population, and long-continued bloody anarchy among the black, if Fiji is left to itself, is no reason why England should incur the risk and expense of managing a country at the other side of the globe. And we cannot doubt the sad truth that the crabbed selfishness which gave birth to that infamous sentiment, lives and thrives unabashed in a very large and powerful portion of the people. The Age of Drift, as Mr. Jenkins has felicitously called it, has not yet passed away as regards most of our legislators. The blight of political fatalism lies heavy on Lords and Commons alike. The energetic personality of the few, which has achieved every great improvement of mankind, is invisible to modern political eyes through the general and apparently impersonal processes of human change, to which that very personality has given impulse and direction. We have far too many helter-skelter politicians, never ready for an emergency, but buffeted hither and

thither by the waves of accident ; men who are so “cautious” that they can never see the need of action till the manifest and irretrievably disastrous results of inactivity have made action impossible, or utterly useless ; carried idly about by every wind of a public opinion which they take no part in forming ; able only to dodge from one makeshift to another, and appalled at the audacious suggestion to look a little beyond their own noses. Far too many administrators who glory in the shame of aimless patchwork, and do not despise themselves for being not Wills but Weathercocks. Far too many sniggering cavillers who never do anything, or have serious thoughts of the way in which anything is to be done ; but prompt to raise vague yells of “danger” at every proposal of action, while comfortably blind to the dangers of careless repose, and practised in the use of oratorical wet blankets dripping with the cold rain of proverbial philosophy, to quench all sparks of manly political action. We hear far too much about the unwiseness of going farther to fare worse, and the wiseness of enduring the ills we have, rather than flying to others which we know not of ; far too much semi-pious advice to take no thought for the morrow, and trust in Providence, hoping that something may turn up to help men who will not help themselves. There is far too much of the spirit of those French triflers whose maxim was *après moi le déluge*, and far too little of the spirit of the statesman. A statesman is not a molluscos creature who lets other men make



up his mind for him, but a strong, wise man, who knows what is good for his country or the world, and ~~is~~ determined to do it. He does not regard himself as a mere machine for accurately reflecting and registering the blind movements of human masses. He does not make it his prime immediate object to be all things to all men, but to be master of the situation in all circumstances. He does not swim with the stream of other men's activity, but tries to turn the current in the direction which he prefers. He does not so much shape his policy to events, as work to make events convenient for his policy. His talents are not for discovering or conjuring up difficulties, but for overcoming and undermining them. Difficulties only strengthen his resolution. "Rest and be thankful" seems to him a motto fit only for men in dark ages, who are quite content that the ages should remain for ever dark. Thank God, England has some few statesmen in Parliament, in power! The spirited and strong-minded Cecil of the 19th century is a happy contrast to the stilted goose who founded the political greatness of his family; to that shifty, head-shaking, hand-wringing Burleigh who successfully cheated the world into believing him great, till Motley came forward to show how he had worried and hampered those brave men who saved England in spite of his negligence and meanness, to drag the solemn noodle into the daylight of impartial criticism, and to crown him with his appropriate fool's-cap. The Prime Minister has swum undauntedly against the stream throughout

the greater part of his life. He has steadily fought the good fight against stagnation and anarchy amidst storms of ridicule and obloquy which few men but he could have endured. Now, at length, in the fulness of years, he holds in his hands the power to shape the history of England; the power to loose and to bind the British Empire; the power to set the fashion of government which the world is most likely to follow. High hopes are natural, and expressions of enthusiastic expectation pardonable, even in the form of suggestion and exhortation. There can be no more useful ambition than that of helping on the great reaction against the accursed Devil's-spell of Let Alone, led by Fitzjames Stephen as philosopher, and Benjamin Disraeli as political orator. Against the mawkish and sordid delusions still stifling the English people, it is the duty of every man who has a spark of the enthusiasm of humanity, to raise his most energetic protest. He is bound to make some effort to rouse his countrymen from their paralysis of public spirit—their stupor of complacent self-degradation.

## CHAPTER II.

### ENGLAND'S ABDICATION.

AN able English thinker has lately warned his countrymen that three dangerous rocks lie ahead of their political course. Unhappily he has had good reason to style himself Cassandra, for the general feeling of his readers seems to be a comfortable incredulity, the thought of which must be very uncomfortable to every patriot.

Taking a wider sweep than Mr. Greg's, and extending the prophetic scrutiny from Great Britain to that group of territories supervised by England and loosely called the British Empire, I see its collective existence menaced by the growth of three great disruptive influences.

(A) The loss of the mother-country's commercial preeminence and consequent control.

(B) The ambition of colonial statesmen.

(C) The rise of national aspirations in India.

(A) The probability, the certainty of England's commercial decline may be assumed here without any statement of reasons. Every one knows them or knows where to find them. Competent observers and economists have so marshalled the evidence, that the comfortable sayers of smooth things and prophets of

false peace have almost ceased to repeat the hackneyed cavil that similar alarms have been raised before and not justified by following events. Even the rotund optimist platitudes of the late Under - Secretary for India, have grown somewhat pale and flabby at the evident approach of the wolf. The only crumb of comfort which he can give is that the evil day is still far distant, and two or three generations more, therefore, may eat, drink, and be merry in the glow of sufficient coal. But even while her mineral wealth endures, while the pits are not yet abandoned, while the furnaces are not yet blown out and the factories not yet shut up because of the famine-price of coal, while there is no absolute decadence, nevertheless a small territory with limited internal resources and widely separated from its dependencies, must constantly become less and less important as a member of the society of progressive states. Relatively England must decrease with the rapid increase of manufacturing activity in larger countries, probably not much inferior acre for acre in natural resources above ground and below. We are in our zenith, they are only coming up from the horizon. The industrial progress of other European countries and of the gigantic North American republic promises that they will very soon leave us far behind in the competition. And prestige, "moral" superiority, intellectual influence, all depend so much on material superiority, that loss of the last must be quickly followed by loss of the former. From

England's material weakness alone, if from no other cause, the self-governing colonies will soon cease to pay any deference to the authority of their decrepit mother, or any regard to her wishes and interests, do form any part of her strength in diplomatic dealings, or to be bound by any but the loosest ties, if, indeed, they do not claim formal independence and make open separation. Her African and Asiatic dependencies and her warlike strongholds she will soon be incapable of holding against internal rebellions, against the attacks of neighbours now savage but then grown powerful, or against the jealousy of those Great Powers whose dignity will be offended and whose cupidity will be roused, by the sight of a second-rate or third-rate power possessing so many of the keys of war and commerce. If the ordinary course of nature is allowed to run in its present grooves, the loose, unsteady fabric of dominion cannot long escape dismemberment, and one consequence of dismemberment will be the speedy political effacement of England, now the central figure of a superficially magnificent empire. Spain will not allow Gibraltar to remain in the hands of a nation having only half of her wealth and population. The Italians will not rest till they get hold of Italian-speaking Malta. The French will reap the benefit of Indian revolts, and find excuses for wresting Aden, Singapur, Hong-kong, the Mauritius and the African settlements from the feeble hands of perfidious Albion. Brother Jonathan's mouthpiece in London will soon be audibly

calculating that the manifest destiny of Canada, Bermuda, and the West Indies is to be ruled from Washington, and fraternally pointing out the uselessness of fighting against Providence the thickest iron-clads and the biggest battalions. Robbed on every side, and growing weaker day by day, England will sink into unhonoured senility, with neither love, obedience, nor troops of friends to comfort her in her days of dull decrepitude. A continued diet of leeks and humble-pie will soon shrivel up John Bull into the proper leanness of a decayed gentleman who has seen better days, and convert him into the likeness of those Greeks and Portuguese, whom he now so much despises. That is what will happen, at least, if he continues to think more of his nationality than of his imperial functions. His temporary industrial preeminence has been designed only to give a start in the race for empire, which he must finish in reliance on means of another sort. The alternatives before him are a struggling increase to be The Great Power, or a sleepy decrease to be one of the smallest Powers. He must look beyond the British seas for sources of new strength, which he may make all his own. To remain great he must make the territory of England greater, and found the United Kingdom on a wider material base by taking in new English-speaking kingdoms to be integral parts of the union ; to be bone of its bone, flesh of its flesh, nerve of its nerve. Wielding their ever-growing forces in virtue of his paternal influence, he may hope to hold the

first place in the world as long as the sun and moon endure. But never by his own insular and insulated strength.

(B) The separation of the colonies peopled by men of European blood, and already self-governed in all domestic affairs, is otherwise so easy as to be highly probable, but is seen to be inevitable when we consider the natural ambition of colonial statesmen. That ambition must in almost every case greatly accelerate the adolescent divergence of the young Anglo-Saxon from the household of the parent. It was one great cause, perhaps the great cause, of the American Declaration of Independence, and that is a precedent which amply justifies fears of similar movements in the larger colonies still attached to their mother, and rapidly becoming as large in comparison with her as the North American colonies were in 1776. To assume difference of future conduct from alleged difference of treatment, and consequent absence of motive, is to overlay a permanent cause with the immaterial occasion which manifests or precipitates its effects. The Yankees were as much self-governed, and, in general, quite as liberally treated as our new colonies now are. Like the story of the greased cartridges in India, the petty amount of taxation without representation was only a spark of injury, so fanned by dexterous intriguers, that a mass of mankind already inflammable with pride and lawlessness, burst readily into a flame of open revolt. The grievance was merely a grievance to

sentiment and vanity, to the feelings which naturally make large bodies of civilised men impatient of even nominal control exercised by distant authority. Public feelings of this kind are naturally strongest in the public men of the country, and co-operate with their more conscious and self-interested desire to swell their own power and dignity, in disposing them to cherish and educate the germs of national aspirations which exist among their constituents. No one who has used his eyes well in observing colonial events can have failed to see that such a process of education has been carried on for not a few years in more than one of our larger colonies. An impatience of their subordinate position is very evident in the attitude of Canadian and Australian politicians. They have a longing for the diplomatic swagger of an independent state, able to deal directly with foreign nations. They would like to have a finger in the international pie, to send plenipotentiaries, to make treaties on their own account, with an eye to their own exclusive interests, to have their own little foreign intrigues and their own little foreign wars. New South Wales assuming the airs of a sovereign state, offered to pay for the government of Fiji as her dependency, and is now sulking because the Earl of Carnarvon has made it a separate Crown colony. They would like to confer titles *ad libitum*, or to abolish them altogether, according to their several preferences. They have no patience for the long and varied service which fits a man for a well-deserved



governorship. Led by social circumstances, by education, and by political theories, to follow American rather than English modes of public life, they would like to reach the highest posts by the short and easy roads of trickery and popular flattery. British snobs who use stolen crests on their letters are quite willing to abolish the hereditary titles which they have no hopes of enjoying. Accordingly it is not astonishing that colonial politicians should occasionally make or allow a spiteful peck at the Civil Lists, which they do not expect to have to spend. Within the last six years large majorities of the Canadian Parliament and the New South Wales Assembly have attempted to cut down the salaries of their governors. In neither case was it seriously argued that the sum paid was too much for a colony to give or a British Governor to receive. In both cases this strange and significant reason was given, "the President of the United States gets less."

"Advanced" politicians at the Antipodes, chafe under the restraints which British supervision places upon robbery, jobbery, oppression of opponents, and all those freaks of boastful tyranny which an ochlocratic majority so keenly relishes. British control is slender indeed, but it is enough to gall the Australian rowdies. They would like a little more freedom to insult and plunder the Australian gentlemen, whose English sympathies, English habits, and superior culture, are so offensive to republican simplicity. Ostracism from public offices and honours, of the class which has most

loyalty to England, and most sympathy with English ideas, gives only feeble satisfaction. Neither do they think that they have done enough against the most obnoxious section of that class by legally allowing "free selection" of a squatter's lands, and practically permitting any vagabond to extend the application of the same principle to the squatter's horses, cattle, and sheep.

Nothing less than a social revolution, levelling all to the "uniform condition of frogs under a flagstone," will satisfy the Australian Communards. Complete confiscation of estates bigger than one-man farms, is openly and perseveringly sought. A Victorian prime minister announced that it was the mission of his Government to "check the baneful operation of those odious laws which make some men poor and other men rich." The Victorian Government is indeed little but a great organization for out-door relief to its rowdy supporters. Its chief employment is in laying heavy taxes on its opponents, to build useless railways, and bribe with subsidies those numerous constituencies which are too mean to pay for their own local roads, bridges, and schools. Self-government there is nothing but self-indulgence by the rabble, at the expense of the better inhabitants and the rest of the Empire. The revenue (say rather the poor-fund and bribe-fund), is made to look like the big revenue of a flourishing country, by reckless borrowing and by squandering of those Crown lands, which the Whig Parliament of 1856, with equally disgraceful recklessness, entrusted to the Colo-

nial Assembly. The handful of persons who happen to be already in Victoria, grab for themselves the sole and exclusive benefit of lands which are the heritage of the whole British race. They give not a penny of the money for the promotion of emigration from overcrowded England, the very purpose for which the Crown lands were given to them in trust. They have fixedly set themselves against increase of the population of their land of milk and honey, fiercely determined to keep all its good things to their own greedy and dishonest selves. Not content with these stolen gains, they, and with them other Australasian rabbles, have tried to force up the rate of wages by protective tariffs, and are impudent enough to avow the additional purpose of thereby rendering themselves independent of external supplies. The popular cry in Melbourne, "Why let foreigners swamp our markets?" will bear testimony to the truth of the accusation. And so will the only scientific sentence in Mr. Mill's "Political Economy" which the Victorian Assembly hears with patience. "The only case in which on mere principles of political economy, protecting duties can be defensible, is when they are imposed temporarily (especially in a young and rising nation), in hopes of naturalizing a foreign industry, in itself perfectly suitable to the circumstances of the country." Observe the words "nation" and "foreign" in the only argument of protectors who deign to reason. When this policy was resisted by the Upper House, an official person named Higginbottom, aided and abetted by the other ministers, burst out

into violent contempt and open outrage of the constitution which the British Queen and Parliament had established. He levied the proposed taxes on his own authority, insulted the judges who protected the rights of Her Majesty's subjects, arrogantly set aside their judgments by his own illegal interference, and made a stupid and slavish Governor refuse to sign warrants issued by the supreme Court. This extraordinary and audacious animal was indeed a fitting mouthpiece for an Assembly of sharp practisers, public spongers, bankrupts, and brothel-keepers, elected to be vessels of the popular wrath against the taxpayers represented by the Upper House. The Upper House, however, fought for and saved the constitution, and the infamous proposal to reward Sir Charles Darling for violating the constitution was gallantly rejected, in the face of threats and actual danger from the brutal mob of Melbourne. This courageous resistance, and the lash of English censure, have since led to some improvement, and the Higginbottom no longer roars from the Treasury benches. But he is still powerful, and lately denounced British supervision as "interference by a foreign power," in the midst of the approving Assembly. Sir C. G. Duffy, the succeeding Prime Minister, has written the same thing in more guarded language. And above all, the protective duties are still at work to build up an independent Victorian nation. New South Wales is not so bad as her big sister, but she also has a restless rabble, ready to aspire to independent national exist-

ence, and the other Australian colonies show signs of following in her wake. In Southern Africa, a half-Dutch half-Radical antipathy to British control has been openly expressed, since the introduction of responsible government. In Canada very few politicians would express any desire for the continuance of connection with England, if they were not afraid of inability to stand alone. The benefit of the connection goes altogether to Canada, and the burden altogether to England. Canada supplies nothing which cannot be got elsewhere, at least as cheaply; buys no great quantity of English goods, and takes in no great number of English emigrants. In return for these nothings, she gets entire exemption from diplomatic expenses, and almost entire exemption from military and naval expenses. Nevertheless, the dominant party is too ambitious to be satisfied under the present shadow of subordination. A powerful section favours annexation to the United States. A more powerful section openly or covertly is preparing for independence. As the *Standard* ingeniously hints, the new motto, "Canada First," really involves "England nowhere." If proof is wanted, the recent negotiations with the Yankees will supply it in abundance. Any one who has conversed with many Canadians, and made a practice of reading Canadian newspapers, can see that the people of the Dominion are already more Yankee than British. They have formally adopted the Yankee currency, and their speech is so full of Yankee phrases and idioms, as to show that they look at most things

through Yankee spectacles from a Yankee point of view. I believe with Sir A. T. Galt that the proposal of a British Federation comes too late for Canada. And I confess that I am not at all sorry. She would necessitate such an addition of colonial members to the Federal Legislature, as would frighten jealous Englishmen into rejection of the entire proposal. She is a child too big and wilful for paternal amendment of her evil republican ways, and the elevating effect of the indirect influences of British connection is far too slight to justify an enormous sacrifice of British imperial efficiency. While she remains nominally a part of the British Empire, she is the pledge of its thralldom to her insolent neighbour. The rowdy Republic is formidable to England, only because England is trammelled by the fear of bringing a Butler or a Sherman to acquaint helpless Canadians with the horrors of American warfare. She is now thoroughly tired of being sauced, fleeced, and kicked by Yankee bullies, and ought to hail with rapture the prospect of deliverance from the source of her weakness and humiliation. When liberated, she may obtain compensation for the loss of Canada by taking more manageable territory in warmer latitudes. Newfoundland, moreover, need not follow Continental Canada, and British Columbia is so far separated from the populous parts of the United States, as to be nearly equally secure from attack. It is indeed already part of the Dominion. But it is so disaffected that severance would be welcomed by its own people, and could not well be prevented by the

other provinces. These last would then be at liberty to secure a quiet life by forming themselves into the Canadian Republic.

But a happier fate is possible for the other English colonies. Their connection with England adds in no way to the dangers of either party, and federation would make each a sure source of strength to the other. At present, nearly all the military and naval expenses of the Empire, leaving out of sight those specially belonging to India, are defrayed by England alone, and the colonies are consequently exposed to the very real dangers of having their rights and interests sacrificed to the bold demands of some aggressive foreign state, or of being left unprotected against barbarous neighbours, by ungenerous economists in the House of Commons. Federation would immediately give relief to England, and security to every one of the now endangered colonies. Under the benign influence of political union, many unpleasant characteristics of Australasia and South Africa would gradually soften and disappear. Local feeling, instead of developing into national feeling, would never be more than the patriotism of Scotland now is, a merely graceful and picturesque sentiment, giving warmth to poetry and zest to friendly emulation. Capacity of full-fledged patriotism will have nobler and more enlightened exercise than any mere love of Australia or South Africa could furnish, in proud love of the empire on which the sun never sets. The current of colonial ambition would be changed by access to the splendid dignities of the

federal legislature and emoluments of the federal ministry. The character of colonial politicians would be elevated by translation of the ablest to work in a higher field, in contact with men of high culture, and stainless honour, and under the influence of the traditional purity, courtesy, and self-control, which have ennobled the public life of England. A judicious bestowal of some few privy councillorships, and a more liberal distribution of the honours of the Bath, among the more prominent colonial officials, would give a seductive foretaste of the imperial grandeur which they are asked to share, and be wonderfully efficacious in facilitating the cheerful acceptance of the federal state of existence by the ambitious Anglo-Saxons of the southern hemisphere. The recipients may not be worthy of their honours, but the greatness of the occasion will vindicate the English Ministry from the charge of making its rewards too cheap.

"Some kinds of baseness  
Are nobly undergone, and most poor matters  
Point to rich ends."

England must stoop to conquer. If she continues to grasp too long at the form of supremacy, she must soon lose the substance. She must descend from her solitary position of formal sovereignty, to preserve her real greatness, as leading member of a joint and undivided family of sovereigns, all controlling a huge common estate. The younger members, now ready to fret under a sense of constraint and inferiority, would then cheerfully yield precedence to the elder sister,



with whom they are formally equal, and she, while continually dwindling in her own material greatness, would continue strong with all the strength of a wider organic unity, growing greater and greater from year to year. When no longer entitled to a majority of the central legislature, she would still rule indirectly through new English communities, moulded after her own likeness by long reverent submission to her mental influence. Their growing life would be trained to take the forms of solid British culture, in conformity with the standard of British morals, in harmony with the refined social and political institutions of the British Islands. Such healthy organic outgrowths, filially receptive of influences generated at the centre, would invest England with tremendous physical weight in the counsels of Europe, and be vigorous cooperating factors in the Anglification of the world, not as they now threaten to be elements of strength to the Philistine opposition. Their increase would be just as good as increase of the area of England itself. They would keep the Yankees below us in quantity as well as in quality, and insure such a perennial increase of the effective man-power of the true English breed, as would, in case of need, keep the dark-skinned races in just and necessary subordination, by sheer power of bone and muscle. England would always remain their beloved metropolis ; the venerated head-quarters of British law and literature, science and social culture ; the focus of the highest form of earthly civilisation. Holding such a position in the most powerful federa-

tion of countries on the face of the globe, she would inevitably reach a still higher position in the time of the unity of man and the "Federation of the World." She would be the necessary seat of the "Parliament of Man," the administrative centre of the earth, the fountain-head of all authority. And she would also be the great University of the nations; the Athens as well as the Rome of the new civilisation; the centre of thought and light to which illustrious men would be irresistibly attracted from every corner of the earth, and whence their children would go forth fitted for high careers of honour and of usefulness. The features of the developed world would be moulded after English types, and English brains would guide the energies of the human race.

## CHAPTER III.

### THE PAST AND FUTURE OF INDIAN POLICY.

(C) THE supposed grateful loyalty of the Hindu peoples to their British rulers has now become one of the exploded superstitions of Indian policy. The upper classes, descended from the old military and official aristocracies, have had little cause to be grateful, and much cause to be sulky, impatient, and resentful. Among the trading classes and the new aristocracy, who have reaped pecuniary advantages under our rule, English education and acquaintance with the common ideas of Europe have engendered a quasi-patriotic dissatisfaction with the Paternal Government of men who come from England, and go back to it to be buried. Even the Parsis often forget what we have done for them, and the sharp young men whom the Indian Universities turn out in such excessive numbers, are all voluble declaimers about the rights and wrongs of the "sons of the soil." The lower classes of the towns share in the dissatisfaction of their aristocratic patrons, now no longer able to pamper and amuse, and lament their lost chances of rising in the lottery of lawlessness. Among the rural lower classes, the immense majority of the whole body

of Hindus, the English were beloved while the insecurity and cruelty from which they brought deliverance had not entirely passed out of memory, and while the reign of English improvements stood out in bright contrast with a well-remembered time when post-offices and public works were things unknown to India. Such affectionate loyalty may still be found in the newer parts of British India, in the Central Provinces, in Audh, in the Panjab. But it has utterly disappeared from those parts which have long been coloured red on the map. All men think more of present evils than of past. The universal natural tendency to deify the past under the name of the "good old times," can hardly be restrained by personal recollection of a painful state, from which the change to the present state has given evident relief. But when recollection has dwindled away into second-hand tradition, present inconveniences, which would never have been felt by the earlier generation with its inferior standard of satisfaction, attract all attention to themselves, and make loyal gratitude impossible. The effect of this unavoidable alteration of experience and circumstances will soon be aggravated by the percolation of "patriotic" notions down through the commercial to the agricultural classes of Hindu society. At present we cannot regard the general attitude of the Hindus towards us as anything better than one of indifference, and we have much cause to fear that this indifference among the many may become hostility, as the hostility of the

few becomes more impatient and more daringly active. The growth of "patriotic" dissatisfaction and indignation is natural and inevitable in the mental atmosphere of the 19th century, however slight may be the available basis of facts and reasons for the stronger feeling, and even for the weaker. Only ill-informed Europeans really suppose that the British in India are coarse trampling on national feelings, and, indeed, wanton aggressors who have no right to be in the country at all. But many men, who might be expected to behave more wisely, think it fine to express a maudlin sympathy with the ambitious natives, who say that we have no business in India but to fit her inhabitants for governing themselves. Even such a man as Sir Herbert Edwardes allowed himself to be carried away by this dangerous fashion, and to speak of British management as a grievance—as "the heavy burden of an alien rule." Burden, indeed! Is it a burden to be enabled to sit, as Hindus could rarely sit before, each man under his own vine and fig-tree, none daring to make him afraid? Is it a burden to have, instead of lazy, capricious, and cruel official plunderers, English civilians who scrupulously avoid the slightest taint of corruption, and diligently dispense even-handed justice without prejudice for or against rank, or race, or creed, or colour? Is it a burden to pay less for the tolerant, paternal care of English improvers than they yielded formerly, and but for English intervention would have been yielding still, to organized legal gang-robbery by Muslim bigots

and Mahratta Vandals? Is it a burden to be secured against drought and famine by railways and irrigation ~~A~~works which they never could or would have made for themselves? Is it a burden to be awakened out of their mental stagnation by quickening contact with the advanced culture and progressive tendencies of Western Europe, and to experience the beginnings of moral regeneration through experience of English energy, truthfulness, and devotion to duty? Truly, they get far more than they pay! The conquest of India was the result not of British but of native aggressions. We had an excellent reason for beginning to hold Indian soil, in the need of fortified factories for that great trade which has been so beneficial to India herself and to the world. There was no foregoing purpose of conquest, and the East India Company was to its end consistently opposed to acquisition of territory. So lately as 1852, when permitting the Marquis of Dalhousie to annex Pegu, the Directors wrote that they regarded all such acquisitions as misfortunes. English statesmen and English public opinion, so far as it then existed, were nearly all on the same side, influenced partly by pedantic notions about "liberty" and "national rights," and partly by a standard sophism about the mischievous results of extending the Roman Empire. That pompous phrase-monger, the younger Pitt, declared, with characteristic parade of virtuous moderation, that he could never forgive Mr. Hastings for having added so much to His Majesty's dominions. As yet India

owes nothing to Englishmen in England. The Company looked on her with a purely commercial eye, and statesmen—Whig and Tory alike—meddled with her only to obstruct the beneficial operations carried on by Englishmen resident in the East. But the irrepressible turbulence and treachery of the native chiefs and freebooters compelled the adoption of a policy of conquest as the only efficient means of self-defence. It was impossible for the English settlers to go on letting those alone who would never let them alone. Mere defensive operations and retributive inroads brought only temporary relief, and security was soon seen to be impossible, until the districts around the seats of trade, at least, were placed practically under English government. Clive first, and then Warren Hastings, saw and acted in accordance with this necessity, and made Bengal and the Carnatic virtually British. The keener and more comprehensive mind of the Marquis of Wellesley came to perceive, in the light of continual wars and worries, that Bengal and Madras were interested in and affected by every part of India, and that they could never be sure of peace and safety except under the domination of one paramount power, able and willing to forbid the firing of a shot between the Indus and the Bramhaputra—between Cape Komorin and the Himalayas. The East India Company alone could become such a power, and Wellesley accordingly played his “great game” by crushing its most powerful enemies, doubling its territories, making it protector and controller of the

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Great Mogul with all the decaying but revivable rights and powers attached to his theoretical supremacy, and binding most of the inferior princes to an acknowledgment of the Company's superiority by entering into subsidiary alliances, and maintaining troops under British officers. The execution in great part of his scheme of pacification and political arrangement, was the beginning of a new era in Indian history. Order took the place of chaos. Boundaries were for the first time fixed by an authority which could preserve them. The great robbers were confirmed in possession of the lands which they happened to have at the time, but forced to abstain from further seizures. In deference to the obstructive "cheese-mongers of Leadenhall Street," the "glorious little man" and his coadjutors sought to work as much as possible by native means, and under native forms, and hence till the time of Bentinck internal improvements were neglected or obstructed. The Persian language was retained in public business, with other hindrances to justice and screens for corruption in low places. Very scanty provision for education was made, and Christianity was systematically discouraged. Native dynasties were maintained, in spite of strong provocation to dethronement. Their more modern advocates, however, forget, in quoting the opinions of Metcalfe, Elphinstone, and other eminent men of the same school, that these statesmen wished to maintain native princes as mere puppets, and showed their opinion of native states by seizing every opportunity



of placing them under British administration. Their notions were mightily different from the notions then and now popular in England. And so were the notions of every one who came out from England and learned to know the real character of native rule.

Governor after governor was sent out, primed with the principles of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas's "beautiful theory" of non-interference. But the native princes themselves were the most efficient of possible agents in converting His Excellency to disbelief in the sanctity of their rights to torture and plunder without stint among their wretched subjects. The incorrigible perfidy and lawlessness of heathen savages so ignorant of duty and steeped in gross self-indulgence, soon wrought a change in the most Whiggish and humanitarian of English minds. Lord Northbrook has only gone in the way of almost every one of his predecessors. He went out a disciple of Dundas, but in three years he has annexed the Garo Hills, deposed the Gaikwar, and instituted a secret investigation into the state of those territories whose blood is sucked by His Highness the Nizam, the biggest bug of all the princely vermin. Lord Wellesley had not been permitted to finish the execution of his plans, and accordingly his successors were forced to go on fighting and annexing. Lord Minto, Lord Hastings, and Lord Amherst, each crushed some of the Company's enemies and added something to its territories. Even Lord William Bentinck swerved so far from the policy of "wise moderation,"

as to annex Kurg and Kachar. Lord Auckland first saw the need of treating Afghanistan as part of India, but his bad management of our dealings with it has caused such a panic of disgust that strong arguments must be frequently and vigorously stated before Englishmen will be induced to resume his thoroughly sound-principled policy. The eccentric Earl of Ellenborough refused to annex Gwalior after great provocation, but was guilty of a "very humane and advantageous piece of rascality" in annexing Sind without any real provocation at all. Soon afterwards came a successor worthier of Wellesley's seat than any who had come before—the great Marquis of Dalhousie. He so far went beyond the plans of his exemplar, as to strive not merely for assured British supremacy but for sole sovereignty of Indian soil. Sikh and Birmese aggressions compelled productive wars, and an end was thus made of all possibility of resistance to the British Power between China and the Soliman Mountains. The Right of Lapse, exercised by every strong native feudal superior from Rama to Ranjit Sing, was called out of desuetude on behalf of the paramount power of all India. Wherever it was exercised, moreover, specific concurrent circumstances furnished additional excuses for interference, and greatly strengthened the hands of the bold Governor-general. The Raja of Sattara two hours before his death tried to keep his benefice from reverting to the British superior, by adopting the first brat whom his servants could catch in the streets. The Raja of

Berar was the first of his line, and as he died without either natural or adopted children, was also the last. The kingdom of Audh was taken from its ruler during his life by a similar exercise of paramount authority, because the cry of his oppressed people went up to heaven, for relief from long-drawn misery unsurpassed at any time even in Southern Asia. The British districts bordering on the Nawab Vazir's territory, were the most densely peopled in all India, some of them with 1000 persons to each square mile, by reason of the emigration of such of the Nawab's subjects as could no longer endure a régime of unslackening plunder, murder, and torture. Just so at this moment British Birma is draining away the subjects of Ava. Of course Lord Dalhousie's beneficent subversions infuriated the vampire-families whom he reduced to peace and brought under control of law, and their machinations combining with the superstitious alarms excited by his grand educational and other internal improvements, culminated in a mutiny after his strong hand had been removed from the helm of state. The agents of the Hindu magnates, and their sentimental sympathisers in England, made use of this sad mishap to persuade the mass of English public men into a belief that India's second great benefactor was merely an ambitious and unscrupulous tyrant, whose policy had aroused a just patriotic indignation in the whole "Hindu nation." But Mr. Marshman and the Duke of Argyll have keenly exposed the quibblings, exaggerations, and evasions of

the advocates of native despotisms, and since the waning of the mutiny-panic Englishmen have become willing to see the inapplicability of the high-flown "international" morality, which is still the Indian creed fashionable in many political high places. The "reign of terror," admitted as existing in the Panjab and Audh, was in Lord Dalhousie's time, almost everywhere prevalent in the native states, and is still characteristic of the majority. One-half, two-thirds, sometimes three-fourths of the produce of the soil are torn from the cultivators, to be squandered chiefly on gaudy temples and palaces peopled with herds of concubines and buffoons. What the prince can spare from his superstition and sensuality, he spends in part-payment of a huge army, kept up formerly for plundering aggressions, and now to flatter its sovereign's silly vanity. It never gets more than a small fraction of the stipulated pay, and gets settlement of ever-recurring arrears, by being turned loose on some district with permission to pay itself or amuse itself, as it chooses. Nothing more than a pretence of civil government exists, and the so-called civil officers are allowed to pay themselves by squeezing the people over again on their own account, by any means which they may choose to employ. The British provinces are the only ones where the revenue is what the Government needs for public purposes, not what a prince can squeeze out of his subjects for his own private purposes, where the army is not a mere gang of robbers in uniform, and where policemen are not

mere licensed torturers, where justice is not an article of commerce, and where, indeed, the Government is anything better than an engine of extortion. Whatever is or has been good in a native Government, has been due to British restraint and supervision. "Nagpur was as rich as a garden," says one enthusiast. Yet that wicked Lord Dalhousie annexed it ! There was some foundation for such a description when the country was administered by Mr. Jenkins. But under the subsequently restored native management it was so disgracefully abused that Major Wilkinson and Mr. Mansell, the two last Residents, though they both opposed annexation, confessed that it was actually desired by the great majority of the inhabitants. The Hindus are "unanimous in preferring native princes," says another assailant\* of the great marquis. Perhaps some of them, who have been born British subjects, think that they have such a preference. But few Hindus ever thought so when they had native princes, and none ever offered the slightest resistance to the dethronement of these supposed popular darlings. Not even looks or murmurs of dissatisfaction were ever perceptible outside of the predatory classes. "The Hindu peasant has a patriotic affection for his native village." True, and that affection was never interfered with by the change of sovereignty, except in the way of increase, through the increased comfort and security of village-life. But

\* *Westminster Review*, Jan. 1863.

he has no such affection for anything wider than his village, is not offended when the British rule takes the place of a comparatively mild native dynasty, and is positively anxious to escape from native rule as experienced under such princes as the present Gaikwar. The village-communities were and are the only native political institutions in India which deserve the name of Governments, and these municipalities have been scrupulously respected under British sovereignty. The village-officials are the only officers in native states who actually discharge duties and regard themselves as having responsibilities. It has been said that "native rulers keep order cheaply," and much has been made of the fact that the Raja of Sattara had always a surplus, while after annexation, the revenue was found insufficient. Doubtless it is very easy to sell cheaply when you give very short measure, and every one who knows the history and character of the Marattas can form a shrewd guess of the kind of "order" kept in Sattara. The only real civil officials discharging real functions were the village-watchmen and other locally-paid officers, with whom the Raja had nothing to do, and who cost nothing to the general treasury. That existed merely to supply the Raja's pocket-money. Much is said about the villany of assailing "independence" and "national character," but most by those who know least about Asiatic peoples. The opinion of the man who is most intimately acquainted with Asiatic nature stands in startling and instructive contrast

with these declamations. Vambéry\* says, "Sentimental newspaper writers in their political rhapsodies may yet for a long time take under their protection the feelings of independence of many a savage Asiatic tribe, to whom freedom means nothing more than anarchy, plunder, and murder. But the dreams of Rousseau have had their day, and we can with the fullest confidence say that whenever Europe shows herself in the East, whether in the peaceful garb of the missionary, or in the terrible panoply of her war-like power, she brings only blessings in her train and scatters the seeds of a new order of things." But the Indian princes are not even independent, and their subjects have nothing even resembling national character, except in the Rajput principalities. The princes are mere creatures of British compassion, descendants of the successful robbers who happened to be last in possession when all India lay at the feet of Lord Hastings, and were therefore confirmed in their powers and dignities when the great pacification was arranged. All owe their seats to British forbearance from just vengeance, or British support against rebels and hostile neighbours, and few could hold together their bundles of territories for so much as six months, if the British garri-sons and guarantee were withdrawn from their capitals. They are makeshift-puppets who have no hold on the industrious classes. In many states, and those the

\* *Fortnightly Review*, May, 1867.

largest, they are just as much aliens as Englishmen would be. The Tartar Nizam, with the help of some thousands of miscellaneous Muslim vagabonds, rules over ten or twelve millions of subjects, almost all of whom are Hindus by religion as well as birth. Sindia, Holkar, and the Gaikwar are Marattas, whose subjects are for the most part haughty Rajputs. The ruler of Audh was a Mahometan among high-caste Hindus; the ruler of Kashmir is a Rajput among fanatical Mahometans. The native states moreover lack many other elements of permanence and of "nationality." Most of them are not real ethnological or old historic divisions of the country, but mere arbitrary shares of plunder, acquired not more than three or four generations ago. The Nizam's subjects are not one people, but four by separate language, and three at least by separate locality. A million or more of Kannadis in the S.W. corner, Marattas and Telugus separately occupying the west and the east in nearly equal numbers, and over all a Mahometan military aristocracy straggling through the country from its head-quarters at Haiderabad. Sindia's dominions are a magnified county of Cromarty, a number of *disjecta membra* bound together only by common subjection, and each peopled by inhabitants quite different from those of every other. Holkar's are nearly as disjointed and diverse, and the Gaikwar's, though territorially more compact, are ethnologically quite as jumbled. What claim have such monstrosities as these to the name and dignity of a nation? And how absurd the statement



that Lord Dalhousie's threatening treatment of such political rubbish was the cause of a great burst of moral indignation and deadly suspicion among all the inhabitants of India, and consequently the cause of the terrible mutiny! Hindus were far too familiar with high-handed confiscation and resumption as ordinary acts of State, to be capable of indignation at Lord Dalhousie's acts, and of supposing them proofs or portents of the decay of British good faith. They saw that what virtuously indignant Englishmen were pleased to call "stealing," did not involve that deprivation of the means of comfortable living, which ignorant sympathetic Englishmen imagined as one of the woes of the deposed families. And seeing that, they did not think the British Government a monster of cruelty for taking away the right of property in government which those families imagined that they possessed. The notion of such a right is not startling in India; but one is startled at hearing it tacitly assumed by sentimental Radicals in England, when prating about nationality and the wrongs of natives. One might have thought that the most antiquated Conservative had got beyond it. Outram was a follower of Metcalfe and Elphinstone, but he did not share the wilful blindness of those who make use of his name in regard to the policy which he deprecated and they denounce. "What can be more ridiculous," he wrote,\* "than the notion that the annexation of Audh caused the mutiny." Is it reasonable to suppose

\* Kaye's History of the Sepoy War. II. 36.

that the inhabitants of the British provinces cared a jot about sovereigns whom they never saw, who stood in no relation to them, and whose weal or woe could not affect them in the slightest degree? Such of them as could remember native rule would rejoice at the annexations for the sake of their fellows, if they were capable of so extended a sympathy. Assuredly they could feel no indignation. And what did the Hindu people of Audh care for a Mahometan Nawab, who outraged both their persons and their religion? They showed what they cared by remaining quiet even when the mutinous army had complete command of the kingdom. The robber-barons and the men of the robber-villages indeed joined the rebels, but they got no help or sympathy from the mass of the people. And so it was throughout the field of the war. The predatory classes of course went with the mutineers, but everywhere the respectable classes remained loyal. In South Behar there was an apparent popular rising, because Koer Sing an influential Rajput chief had reduced himself to bankruptcy, and could make his position no worse by fishing in troubled waters. But in North Behar there were no insolvent but influential warriors, and consequently not the slightest disturbance took place, though not a single European remained in it to keep up the British flag. Only in an indirect way was the mutiny at all caused by Lord Dalhousie's rough dealings with native royal families. Those families were so enraged that they assiduously and insidiously set themselves to poison the minds of the Sepoys against their rulers, by

working on their superstitious feelings. The new policy of encouraging education and Christianity, the diabolic telegraph, the caste-assailing railway, were so new that they were easily made to appear dreadful indications of a secret design to destroy the Hindu religion and social institutions. The cunning story of the greased cartridges soon gave definiteness to the vague superstitious alarms previously excited, and the Bengal army ran frightened into mutiny to escape damnation. Other things quite separate from the Governor-General's policy had, however, rendered the work of the poisoners easier. The wretched system of connecting officers with their regiments in a loose and discontinuous way, and allowing them to live in ignorance of their men's language and customs, prevented any community of feeling, and rendered the officers unable either to understand or to influence the thoughts and feelings of their native fellow-soldiers. And preceding Governors had so demoralized the troops on the one hand by fits of provoking niggardliness, and on the other hand by weak pampering of unsoldierly social and religious customs, and by irresolute treatment of insubordination, that mutinous feelings were kept in check neither by gratitude nor by awe.

To say that British India was saved by the goodness of the native princes to us in our hour of need, is even more absurd than to say that it was endangered by our wickedness to them in the day of our power. India was saved by Havelock, Nicholson, and the

Lawrences. None of the larger states gave any help till the speedy suppression of the mutiny appeared certain, and some of them permitted or could not forbid their troops to join the mutineers in the British provinces. Sindia with difficulty kept half of his army in a state of neutrality, and like Holkar, the Nizam, the Raja of Bagelkand, and several of the Western Rajput chiefs, he "stuck on the fence" for a considerable time, before finally accepting the advice of his prudent minister. That he and others saved us from some trouble by abstaining from actual hostility, is indeed, quite true, but no ground for effusive gratitude. The consequent greater length and costliness of the war would have been amply compensated by the great acquisitions of profitable new territory. They were merely shrewd enough to see that the British would not be beaten. That they are at present safeguards against another mutiny is another opinion based on very slender grounds. History and Hindu nature make it improbable that their professed friendship is sincere, and the Mutiny showed that whether sincere or not it was nearly useless. If Gwalior had been annexed in 1843 by the Earl of Ellenborough, it could not have been any more a source of weakness and danger than it actually was under Sindia's rule, and if it and other principalities were turned into British provinces to morrow, not an atom of military advantage would be lost. The native princes and their armies would assuredly go over to the enemy after the first serious British defeat in any mortal struggle. That their

states are useful safety-valves for the dangerously ambitious and turbulent classes and individuals in all India is also a very questionable statement. They cannot gratify turbulence and ambition in open war, because war is forbidden by the Paramount Power, and gang-robbery of peaceful traders and peasants is the only other resource. A "safety-valve" at such a cost cannot seem desirable to any one who really cares for India's welfare. Nor are they as territories much more useful as peaceful fields for the exercise of the more useful talents of ambitious natives. In the first place, the important offices to be filled are few in number, very few indeed in comparison with the ambitious persons among 25,000,000 of Hindus. They can therefore be of little use to the numerous aspiring inhabitants of the British provinces, who complain that they are shut out from the gratification of their legitimate desires. In the second place, administrative and judicial abilities are not the qualities which enable men to obtain such offices. On the contrary, ingenious flatterers and successful caterers to royal vanity and sensuality are generally the favoured competitors. A really good native minister seldom gets his post, and never holds it, except by the authoritative interference of the British Resident. In the third place we can safely and beneficially employ native talents in important offices under the British Crown. There is no reason for sticking in practice, as we do still, to the irritating and disloyalty-breeding policy of exclusion inaugurated by Lord Cornwallis. The Covenanted

Civil Service is theoretically open to natives, but is practically closed to all but a very small class. If, as some advise, the competition should be held in Calcutta, the Service would be inundated with low-caste townsmen, who have none of the virtues of the English middle classes, and no benefit would be conferred on the Hindu landed gentry, the class whose goodwill is most important to us, and whose services would be most trustworthy and efficient. A rule of Feringhis is more tolerable to them than a rule of Bengalis. They are too proud, and perhaps too indolent and prejudiced against English learning, to get much benefit from open competition. The Indian Government ought, therefore, to offer special inducements and make special arrangements to suit their peculiar circumstances. It would do well in setting up an English school in India, specially for the sons of Audh Talukdars, Panjabi Sirdars, and others of the same rank, and in setting apart four or five Civil appointments annually for the most promising pupils at this aristocratic seminary. It would do still better in similarly setting apart four or five Woolwich cadetships, and 15 or 20 other appointments to commissions in the Queen's army. The ability and ambition of the Sikhs, Muslims, and Rajputs are almost entirely military, and to lay open an honourable military career would do far more than any bestowal of civil offices to conciliate those who are now the most dangerous, and may be made the most useful of the inhabitants. At present the natives are entirely excluded from military honours.


No native can rise to a position equal to that of the English officer, ~~cannot~~ be a field officer even nominally, or can in dignity and emolument be really a commissioned officer at all. That is one of the great blots of our rule, and the removal of it would do more to confirm our hold of India than any amount of tenderness to obscene superstitions and mushroom dynasties of plunderers and blunderers. The native aristocracy would eagerly come forward to don the uniform of the British Queen, and warm attachment would soon grow up in place of sullen mortification. English education and association with Englishmen would strengthen and refine the rude sense of honour generally found in the warlike north-west, and having more to lose than the rebels in 1857, their fidelity would be secured by their prudence, if higher influences should be insufficient. In foreign service in other parts of Asia and Africa, their character would be entirely beyond suspicion. Most certainly more can be done easily, can be done safely, and ought, if we wish to keep India without keeping her people dissatisfied, to be done quickly, in order to show that our profession of admitting them to the public service of their country is not a mere mocking pretence. There is no reason why we should not have a Sikh or Rajput General of Division, K.C.B., in the course of another generation, and a good beginning of the new era would be made by making the Maharaja Dhulip Sing the next Governor of Madras or Bombay.

So much for the main arguments of those who ad-

vocate the maintenance of native states. One only remains for statement, not for discussion ; for it is simply diabolical. We ought, it is said, to keep up native states that our subjects may remain contented with our rule through seeing the misery of their neighbours. If we cannot keep India except by such means as that, we have, indeed, no right to be there at all.

On the other hand there are many reasons for speedy annexation. It would increase the security and diminish the burdens of the industrious classes in those states, would promote the development of natural resources, and, therefore, greatly increase the wealth of India, would facilitate works of improvement and proper administrative division of the whole country, and would introduce all the conveniences resulting to all persons concerned, from uniformity of laws and unity of authority in countries neighbouring and otherwise closely connected. The vices of native states are oppressive to their subjects, while their very existence, and still more their supposed or prospective virtues, are or will become dangerous to the tranquillity of the British provinces. At present they furnish examples of lawlessness very exciting and suggestive to turbulent and disorderly persons beyond their borders, and hereafter they may lead to disorders of a graver kind on the part of more respectable persons animated by more respectable motives. They may suggest impatience of a "foreign yoke," and will certainly become rallying-points for



the insurgents, if a strong "patriotic" feeling should burst out in open rebellion. 

Nevertheless there is no need for a flaring *coup d'etat*, such as might expose the Government of India to a great deal of abuse, and impose upon it too great a pressure of work at one time. We need not be in a hurry to get rid of the jaundice-spots which still disfigure the otherwise ruddy face of India. The patient will soon gradually and healthily become all of one colour, if the physicians do their best for him instead of pampering his disease. No tearing up of treaties is necessary, though the present Secretary of State once boldly declared\* that no treaties with Indian princes would be allowed by him to stand in the way of India's general welfare. The work can be done as effectually in a less startling manner. A gradual and insidious absorption of the functions of government is preferable to formal annexation of territory and pity-provoking dethronement of dynasties. The latter ought to be scrupulously avoided, except, perhaps, in the case of the Gaikwar, and certainly in the case of the Maharaja of Kashmir. The former will be pitied by nobody in India or even in England. The latter is a *novus homo* whose kingdom is a thing of yesterday, bought from the British with stolen money less than thirty years ago. He may think himself very well treated, indeed, if he gets back the purchase-money, for he has broken almost every

\* House of Commons, Feb. 22, 1867.

article of his treaty. He has not suffered travellers to enter his dominions except under severe restrictions, and has forbidden Europeans to remain during the six winter-months. He levies prohibitive duties on English goods sent through his dominions to Tartary. And he has persecuted and imprisoned Christian converts. It is quite intolerable that the "earthly paradise" should be left in the hands of such an obstructive. Kashmīr is the best place in the whole world for English settlers and cantonments of English troops, and British possession of it is necessary for the full efficiency of British rule in India. A few purchases of parts of other states are also desirable. Of the outlying parts of Gwalior and Indūr with some portions of neighbouring small principalities, in order to form with Ajmīr, Jhānsī, Sāgor, and Damo, a new province of British Mālwa, splitting up the great compact yellow blot in the N.W. corner of the map of India. Of long narrow lines of Telugu country separating it from the countries of the Marattas and Kannadis, running through the heart of the Nizam's big compact state and splitting it into three ethnological divisions. The Nizam is so big that he cannot be let alone like smaller princes. He is already coming to occupy the place of the Great Mogul in the eyes of Indian Muslims, and has a most dangerous power of preparing and organizing a great Holy War against the rich Infidels of Madras and Bombay. His territory alone in India is large enough and compact enough to have the appearance

*of a really important state, deserving the dignity and independence which belong to a nation. If a general "patriotic" feeling should rise in India, all eyes would undoubtedly be turned to him as to the future Emperor of India. We ought, therefore, to take immediate steps to prevent him from consolidating his power, and welding his peoples into a large nation united by habits of connection and by common loyalty to the highest native sovereign in India. We can best do so by cutting off two or more considerable parts of his state and erecting them into independent states for younger members of his family. No treaty can be quoted against that. From Maisūr a large slice of territory may be cut off without payment, in virtue of acknowledged rights. In announcing that he had ratified the late Raja's act of adoption, the Marquis of Salisbury strongly hinted that the young Raja would get only a part of the kingdom. There is nothing to hinder the immediate determination of that part. Maisūr is bound to pay a tribute of £245,000 per annum, and we can without shocking anybody take enough land to yield that sum after payment of the local expenses of civil government. As the total revenue, remaining after payment of such expenses, does not exceed £400,000, we have an immediate right to annex two-thirds of Maisūr. The young Maharaja would then become ruler of a state somewhat bigger than Travankūr. Quite as much as will be good for him!*

The remaining native territories will not need to

*be improved in so summary a manner. First of all, larger powers ought to be given to the Resident to check cruelty and extortion. Then ought to follow a gradual assumption or limitation of the powers of the native governments, somewhat in the following manner. (1) They ought to be compelled to disband their armies and keep thenceforward no more than one or two hundreds of guards. (2) A moderate Civil List ought to be fixed, and the public accounts ought to be regularly submitted to inspection by the Resident. (3) Every native sovereign on accession ought to be made to do homage to Her Majesty, and to receive investiture from Her Majesty's Viceroy or one of his lieutenants. (4) He ought to be compelled to establish and support English schools under the control of the Resident. (5) His officers and Courts ought to be liable to trial and punishment by the nearest English High Court, if guilty of inflicting torture or mutilation, and no sentence of death passed by him or any of his officers ought to be executed without reference to and approval by that same High Court. (6) He ought to be compelled to introduce the British Indian Codes as law within his dominions.*

In that way the semi-independent native princes would soon be brought down to the pompous impotence of the once greater Nawab of Bengal, and in the course of a generation or two, the native states would gradually be assimilated to, and at length entirely fused with the British provinces to which they

would be attached. For it would be advisable, as a step in the process of degradation, to place them under the Lieutenant-Governors of those British districts with which they are connected by geographical proximity or community of language, instead of under the immediate supervision of the Viceroy himself. Such natural connection would not, however, be possible without a complete recasting of the present British local governments, and a considerable increase in their number. The purchases already mentioned would enable us to make with ease the necessary renovation of Indian political geography. The following arrangement would be politically convenient because consistent with natural divisions in race, language, history, and physical character. There would be sixteen provinces under the Viceroy, each with a Lieutenant-Governor.

1. AFGHANISTAN (including Peshāwar, Derajāt, Herāt, Kandahar) with the native states of Kabul and Kaffiristan, &c. Persian language and various Affghan dialects.

2. PANJAB (including Kashmīr, but *minus* Delhi, the Derajāt, and Peshāwar) ; with Bhāwalpur, Patialā, the Sikh States, the Hill States, &c. Hindi, Panjabi, and Kashmiri languages.

3. SIND, with the native states of Belūchistan. Sindi and Belūchi languages.

4. GUJERAT (including Surat, and probably Baroda), with the native states of Kach, Pālanpūr, Katiwar, &c., and Baroda if not annexed. Gūjerāti language.

5. MAHARASHTRA, or the Dekkan (including Berar, Nagpūr, Khandésh, Nassik, Ahmednagar, Pūna, Sat-tāra, Kaladghī, Sholapur, and the Konkans), with the Southern Maratta Jaghīrs, the Sattara Jaghīrs, Sawant Wari, Kolapur, Jinjira, and the Maratta portion of what are now the Nizam's dominions, then a separate state under the name of Aurangabad. Marathi language.

6. KARNATA (including the annexed parts of Maisūr, the present Bombay Zillahs of North Kanara, Belgām and Dhārwar, the present Madras Zillahs of South Kanara and Malabar, and part of Bellāri), with Travankur, Kochin, Maisūr, and the Kannadi portion of what are now the Nizam's dominions, then a separate state under the name of Raichūr. Kannadi (Canarese) and Malayālim languages.

7. DRAVIDA (including the rest of the Madras Presidency south of Nellūr and Kadapa), with the native state of Pūdūkotta. Tamil language.

8. TELINGANA (including Nellūr, Kadapa, Karnūl, the Telugu part of Bellāri, and the Northern Sarkars, except the Uriya part of Ganjām, also the Godavari district in the Central Provinces, the Telugu portion of Chanda, and the Telugu districts purchased from the Nizam), with the native states of Haiderabad, Jāipūr, Bastar, Banganapilli, &c. Telugu language.

9. GONDWANA (including the Chattisgarh, Narbada, and Jabalpūr divisions of the Central Provinces, *minus* Sāgor and Damo, the Bengal province of Chota Nagpūr, and the northern hilly parts of Nagpūr), with

Bāgelkand, the western Orissa States, and the states of the Bengal south-west frontier. Hindi and Gond languages.

10. MALWA (including purchased portions of Sindia's dominions, Holkar's dominions, and small neighbouring states around Ujain, Agar, Bhilsa, Nimach, &c., also the present British districts of Ajmīr, Jhānsī, Lal-latpūr, Sāgor, and Damo), with Gwālīor, Indūr, Dhār, Bhopāl, Tonk, Jhalawar, Omatwarra, Alirajpūr, Jabūa, Banswarra, Dongarpūr, and all Rajpūtāna. Hindi and Marwāri languages.

11. ROHILKAND (including north-west provinces of Rohilkand, Mīrat, Agra and Kamaun, and the Panjab Province of Delhi), with the native states of Bhartpūr, Alwar, Dholpūr, Rampūr, &c. Hindustani or Hindi language.

12. AUDH (including Audh, the north-west province of Allahabad, most of Benares, and the district of Jalaun), with Bandelkand. Hindustani or Hindi language.

13. BEHAR (including the Bengal province of Patna, the Bengal Zillahs of Bhagalpūr and Monghīr, and parts of the north-west districts of Gorakpūr, Ghazipūr, Benāres, and Mirzapūr), with Nepāl. Hindustani and Braj Bhakha languages.

14. BENAAL (including the rest of what is now called Bengal, except Kachār), with the eastern Orissa States. Bengali and Hindustani languages.

15. ASSAM (including Assām and Kachār, and perhaps some purchased parts of northern Birma lying in

the way to China), with Bhotan, Manipūr, &c. As-sami language.

16. BIRMA, with the native states of Ava and Siam. Mon and other rude dialects of Eastern India.

By this new and really logical and systematic division of India, for purposes of local government, the cure of our great vice of British Indian administration would moreover be greatly facilitated and indeed compelled. The constant change of locality and function is a grave hindrance to the efficiency of public officers. The proposed division of the civil service into a Revenue Branch and a Judicial Branch, will be only a small step in advance. It will not affect the junior officials in any way, and will do little or nothing to give to even the senior officials that long and intimate acquaintance with the people, customs, and language of some particular district, which is necessary to make a thoroughly intelligent, and therefore just magistrate, collector, or judge. An official has hardly begun to know his people well and understand their peculiar customs and idioms, before he is whisked off to some district with a different language, and people of a totally different character, where he feels a perfect stranger, and has to begin again the work of learning by making blunders. An enormous waste of time and labour, and frequent miscarriages of justice, are the necessary results of this practice of transitory and desultory employment. A London police-magistrate suddenly transferred to Lancashire or Aberdeenshire, would not be very efficient during



the first year. Much less can we expect Englishmen to acquire suddenly a power of nicely appreciating evidence given in a new dialect of some Hindu language, among people whose customs are quite different from those of neighbouring zillahs. Still worse, interchanges are frequent between places having distinct languages, and even languages belonging to totally different families of speech. In this respect, the local divisions of India have been most clumsily made, made far too large, made without system, made in defiance of all radical and natural distinctions of localities. They are merely historic, mere makeshifts, based on no principles whatever. The Presidency of Madras contains four languages. These indeed are similar in vocabulary, though different in syntax and characters. But the Presidency of Bombay contains six, with four different characters, and belonging to three entirely different families. A man very often has to work in every one of them, during separate short periods of his official career. How can he work easily in any? And how absurd to have three Kannadi districts in Bombay, with the rest of which they have not the slightest natural connection, while the other Kannadi districts, and the countries where cognate languages are spoken, are nearly all in the Presidency of Madras. What natural connection have the Belūchis of Sind with the Gūjērātis and Marattas? Or Rājput̃s in Sāgor with Marattas in Nagpūr and Telugus on the Godavari? How great is the difference between Hindus at Delhi and Affghans at Pēshāwar, all in the Panjab though.

they are! The North-West Provinces are far too long and straggling for a single government. Bengal is far too big and populous, and even since the severance of Assam, far too full of diversities. Where can we find greater differences than between the Beharis and the Gonds of Chota Nagpūr, or the coast-people of Orissa? The Uriyas are, however, too few for a separate government, and must remain with the lower Bengalis, whom they so much resemble. Under the system of smaller local divisions, with only one, or at most, two distinct languages, there would probably be much greater efficiency in the performance of all public duties. The Civil Service and the Political Service would naturally fall into sixteen divisions favourable to most thorough acquisition of useful experience. Men would spend their lives among people with whose language and customs they would be closely familiar, and in dealing with whom they would therefore seldom make mistakes. Removals from a province would, or at least, ought never to take place, except for promotion to offices of the highest class, or to a post in the central administrative staff. Indeed, it would be wise to discourage transfers even from one district to another in the same province, by offering an annual increment of pay, such as is given in English public offices, to those young officials who might be willing to stay always or for many years in one district, and thus have to wait longer for promotion. Under such a system, officials would take more interest in the people of their districts, enter more into their feelings, and better under-

stand their wants. Rulers and subjects would not be so ignorant of each other as they are at present, and kindly feelings would flourish much more generally. Similarly the discipline and *morale* of the whole native army would be vastly improved by finally shutting the doors of the Staff Corps, and compelling English officers to stick to their regiments and cultivate close acquaintance with their men.

Mere improvements in matters of administrative practice will not, however, be sufficient. Attention must be given to those matters of sentiment which are day by day becoming more important. If instead of neglecting or opposing the feeling of collective life now rising in India, we try to turn it into safe channels, we may make it a powerfully agglutinative instead of an irresistibly disruptive force. Educated men must have some visible object of pride and love intermediate between families or villages and mankind. An enlightened ruler ought to supply what is needed, and we can do so for the upgrowing generation of intelligent Hindus without at all endangering the continuance of supremacy and management practically English. A national feeling such as exists in European countries will undoubtedly soon grow up in India, or in parts of it, if the natural course of events is not artificially and energetically modified. But it will be quite within the power of the British rulers to nip this national feeling in the bud, and cultivate instead of it a wholesome imperial feeling, not by violence, but by taking kindly and judicious steps to

lead and form Indian public sentiment, while it is still green and plastic. They can imbue the Hindu mind with an imperial patriotism which will have all the pleasurable and all the elevating qualities of sectional patriotism, with none of its mischievous acerbity and extravagance. A huge nation with an assured status is always more liberal and less fidgety than a small one; much more disposed to be candid, and much less prone to set a high value on petty vanities. A proud, probably fierce, affection for Bengal, the Dekkan, or the Carnatic, or even for India—if India could ever be more than a geographical expression—would be a very much less stimulating and elevating sentiment than tranquil pride in membership of the empire on which the sun never sets. But the Hindus can have no such pride, unless we quickly take steps to make them know and feel their membership as a reality, not an empty name, by freely admitting them to imperial dignities and privileges. Bring India and its provinces into a federal kingdom on a footing of formal equality with England and other fellow members. Let Her Majesty be no longer Queen of the United Kingdom *and its dependencies*, but Queen of Britain, including India as a co-equal sovereign part. Make natives of India eligible for imperial and local offices in any part of the kingdom; immediately elevate some to important positions, and specially facilitate their entrance into the more honourable departments of the Indian public service. Let India be well represented in the federal

legislature, and let Hindus have a moderate taste of the free-born Briton's proud privilege of choosing those who are to make his laws. All of these things can be done without giving a dangerous amount of power to inexperienced hands, and they cannot be done without immensely strengthening the connection between India and England. Placed thus on a familiar and fraternal footing, India would willingly look up to England for guidance, and yield that precedence and that deference which a younger may without loss of self-respect yield to an elder and wiser brother. Sectional patriotism would develop no further, but wither away under the overshadowing and displacing influence of imperial sentiments. No longer looking on Englishmen as haughty and repulsive masters, but as elder brethren, separated by no impassable gulf, the Hindus would gradually grow out of their jealousy and dislike of everything English, freely surrender themselves to English influences, and long before the time when they could hope to achieve independence by force of arms, they would have become true Britons, and Englishmen in all but the "accident of birth."

This course of making British rule tolerable and acceptable, by making ourselves and the Hindus as much as possible alike, is the only policy which will ensure the result desired by those who, perhaps thoughtlessly, utter the atrocious sentiment "India was won by the sword, and must be kept by the sword." Held in such a spirit as theirs appears to be,

our rule would necessarily be harsh, and real grievances added to sentimental grievances would drive on the Hindus through ages of sullen hatred to the inevitable revolution. India could not be held for many generations by main force if our control were thoroughly offensive to an intelligent, wealthy, and not unwarlike people, sevenfold more numerous than the inhabitants of the British Islands. Our opposition would only make the enemy rise like the Hydra, stronger after every suppression of a national rising, and we would weld the heterogeneous tribes of the country into a more dangerous homogeneous mass unified by the blows of common suffering. The public opinion of the world would cry shame on us, and if no sudden catastrophe should make an end of British India, substantial power would be lost long before formal separation. Concession after concession would be torn from our ungracious hands by physical or moral pressure, till at length the connection would be merely nominal. Every mental and physical tendency will fight against us, unless we can turn the natural forces of human feeling into bonds of willing connection, by inaugurating a policy of courtesy and conciliation, while few definitely desire independence, and fewer still expect to see it achieved.

It is also at the same time a course which will gratify the humane sympathies of those who look upon Hindu national feelings as inevitably and laudably progressing to a maturity which will render im-

possible the continuance of political connection with England. No policy could gratify them more if they really and intelligently desire the greatest ultimate happiness of the inhabitants of India. They are fond of saying that our whole duty is to fit the Hindus for the soonest possible assumption of self-government, and otherwise to let them and their country quite alone. But they will only do a most cruel kindness to their *protégés* by encouraging such opinions, with the consequent expectations. Self-government would be given not when the Hindus were fit for it, but whenever they might clamorously say that they were fit for it, if this humanitarian folly should become dominant in England. Independence, even with all the amelioration of human nature which we may expect after two or three more generations, would then bring no benefit, except the very questionable one of flattering sectional vanity; and would on the other hand bring in its train many evils from which the British Indians are now happily exempt. The country would very soon, if not immediately, be split up into many separate states, each needing a separate Court, Army, and Diplomatic Service, if not also a Navy. Great increase of taxation would thus be caused, and would be aggravated by frequent wars and revolutions such as devastate South America. Quarrels are inevitable among neighbouring young nations all drunk with the new wine of independence—at least when such tribes as Sikhs, Afghans, Rajputs, and Marattas happen to be in tempting proximity to each other and to less

warlike neighbours ; and so after all the Hindu patriots would find that they had only jumped out of what their delicately irritable vanity made them imagine to be a frying-pan, into a very real and very unmanageable fire. But if England, as is most likely, should refuse to become romantically humanitarian, those who successfully encourage the Hindus to be restless under a "foreign yoke," will be responsible for much of the bad blood which will certainly gather, and much of the good blood which will probably be spilt. For England will assuredly not give up her hold without a severe struggle—not, perhaps, without many such. She has so great a pecuniary interest in the peaceful and honest government of a country where she has invested huge sums of money, and with which she carries on a huge lucrative trade, that she would be quite justified in her own eyes if she should sternly keep what she would have held so long. She has done so much for India, that if guilty of no great harshness, she would be regarded with approval rather than censure by the outside world—at least, till rebellion should become chronic. And the rest of the world would be inclined to agree with her for another and a very strong reason—namely, the commercial and other benefits which British rule of India confers upon the world itself as a whole. For at least a considerable time, continued political and commercial disasters would certainly follow the cessation of that rule, and the interests thereby affected are quite important enough to be set against the wishes of Hin-



dustan itself. The Hindus have rights in their country, but so has mankind.

It will, therefore, be true kindness to discourage national aspirations with a firmness never degenerating into insult or violence. We must draw closer and tighter the bonds of India and England, and make evident our fixed determination to relax them never. We may do so quite kindly and courteously, though of course our conciliatory action would depend upon the submissiveness of our subjects to the proposed new conditions of political concord, and would differ radically from that unregulated and aimless indulgence of desire to make things pleasant for the moment to everybody, which is called conciliation by the humanitarians. No compromise ought to be made with those who obstinately prefer independence to federation. They ought to be regarded as traitors. But every precaution ought to be taken to prevent natives from being deluded or irritated into treason. The patient ought to be guarded watchfully against deleterious influence that the curative treatment may not be counteracted. For these purposes it will be necessary to curtail the present unbounded license of the Indian Press. It is essential to repress with equal sternness, on the one hand all the "damned nigger" style of writing, all the indiscriminating scorn and abuse of natives as a class, which provokes them to retaliation and excites fierce longing to reach a position of equality with, independence of, or superiority to the strong and insolent Englishman ; on the other hand

all insidious disloyalty, all sneers at Englishmen as a class or as foreigners, and at foreign or paternal government, all expressions of hopes of independence or preference of native government, and everything intended to cause dissatisfaction, not with particular men or public acts, but with the Government of India as a whole. Similar rigorous restrictions ought to be imposed on public speakers. Of course no interference would be made with the right of making specific allegations against specified officials.

But though we may trust in the main and in the end to a policy of conditional conciliation, we must keep our powder dry and keep plenty of it. We ought not to neglect any auxiliary mean of taking all point out of the word "foreign," by diminishing as much as possible the difference between Indian and European British subjects. The Indian Government can do much to obliterate all historical and customary distinctions. It can and is doing much to promote the use of the English language. It can do so, however, only very slowly. But it can take almost immediately the great step of transliterating all the various Hindu characters into the Roman, and thus immensely facilitating the acquisition of native languages by Englishmen, as well as of the English by natives. As almost all Indian schoolmasters know something of English, nothing would be easier than to order that every child in a school aided by the State shall be taught to read and write in the Roman character, whatever may be the language which he is

studying. Very soon the Oriental alphabets, especially, it is to be hoped, the abominable Persian, would pass entirely out of ordinary use, and in a few years the printing of books and newspapers in those alphabets, without special permission, might be entirely prohibited. From school-books and public documents it would of course disappear much sooner. Similarly the Government might encourage the adoption of something like English dress, by regulating with such views the costume of all its servants. The adoption of English names in place of the long inverted and often break-jaw Hindu names now commonly placed after the prefix Mr., would also be an important reform. In the name of the eternal fitness of things let us have no more Sir Jamsetji Jijibhais. English habits and etiquette are gradually making way amongst natives, and will soon be happily universal amongst Hindus raised in wealth above the classes which live by manual labour. The Government can hardly, however, do much to promote changes of that kind, except by gradually making slighter recognition of differences of caste. Nor can it openly, with safety, do much to remove the greatest of all barriers to friendly assimilation, that immense radical and practical dissimilarity of religion which admits neither extenuation nor respectful agreement to differ. It can help forward the work by English education, by gradually making less and less recognition of caste, and by sternly repressing the grosser orgies of superstition in all parts of the Peninsula. But the direct

work must be left to non-official individuals and missionary societies. These at present do it in a very clumsy and wasteful manner. They have no tactics at all, and make no attempt to economise their forces. In winning nations to Christianity, as in winning battles with powder and steel, one grand condition of success is to concentrate the assailing troops in overwhelming force against some one part of the enemy's line. When it has been conquered, a new and more favourable base of operations has been obtained, and the remaining parts may be assailed with greater confidence and carried one by one in the same manner. Conversion is, moreover, like panic, very often epidemic. When a long-assailed mass begins to waver under the concentrated effort of the assailants, a change of front on the part of one member will be imitated by nearly all his fellows. And concentration is especially necessary in India, where notoriously the greatest obstacle to missionary success is well-founded dread of the terrible persecution which every solitary convert must endure. Is it wonderful that a man shrinks from a change which would make him an outcast in the fullest and most terrible sense of that word? He knows that he will be driven from his family, and from his village if he is a villager; that in the town where he lives, or to which he may betake himself after conversion, he will be a lonely and suspected person exposed to continual insult, and never free from danger to limb and life. Yet our missionaries seem to expect under such circumstances to convert men who have only the moral fibre of Bengalis.

They are scattered about by twos and threes in great towns where they cannot make any impression on the whole mass of people, or any part of it large enough to form in itself a complete community able to protect and furnish employment to its members. They are just as much squandering their energies as if they were trying to make the Himalayas passable by digging away each at a distance of a mile from the next. They are so dispersed that their strength is nearly all frittered away in isolated and therefore fruitless effort. They try merely to work on individuals hoping to pick up one man here and another there, and accordingly it is not wonderful that their converts are neither very numerous nor very respectable. But if they go to work by regularly attacking in full force whole clans and villages, and thus enabling men to change their religion in company, in safety, and supported by the sympathy of their friends and neighbours, they will make decent Christians in hundreds and even thousands. If one fourth of the missionaries now in India were all set to work on a single rural district, in ten years it would be almost entirely Christian, and they would have made twenty or thirty, or perhaps a hundred times as many converts as all the rest of their brethren put together. Then they could repeat the process in the next district, and thus in time conquer all India. But they will get little for their pains if they go on attacking all of such a big thing at once, refusing to learn by their long experience of failure. It would be far better to send even so many as a dozen

or a score of missionaries to labour continuously in a single village. They would undoubtedly make it all Christian in a year or two, and then it might be left to a single native preacher. The country is more vulnerable than the town, and a new religion is less likely to spread from the town to it than from it to the town. But it is the grand mistake of our missionaries, almost without exception, to prefer the town to the country. That, indeed, is not the only great mistake which they make. Not content with choosing the places where they can do least, they choose to begin with the races least susceptible of new religious impressions. They direct all their efforts to half-civilised Hindus and Muslims, whose minds are pre-occupied and fiercely prejudiced against proselytizers, by elaborate and enthralling religions which have long and imposing histories. They do little or nothing for the open minds of those aboriginal tribes, whose simple religions have not wrought themselves minutely into the daily life of every individual family and society, and who are meekly ready to take religion like everything else from the divinely powerful white strangers. In three generations they have not converted a quarter of a million of Hindus. In one generation they might have converted 10,000,000 of Santals, Kols, Bhils, and Gonds.

The spread of Christianity among the higher classes is retarded not so much by persecution as by a kind of patriotic pride. They cleave to their superstitions because these are Indian, and scorn Christianity be-

cause it is the religion of the alien conquerors. If their political antipathy could be overcome, and they induced to accept heartily their place as privileged members of a great federal British kingdom, their unwillingness to be British in religion would also soon be overcome. Mental cultivation and association with Englishmen in the public service, and consequently in private society, would lead almost every comfortably rich Hindu to forsake his abominable hereditary religion, and even among the Mahometans conversions would be exceedingly numerous. Thus would vanish the great and only insuperable obstacle to that closer assimilation of Indian nature, which can only come by intermarriage of the Eastern races with the Western. At present mixed marriages are thoroughly repugnant to the more respectable persons on both sides of the religious gulf. Differences of morality and peculiar personal habits resulting from religion forbid any hope of happiness in such unions. But if Christianity should become the religion of the Hindu upper classes, every royal and noble house in India might soon be connected with England by ties of family-affection, and we should hear no more muttering against foreign masters. If one of our English princes would only set the example, even at some sacrifice of his own feelings, he would show himself a true patriot and hardly any reward would be too great for his service. That is the way in which we must go to work to establish the unity of the British Empire on firm foundations. We must make what

will be for ages still a practically English rule, a foreign rule no longer, by raising up respectable mixed races with English habits and sympathies. We can do so still better, more quickly, more surely, by raising up a numerous race of natives having none but English blood in their veins. Metcalfe, forty years ago, recommended colonies of the original Roman type, as being, together with a powerful army, the only means of keeping India under control by England ; and it was cheering to hear Sir George Campbell repeating the same advice last year after his last return from Bengal. In Kashmīr, Kāmaun Assām, the Nilgiris, the highlands of the Central Provinces, and even in Mālwa and Maisūr there are many thousands, indeed, tens of thousands, of fertile square miles, so high above the sea that even the poorest Englishmen may live there, at least as healthily, and far more comfortably than in their birthplace, and may raise children to infinite generations, not as sickly exotics, but as vigorous sons of the soil. Hitherto almost all Englishmen in India have occupied the most civilised but most unhealthy parts of the country, and it is absurd to reason as some do from that old folly to the impossibility of doing better henceforward. The experiment has not yet been fairly tried on a large scale, but whenever it has been tried, there has been gratifying success. It may be hopeless to try to rear English children in Calcutta, Bombay, or Madras, but there are scores of ruddy hearty boys and girls at the hill-stations, and in a



score of years there would be scores of thousands, if the Indian Government should take some trouble and spend some money to divert English emigrants from the United States and Canada to the equally healthy parts of India. Assisted passages and guarantees of protection, together with educational advantages and political privileges, would probably be effectual to fill the almost empty uplands of India, with those English agricultural settlers who would find them such prosperous and congenial homes. Slightly increased pensions and small advances of capital would induce old English soldiers to remain in the East as hill-farmers, and thus back up the regular garrison with a reserve force of fresh, sturdy Anglo-Saxons, ready to swoop down into the plains and crush out an insurrection by sheer physical force. For though we may safely trust to conciliation as the main part of our Indian policy and the source of its ultimate and permanent success, we must in the meantime neglect no auxiliary means of security against mischievous local spasms of revolt. In trying to renovate the constitution of the Indian body politic by a chronic remedy, we must keep our lancets ready for a rush of hot blood to the head, and neglect no appliances for the speedy suppression of those local outbreaks which may take place before the morbid tendency has been thoroughly purged away.

As a part of the policy of fusion rather than a military precaution, we ought to encourage settlers of a wealthier class to make India their home. We can

do so without extravagance in offering inducements. The exchange-rates saved by payment of pensions in India instead of England, would almost induce military and civil officials to remain in the East, if political privileges, and educational and social advantages, which they do not now enjoy, were thrown into the same scale. English holders of capital might also be tempted by such privileges and advantages, if the Indian Government should establish an active agency in England, and flood the country with the necessary information. Zemindaries are very frequently sequestered and otherwise brought to sale, while in such thinly-peopled districts as Bīrma, Assām, the Central Provinces, Sind, Kashmīr, and even Mālwa, large tracts of land are so little cultivated, and so thinly peopled, that they can be bought for very trifling sums of ready money. A lavish bestowal of commissions of the peace, and even baronetcies, would be thoroughly justifiable, because very likely to quicken the readiness of English gentlemen to become Indian landlords and permanent holders of plantations. Deriders of what they would call very cheap honours, would lay themselves open to a very effective retort. For the first and therefore now the most honoured of all baronetcies, were obtained by persons and means not half so respectable. Wealthy Englishmen would be glad to settle their younger sons in this way as Indian zemindars, and enterprising, independent men of all kinds would not need much persuasion to invest their moderate fortunes in so safe, pleasant, and profitable a manner.

The English *novus homo*, who cannot easily get into high society by becoming an English landowner, would gratify his ambition without difficulty in India, where he would be regarded as a public benefactor, entitled to any desired amount of petting from public men. The Government might also very advantageously do something more than it does at present, to induce temporary residents in India to make their children Indian both by birth and education. It ought to establish great public schools, both for boys and girls, at the great Hill-Sanitaria, at Darjiling, at Simla, at Utakamand, and at Chindwāra, offering such liberal salaries and pensions as will attract teachers like those at Rugby, Marlborough, and Cheltenham, and giving such subsidies at the beginning, as will enable the schools to offer sound education at a rate not exceeding £100 per annum. An immediate and large influx of pupils would take place, if these schools were favoured like the before-mentioned Rajput seminary, with large reservations of public appointments; or rather, perhaps, with double marks in competitions. Provision ought also to be made, on similar principles, for the children of poorer Europeans.

Many will object that English zemindars cannot keep their health on the lowlands of India. Surely it is sufficient to say that they may spend the whole hot season in a cooler place. A man cannot be branded as an absentee, if he spends six months of the year on his estate. And as for his children, they will spend most of their tender years at school on the hills, and

will be hardly at all exposed to lowland influences, till they have grown up with constitutions nourished into strength amid mountain-air. Some will say that it is absurd to suppose that persons who can afford to live respectably in England, will go to India, or stay in it, when they cannot have such society and occupations as they would have in England, both town and country. But we can reply that very soon their numbers would be sufficient to supply society in the country, and that from the first they could there have occupations and amusements not very different from those of English squires. Town life also they could have, almost as gay and gorgeous as that of London, in the proposed new Indian capital. Calcutta, indeed, is so hot, damp, and unhealthy, as to be a very poor substitute for the English metropolis; but no such disadvantages would cling to a seat of Government somewhere in the Central Provinces, at Jabalpūr, or still better, at Mandla or Chindwāra. It would be a Christian town, almost as home-like as London itself, a well-kept collection of houses, with wide shaded streets and complete drains, all laid out by English engineers in accordance with the soundest sanitary principles. It would have a mild, dry, genial climate, far superior to that of London, a considerable population of wealthy people, who would prefer it to the higher sanatoria, and all the social advantages of a political capital and a university town. Having no great trade, or dense surrounding population, it would not be filled, as Calcutta is, with hordes of dirty, thievish, disorderly, and

disease-breeding natives. It would be a seat of government, learning, and society, but not much more ; a Rome or a Madrid rather than a London or a Paris. Doubtless the social and other advantages and comforts would be inferior to those of London ; but for most of the residents and visitors this inferiority would be more than counterbalanced by the superior social consideration in which they would be held. Very unpretending English families would become magnates in India.

The political advantages of the transfer from the swampy banks of the Hügli to one of the Narbada tablelands, would also be very great, and I cannot resist the temptation to enumerate them here in detail. Every official would be able to do far more work at all times, without any risk of losing health. The block of business and derangement of plans, caused by illness and frequent removals to Simla, would be thenceforth entirely avoided. Valuable lives, like those of the Marquis of Dalhousie, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Wynne, and Sir G. Campbell, would be saved to India. The impress of a supereminent locality, the too Bengali character of the administration, would be effaced, and its character would be made truly eclectic and central. The position would be better than that of Calcutta in accessibility and facilities of communication. It would be still more valuable for the sake of security against riot or rebellion. There would be no danger from the presence of a vast population of fanatical Muslims and Bramhans. The central au-

thority, the centre of Indian life, would be taken away from contact with an old and venerated native civilisation, powerful even in its rottenness, into a clear field, where would be no trammelling reminders of Hindu prejudices and superstitions, and where a purely Christian civilisation would be dominant from the beginning, and would stamp the characteristics of Christendom on animate and inanimate nature. The new capital would be surrounded by English zemindars, and by colonies of English hill farmers. And most of the neighbouring natives would be non-Aryan aborigines, having no indigenous civilisation, no inflammatory traditions of greatness, no ancient, wide-spread, and strongly-enthraling religion ; who, indeed, will probably be all Christians before the end of the present century.

Under such conditions as those proposed, I cannot entertain the slightest doubt that the connection of India with England would last "as long as the sun and moon endure."

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE IMPERIAL STRUCTURE AND ITS SAFEGUARD.

How are India and the other colonies to be made cocqual parts of Britain? By the Queen and Parliament of the United Kingdom in the following manner. The present Ministry ought in the beginning of the next session to propose that the present so-called Imperial Parliament pass a short and simple Act, investing a truly Imperial Convention, with absolute power to establish a legislature representing and controlling every portion of Her Majesty's dominions. To economize time they may omit the formality of asking the consent of each colonial legislature. It may be presumed that every man sent by each colony is a plenipotentiary, and the Imperial sword may justly be thrown into the balance against those who obstinately dispute the presumption. The Convention ought to consist of 1000 members, collected from the following sources :

*A.* The whole House of Commons, 652 in number.

*B.* 200 Members of the House of Lords, nominated in proportion to the relative strength of each of the great parties therein, 110 from the Ministerial side, and 90 from the Opposition. No gentleman on the

Opposition would doubt the honesty of the Ministry in the conduct of this delicate process. The 90 would be undoubtedly nominated from a private list supplied by Earl Granville;

*C.* 48 Members, a fourth of whom ought to be non-Europeans, nominated by the Government of India. Its impartiality also would be beyond suspicion;

*D.* 100 Representatives of the other colonies;

1	Newfoundland .. .. .	1
2	British Columbia .. .	1—2
3	Bahamas .. .. .	1
4	Leeward Islands .. .	1
5	Barbadoes .. .. .	1
6	Other Windward Islands jointly .. .	1
7	Trinidad ... .. .	1
8	Jamaica .. .. .	3
9	British Honduras .. .. .	1
10	British Guiana .. .. .	2—11—13
11	Cape Colony .. .. .	6
12	Natal .. .. .	1
13	Griqualand .. .. .	1
14	Mauritius .. .. .	3
15	Gold Coast .. .. .	1
16	Sierra Leone and Gambia .. .. .	1—13
17	Ceylon .. .. .	6
18	Straits Settlements .. .. .	2
19	Sarawak .. .. .	1
20	Hongkong .. .. .	1—10
21	Malta .. .. .	1
22	Channel Islands .. .. .	1
23	Isle of Man .. .. .	1
24	Fiji .. .. .	1
25	New South Wales .. .. .	15
26	New Zealand.. .. .	10
27	Queensland .. .. .	5
28	South Australia.. .. .	6
29	Tasmania .. .. .	2
30	Victoria.. .. .	21
31	Western Australia .. .. .	1—61



The distribution is based partly on revenue, partly on population, partly on the character of the population. I confidently believe that it will appear equitable to the impartial spectator, and be fairly acceptable to the principal parties concerned. Some small colonies are omitted, because their non-official population is insignificant. The greatest of the purely European colonies is excluded, for reasons which have already been fully placed before the reader. Its most westerly province, British Columbia, is, however, placed in the list, because it is widely separated from Central and Eastern Canada, in situation, in feeling, and in relation to those circumstances which necessitate the exclusion of the Dominion. The representatives of each colony ought to be elected by the members of the Legislative Council and the members of the Assembly sitting together as one body. Where there is no Assembly, or it refuses to vote, the Council alone, or with the minority of the Assembly, ought to exercise the full power of election. To secure representation of all parties, the representatives ought to be elected in one mass by a single and final ballot, each elector being allowed to accumulate his votes in favour of one candidate, or by way of equivalent, restricted from voting for more than one candidate.

The crisis is drifting on with appalling rapidity. Delay will soon bring dissolution. Now or never will be the day of salvation. The Convention ought therefore to meet as soon as possible in 1876. No elaborate preparations would be necessary. A large part of the

local business of the House of Commons might, without much inconvenience, be postponed to the next year, and in June and July its members would have leisure to transact the business of the Empire. No abrupt change would be perceptible ; the Convention would sit at Westminster ; would be served by the clerks of the House of Commons, and would follow its procedure under the guidance of Mr. Speaker Brand. Much might be done in the last two months of the regular session, and after a brief autumn recess, the work might be concluded during the last three months of the year. Nothing but gross mismanagement, or wanton and malignant obstruction could prevent it. The former is improbable. The latter would be checked by public indignation. The nature of the work would present few opportunities for obstruction. No long and complicated Constitutional Bills would be required ; hardly any formal change of any kind. The British Constitution, as it now is, has its being chiefly in public opinion, and the growing changing mass of public traditions. It has never been formulated by authority. The powers and relations of its parts are outgrowths from a few great public sentiments based on a few great public facts. They are not statutory, and need not be specifically changed by statute. Merely change a few great facts, a few great fundamental characteristics of the Constitution by a few laconic Acts, and whole groups of derivative powers and functions will be changed in correspondence. This simplicity and plasticity of the chief object to be operated upon

would immensely facilitate the work of the Convention. Indeed, one of the chief duties of the Convention would be to take care lest anything should hinder the new Imperial Constitution from being similarly simple and plastic. Plant it and let it grow in accordance with the changing circumstances of the time, under the guidance of educated public opinion. Modified continually, like the English Constitution, by the mere fact of its existence in the changing minds of men, it would yet be stable, living on as an organic whole, and broad-based upon the public will. By common consent, by general recognition of the fitness of things, the Imperial Government would draw to itself all necessary powers, and throw into desuetude all practices and even laws inconsistent with the performance of its approved functions. And by the very same forces its unnecessary encroachments would be repelled.

The work of the Convention would be mainly a work of transference by declaratory Acts, few, short and simple. The abrogatory and creative Acts would be fewer still, and only one of them, that creating the Imperial Legislature, would be at all lengthy or complicated. The changes of names would be few and slight, and the Conservative sentiments of Englishmen would receive only a very mild shock. To the superficial observer very little difference would be apparent. Her Most Gracious Majesty would still bear the honoured English name of Queen, not the foreign and novel name of Empress. She would still live in London, and be

the direct ruler of England without an intermediate viceroy. London would still be the seat of the Privy Council of the Empire, and the head-quarters of all departments of the Central Government. The Houses of Lords and Commons would live on, would still manage all affairs, and enact all laws, with which Englishmen, as mere Englishmen, are peculiarly concerned, and would appear altered only in having less work to do. Nobody would interfere with their formal dignity, or forbid a member of the Lower House to write after his name the important letters, M.P. The laws and their administration would remain unaffected by extraneous action, except in the institution of appeal to the Privy Council. The fate of the Church of England would remain wholly in English hands. The schools, endowments, and municipal institutions of England would still be under the sole supervision of the English Houses of Parliament. The revolution would, indeed be scarcely seen or felt by anybody except those who had brought it to completion.

The chief probable changes, and their effects may easily be put into a summary.

I.—A declaratory Act would proclaim that Her Majesty should thenceforth be styled Queen of Britain instead of Queen of the United Kingdom and its dependencies, and that the name Britain should be regarded as including all these dependencies among its integral parts. Nothing would need to be said about Her Majesty's Rights and Prerogatives. By presumption of law they would remain unchanged; and

therefore by the simple proclamation of a new royal designation, the real powers of conferring titles and pardoning offenders would be transferred from the guardianship of the Ministry dependant on the present House of Commons, to the Ministry dependant on the Central Legislature. Similarly they would acquire the patronage and administration of the Army, the Navy, and the Diplomatic Service, with which Her Majesty can deal as she pleases, checked only by the need of obtaining supplies. These her advisers would recommend her to ask thenceforward from the Central Legislature, instead of the House of Commons. In the same tacit way the control over India and the other Colonies now exercised by the latter would be surrendered to the former. The task of organizing the administrative framework would not need to occupy the time of the Convention, but might be left to the manipulations of the Executive Government wielding the formal powers of the sovereign. If legislative interference should appear desirable, it might be left to the Central Legislature, and no great harm could result from the delay.

II.—All Crown lands in England and elsewhere would be transferred by formal enactment from the House of Commons and other local legislatures to the Central Legislature. The latter might, however, permit the former to manage, and in some cases to draw revenue from these common heritages of the Empire. The remaining revenue would be available for the general purposes of the Central Government;

preferably not for the maintenance of the monarchical element. The royal family and the various viceregal establishments ought rather to be supported by a tax at the rate of one per cent. levied on the net general revenue, and on each net local revenue. As the value of money will probably continue to decrease, it is reasonable that royal expenditure should increase—at least proportionately with the increase of other public expenditure. Even if the value of money should not fall, or, on the contrary, should rise, we must remember that increased public expenditure generally shows increase of wealth and power in a healthy nation, and therefore a necessity for proportionately increased splendour in the embodiment of the national dignity.

III.—The religion preferentially acknowledged by the Central Government in its ceremonials, and at its diplomatic and consular posts, would be chosen by the Sovereign. But all important religions could be recognized in the establishment of military and naval chaplaincies.

IV.—A regular Act would abolish the Privy Council of the United Kingdom, and transfer all its powers in a mass to those whom Her Majesty should be pleased to call as the Privy Council of Britain, responsible for its advice to the Central Legislature. These persons, of course, would be the present Privy Councillors, with some additions. The Cabinet ought to be legally recognized under the name of the Executive Committee, including always the following

great officers of state, besides others whom Her Majesty might be pleased to summon.

(A) The Lord Chancellor, corresponding to the Continental Ministers of Justice.

(B) The Lord President of the Council.

(C) The Lord High Treasurer.

(D) The Lord Marshal, equivalent to the present Secretary for War.

(E) The Lord High Admiral.

(F) The Lord Correspondent with Foreign States of Europe, equivalent in part to the Foreign Secretary.

(G) The Lord Controller of Trade, having the powers of the President of the Board of Trade.

(H) Five Lords Chief Secretaries of State—viz.:

(a) For Home Affairs, including those of Malta and Gibraltar.

(β) For Indian Affairs, including relations with protected States east of Persia, and with independent Asiatic States except Russia.

(γ) For African Affairs, including those of Western Asia, and relations with protected and independent States, from Persia and Arabia westwards.

(δ) For American Affairs, including relations with protected and independent American States.

(ε) For Australian Affairs, including those of China, Malacca, and the Pacific Ocean.

Possibly, also, the dozen might be made a baker's

dozen by the addition of a Lord Privy Seal. But this office might very well be included in that of the Lord President, who would generally be Prime Minister, but not necessarily and *ex officio*, as the leading spirit of the Ministry might wish to have a special department, besides a general supervisory function. Recognition of the Prime Minister's name and position ought to be formally made in the procedure of the new Government.

The Judicial Committee of the new Privy Council would have the jurisdiction of the old, enlarged by an Act of the Convention making the Committee the Supreme Court of Appeal for England, Scotland, and Ireland, as well as India and the other colonies. Its paid members would be increased in number, and would receive higher salaries. The Lord Chancellor, who might also be Lord Chancellor of England, and practically always would be such, would sit as president. The Lord Chief Justice of England, the Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, the Lord Chief Baron, the Lord Justice-General of Scotland, and the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, would be members *ex officio*, and, of course, also the Lord Chancellor of England, if he were not Lord Chancellor of Britain.

V.—A British Senate would be constituted jointly with the Queen in Council, the supreme legislature for all Britain. If so un-English a name should be insuperably distasteful to Conservatives, it might be called the British Parliament, even at the risk of confusion with the Parliament of the United Kingdom of



Great Britain and Ireland. By statute it would have:—

1. Exclusive power to pass Acts binding all Britons, when approved by the Sovereign.

2. Power to levy taxes and raise money, to any amount, in any way, for any purposes.

3. Power to control and gain profit by all post-offices and telegraphs within Britain.

4. Power to define the territorial limits of local legislative action.

5. Power to give authority to the Queen in Council to restrain local governments from borrowing money, and to compel them to pay interest due on their debts.

6. Power to give authority to the Queen in Council to restrain local governments from levying custom duties, and to confiscate the money so gained.

This last power would be necessary for the security of free trade between all parts of the consolidated empire. But in most of the smaller colonies it would be necessary to let the local government raise money by such taxes, or to bestow upon it a subsidy from the central treasury. The Central Government would have no direct concern with the National, Indian, and Colonial debts now existing. They would remain local debts, and continue to lie upon the same shoulders which bear them now.

The bestowal of the six above-named powers upon the Senate would be the only formal interference by the Convention with the House of Commons. The constitutional right of that House to control those

Acts of State in war, diplomacy, &c., which naturally belong to a Central Government, is not a legal right, but a moral right depending on public opinion, and that public opinion is based on the fact that the House alone has the power to tax, and therefore the power to supply. Transference of the power to the Senate must transfer the right, since Her Majesty's Counsellors would then advise her to seek supplies no longer from the House of Commons, but for ever afterwards from the Senate. No general statutes to define the boundaries of the central power over local governments would be at all necessary. The discretion of the Central Government might safely be relied upon. The Sovereign's powers would continue to be as impotent for mischief as they now are, and a legislative body, constituted as the Senate would probably be, would not be prone to wanton and irritating encroachments on local autonomy. In the last quarter of the 19th century, the public opinion of the world's most enlightened race would be a far better check than any elaborate constitutional barriers. Such things are in the end more troublesome to all parties than useful to any. Change of circumstances, in these days of rapid change, soon makes them useless obstructions. Very frequently the common weal or the safety of the federal state imperatively demands that they be broken down, and this can sometimes be done only by the constitution-shocking operations of a war, or a *coup d'etat*. England needs have little fear that her wishes would be overridden by a legislature, which would for

at least a generation contain an immense majority of Englishmen. But to take away all excuse for hesitation on the part of timid Conservative minds, the Convention might enact by way of exception to the first general power conferred upon the Central Legislature, that every Act affecting the rights, dignities, and constitution of the Houses of Lords and Commons, or the Laws of Primogeniture and Entail, or the religious establishments of England and Scotland, or the educational and charitable institutions and endowments in Great Britain and Ireland, should be null and void unless approved by both Houses of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, or of England, Ireland, and Scotland, if those kingdoms should afterwards have separate local legislatures.

The Convention would not act wisely if it should seek to restrict the power of the Central Legislature to change the mode of electing the Senate, the distribution of its members to constituencies, or the electoral rights of the constituents. It would show its discretion by practically acknowledging that laws must change with the times to remain just, and by therefore placing full confidence in the discretion of the Senate. But it could not neglect the duty of determining the composition of the first Senate, the kind of suffrage by which it would be elected, and the mode of conducting the election. We would hear little wrangling about the last. The ballot is already used almost everywhere for local elections, and no good reasons

can be given for not using it at an Imperial election. For the sake of simplicity, saving of money, and saving of time, the Senate ought to be a single body. It would not be wise to hamper the organizers of the new kingdom with the cumbrous and costly machinery of a second chamber. An Upper House is either superfluous or mischievously obstructive, when the Lower House is so wisely constituted, as to be really representative of the nation's culture, experience, and intelligence. It can be useful only when the Lower House contains a majority of demagogues elected by the rash young and the ignorant poor. But in that, as in every other morbid case, prevention is better than cure. To keep most of the demagogues out of the elected House is better than to thwart them by an Upper House of nominees. The best safeguard against hasty legislation is a suffrage-law, which will always keep the hasty legislators in a small minority. It is always safer to meet such enemies in the open field than to skulk behind some flimsy constitutional bulwark. Opposition by an Upper House very often strengthens the enemy by uselessly irritating him. But the demagogues would quickly be reduced to their natural insignificance by a good suffrage-law, not excluding the rash young and the ignorant poor, as stupid Conservatives propose, but giving to them no more than their small rightful share of representation, and thus providing a safety-valve for those volcanic forces which would rend the body politic asunder, if caged in according to the stupid Conservative formula. Even

the British House of Lords, the best of all Upper Houses, has been nearly as obstructive to good legislation as to bad, and with such a House of Commons as the present must be useless where it is not mischievous. There is no strong reason for preserving it except the historical, and that reason will lose much of its strength with the loss of the Appellate Jurisdiction.

Concentration of the political talents of a nation in one legislative chamber, saves not only from waste of time, but from waste of power, and secures a more thorough discussion for every bill. No disputed proposal can get the fullest and fairest treatment, if the ablest supporters are in one house and speak to-day, while the ablest opponents are in another house, and cannot speak till the middle of next month, when the attention of the first speakers is claimed by something entirely different. The efficiency of Parliamentary leaders is moreover seriously impaired by the distracting necessity of frequently keeping an eye upon two important debates going on at the same time in separate chambers. Under such circumstances, no statesman can work at his highest intellectual level. Iron cannot sharpen iron when each piece is used at a different time and in a separate place. An able statesman sent to the gilded cage of an Upper House loses more than half of his influence on the nation's counsels, and the nation loses more than half of the value of his services. He is totally excluded from the consideration of fiscal ques-

tions. In disjointed discussions his arguments do not fall with their just weight upon remote antagonists, and his projects do not gain adequate consideration. His debating powers are wasted on a cold and narrow stage. He is continually galled by a feeling of helplessness and confinement. He cannot hope to produce so much effect and gain so much glory by his activity as in a larger and more exciting arena. And consequently he does less public work and takes less pains with what he does. The Convention ought therefore to eschew that worn-out discredited makeshift, an Upper House. It ought to aim at gathering together all the cream of British political talents on the floor of the Senate, and letting these powers come into collision on a common level of debate, where every man can strike while the iron is hot, where he has all his foes before him, and knows that his argument and theirs will command attention together. Such men as the Duke of Argyll and the Marquis of Salisbury in the House of Lords are steam-hammers used to crack walnuts, and would rapturously hail the prospect of removal to the grander theatre of the Lower House. To provide another elegant cage for such men in establishing a new constitution would be a deliberate and sinful waste of noble powers.

The first senate would probably consist of about 450 members,

1. From the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, 300.

## II. From India :

(a) Nominated by the Viceroy in Council	..	..	20
(β) Native Princes of Protected States and Titular			
Princes, or their Deputies	..	..	
The Nizam	..	..	
The Nawab of Bhopal	..	..	
The Amir of Kabul	..	..	
The King of Siam	..	..	
The King of Birma	..	..	
The Mahārana of Mēwar or Udiṇpur	..	..	
The Maharaja of Gwalior	..	..	
„ of Indur	..	..	
„ of Maisur	..	..	
„ of Marwar or Jodpur	..	..	20
„ of Jaipur	..	..	
„ of Travankur	..	..	
„ of Rēwa or Bagelkand	..	..	
„ of Nepal	..	..	
„ of Patialā	..	..	
The Gaikwār, or the Rau of Kach	..	..	
The Nawab Vazir of Audh	..	..	
The Nawab of Bengal	..	..	
The Maharaja Dhulip Singh	..	..	
The Raja of Berar	..	..	70
(γ) Elected by the British Provinces:—			
Bengal and Orissa	..	..	5
Assam	..	..	1
Birma	..	..	1
Behar	..	..	2
Audh	..	..	2
Rohilkand	..	..	2
Malwa	..	..	1
Panjab	..	..	2
Afghanistan	..	..	1
Sind	..	..	1
Gujerat	..	..	1
Dekkan or Maharashtra	..	..	3
Karnata	..	..	2
Dravida	..	..	3
Telingana	..	..	2
Gondwana	..	..	1

## III. From the smaller colonies :

1	Newfoundland ..	..	..	..	..	1	} 8
2	British Columbia	..	..	..	..	1	
3	British Honduras	..	..	..	..	1	
4	British Guiana	..	..	..	..	1	
5	Jamaica ..	..	..	..	..	2	
6	Bahamas	..	..	..	..	1	
7	Leeward Islands	..	..	..	..	1	
8	Windward Islands	..	..	..	..	1	
9	Trinidad	..	..	..	..	1	
10	Cape Colony	..	..	..	..	5	} 9
11	Natal and Griqualand	..	..	..	..	1	
12	Mauritius	..	..	..	..	2	
13	West African Settlements	..	..	..	..	1	} 7
14	Ceylon..	..	..	..	..	4	
15	Hong Kong	..	..	..	..	1	
16	Straits Settlements	..	..	..	..	1	
17	Sarawak	..	..	..	..	1	} 80
18	Malta	..	..	..	..	1	
19	Mau	..	..	..	..	1	
20	Channel Islands..	..	..	..	..	1	
21	Fiji	..	..	..	..	..	
22	New South Wales	..	..	..	..	13	
23	New Zealand	..	..	..	..	8	
24	Queensland	..	..	..	..	4	
25	South Australia	..	..	..	..	5	
26	Tasmania	..	..	..	..	2	
27	Victoria ..	..	..	..	..	17	
28	Western Australia	..	..	..	..	1	

The Senate would not be bound to apportion numbers to these thirty territories, and others afterwards added, in accordance with any hard and fast principles. Room for the exercise of discretion would be necessary. If the rate of contribution to the central treasury should be made the standard, India would have nearly as many members as England, the representatives of the other colonies would form an inappreciable fraction, and indeed the majority of those colonies would be left



completely out in the cold. All of these results would be highly inconvenient. And if quantity of population should be the standard, the obvious and startling differences of quality would make its application ridiculous as well as dangerous. In drawing up the scheme for the first Senate therefore, the Convention would consider revenues, quantity of population, and quality thereof, in connection with each other, and would moreover be very liberal to the smaller colonies. The foregoing list is therefore probably approximate to that which would seem good to the assembled wisdom of the empire. Whether the members should be directly elected by constituencies specially formed for them, or should be nominated by the Local Legislatures, would be indifferent if all those Legislatures were bodies electéd by a uniform system of graduated suffrage. But as many are not elective at all, and few, if any are likely to become elective by graduated suffrage, before the time would come for choosing the first Senate, the Convention would have the not very difficult duty of carving out districts to form special constituencies. The work would be greatly lightened by acknowledgment of the right of minorities to some representation, and consequent establishment of no constituencies not big enough to deserve at least three members, except in the smallest colonies. To make the working of the principle simple and complete, no elector ought to be allowed to vote for more than one candidate. All the Indian provinces would be single constituencies, and likewise all the other

colonies except the three largest of the Australasian. Only in those and in the United Kingdom therefore, would the Convention have to trouble itself with making electoral divisions. And in these cases the simple standard of population would be sufficient.

The nature of the suffrage would differ materially in two great natural divisions of Britain. In those mainly peopled by men of European blood, the United Kingdom, Man, the Channel Islands, Malta, Newfoundland, British Columbia, and all the Australasian colonies except Fiji, it might safely be universal. But in the others, as every one would agree in saying, it ought to be restricted to those having considerable freeholds, occupying substantial houses, or paying income-tax. A graduated income-tax with a corresponding dependent system of graduated suffrage would not be at all unpopular in India, and would be peculiarly fitted to draw out in fair proportion the expression of such opinions of the natives and non-official Europeans as are deserving of public attention. It ought to begin at a rate of one pie in the rupee on all incomes of Rs. 300 per mensem, and go up at the rate of an additional pie and additional vote for each additional amount of Rs. 300, the second pie not being levied on the rupees under 300, nor the third pie on the rupees under 600. So on it would go, till it would reach the possessor of more than Rs. 3600, compel him to pay an anna of every rupee above that amount, and endow him with twelve votes by way of compensation. The temptation to under-

statement would thus be counterbalanced, and the Indian Exchequer filled without odium or unpopularity attaching to the Indian Government. Similar, but probably less restricted systems would be fit for the other colonies where white men are outnumbered by black.

As the convention would not consist of madmen, it would not add equality to the universality of the suffrage in the other great class of constituencies. A more elaborate kind of graduation than that already exemplified would be necessary, but one or other of two alternative scales would be fit for application to every locality. The two following scales are, I believe, good enough to be their own excuses for publication. In preface it ought to be stated, that every sane person not being a minor, nor a pauper, nor a prisoner, nor unable to read and write, would have one vote. He would be able to register his right in any constituency within whose bounds he had dwelt during thirty days of the time having elapsed since the last registration. But he would have no right to have his name on more than one register at the same time.

## SCALE I.

STANDARD A.	EXPERIENCE.	VOTES.
	<div data-bbox="304 455 594 581">           (1)      Age          21                         „          30                         „          40                         „          50         </div>	<div data-bbox="781 455 905 581">           1            Double            Treble            Quadruple         </div>
STANDARD B.	PAYMENT OF TAXES.	ADDITIONAL VOTES.
	<div data-bbox="304 740 750 1068">           (1) Occupation for the greater part                  of a year, of a dwelling-house at                  a rent of £20, and consequent                  payment of house-tax in England                  already, and in Britain after-                  wards.            (2)        at        £40            (3)        at        60            (4)        at        80            (5)        at        100            And so on up to 600         </div>	<div data-bbox="822 892 853 1068">           1            2            3            4            5            30         </div>
STANDARD C.	KNOWLEDGE.	ADDITIONAL VOTES.
	<div data-bbox="304 1236 750 1564">           (1) <i>For the present.</i>—(α) Certificate                  from Inspector of aided schools,                  after examination in ordinary                  subjects, especial attention                  being given to Geography,                  English and General History,                  and Elementary Political Eco-                  nomy.            (β) Certificate of the second class                  from University Local Exa-                  miners of middle-class schools.         </div>	<div data-bbox="832 1530 853 1555">1</div>

SCALE I.—*continued.*

STANDARD C.

KNOWLEDGE.

ADDITIONAL  
VOTES.

*Afterwards.*—Certificate from Public Examiners specially appointed to hold quarterly examinations equal in difficulty to the foregoing, instead thereof.

(2) *For the present.*—(a) Certificate of first class from Univ. Local Ex. of middle-class schools.

(β) Success in competitive examination for Home Civil Service, Class II.

*Afterwards.*—Equivalent public certificate instead thereof.

(3) *For the present.*—(a) Matriculation by examination at any Indian Univ. or Univ. in Great Britain or Ireland, or Univ. of Sydney, Melbourne, Capetown, Otago, Adelaide, or Queensland.

(β) Success in competitive examination for the Army or Indian Civil Engineering College.

(γ) License to practise as an attorney.

(δ) License to practise medicine or surgery.

*Afterwards.*—An equivalent public certificate as an alternative, not displacing the foregoing qualifications.

(4) (a) A first University Degree, Literary, Scientific, or Professional.

(β) Admission as an English or Irish Barrister or Scotch Advocate.

SCALE I.—*continued.*

STANDARD C.	KNOWLEDGE.	ADDITIONAL VOTES.
	(γ) Success in competitive examination for Indian Civil Service, or Home Civil Service, Class I.	
	(5) (α) Honorary Degree, or Degree of LL.D or D. Sc. by examination, or Professional Degree in addition to Literary Degree by examination.	
	(β) Call to Bar in addition to Literary Degree.	
	(γ) Queen's Counselship.	10

This scale would be fit for all countries, as house-rent is everywhere a fair practical test of what a man pays in taxes direct and indirect. The connection, however, is not so obvious as that between a graduated income-tax and a corresponding scale of voting power, and the substitution of income-tax for house-rent under Standard B would make a new scale peculiarly fit for the local suffrage of the United Kingdom, but fit also for the general suffrage of Britain, if the Central Government should need to raise money by an income-tax. Payment of the tax for three years before registration would be required as a security against bribery.

## SCALE II.

Standards A &amp; C same as in Scale II.

STANDARD B.	PAYMENT OF TAXES.			ADDITIONAL VOTES.
	INCOME.	PART PAYING LAST RATE.	RATE.	
			s. d.	
	£100	£20	0 1	1
£101 — 125	£1 — 25	0 2	2	
126 — 150	1 — 25	0 3	3	
151 — 200	1 — 50	0 4	4	
201 — 250	1 — 50	0 5	5	
251 — 300	1 — 50	0 6	6	
301 — 350	1 — 50	0 7	7	
351 — 400	1 — 50	0 8	8	
401 — 450	1 — 50	0 9	9	
451 — 500	1 — 50	0 10	10	
501 — 600	1 — 100	0 11	11	
601 — 800	1 — 200	1 0	12	
801 — 1000	1 — 200	1 1	13	
1001 — 1200	1 — 200	1 2	14	
1201 — 1500	1 — 300	1 3	15	
1501 — 2000	1 — 500	1 4	16	
2001 — 2500	1 — 500	1 5	17	
2501 — 3000	1 — 500	1 6	18	
3001 — 4000	1 — 1000	1 7	19	
4001 — 5000	1 — 1000	1 8	20	
5001 — 6000	1 — 1000	1 9	21	
6001 — 8000	1 — 2000	1 10	22	
8001 — 10,000	1 — 2000	1 11	23	
10,001 — 15,000	1 — 5000	2 0	24	
15,001 — 20,000	1 — 5000	2 1	25	
20,001 — 25,000	1 — 5000	2 2	26	
25,001 — 30,000	1 — 5000	2 3	27	
30,001 — 40,000	1 — 10,000	2 4	28	
40,001 — 50,000	1 — 10,000	2 5	29	
50,001 ad infinitum	1 —	2 6	30	

By the adoption of such schemes as these the timid Englishmen in the Convention would completely secure themselves from being overridden by colonial demagogues, while these demagogues, inside of the Convention and outside would be utterly unable to resist the current of legislation. They could nowhere rouse the enthusiasm of their rough constituents to the resisting point, except, possibly, in Victoria. Elsewhere delight in securing federation on any terms would be the uppermost feeling. And if the Victorian Government should actively or passively obstruct the proclamation and effect of the Convention's Acts, a British fleet, a brigade of British soldiers, and a *coup d'état* would be warmly welcomed by one-third of the Victorian population, three-fourths of its wealth, and nearly the whole of its political intelligence and virtue.

Most probably the Convention would have the honour of introducing Graduated Parliamentary Suffrage to the enlightened and delighted world. Possibly, however, it might find a precedent for its Act in an English statute. Great principles advance slowly. The great principle of qualitative representation, the only security for stability and progress in democratic communities, is still invisible to most minds through mists of custom, prejudice, and grasping dishonest selfishness. The inability of most professed politicians to grasp the notion of a golden mean between the unconditional admission of the lower classes to the right of suffrage, and their unconditional



exclusion, would seem ridiculous, if it were not so terribly dangerous. Men who admit the evils of ochlocracy, but yet rightly think that adult, self-supporting, tax-paying heads of families ought to have some share in making the laws which they obey, nevertheless perversely or stupidly think that they can only do what they believe to be just by establishing what they secretly dread. And on the other hand, most men who wish above all things to save their country from mob-rule, can find no other way of doing so than by cutting off large masses of their fellow-countrymen from all the elevating influences of recognized citizenship, with its privileges and responsibilities, and thus making them exasperated with a sense of exclusion and oppression. Legislation goes stumbling blindfold from the false principle of exclusion to the false principle of absolute equality, missing the true principle of proportion or relative equality which lies between. The first triumph of the political Elixir Vitæ was won in England forty years ago, but never since has it made much advance, except in men's minds. The English scale of voting for Guardians of the Poor, the tolerated ancient anomaly of University representation, and the German system of dividing the power of electing Town Councillors in three equal shares to three pecuniary classes of municipal voters, are the only experiments which have yet been made. But though they have been such conspicuous improvements and successes that no one proposes to make an end of them, there is a

strange lack of proposals to make similar experiments in other fields. Whately spoke for them without producing visible effect. The Conservative Government in 1867 made provision for dual suffrage in its Reform Bill, but esteemed it so lightly as to sacrifice the clause without a contest on the first intimation of Mr. Gladstone's disapproval. Professor Lorimer's admirable "Constitutionalism of the Future" was roared down without serious attention, in the noisy political conflict terminated by the lucky leap in the dark. But a crisis is now approaching when for self-preservation the Conservative leaders must revive the discarded principle, and give to it full embodiment in a necessary legislative act. The agitation for Household Suffrage in the counties is not a thing fit to be treated in a spirit of jaunty and jesting procrastination. The strenuous cry of two or three millions of men, goaded by a rankling sense of exclusion from those rights of citizenship which are possessed by their equals in urban constituencies, cannot long be baffled by mere dilatory pleas and plausible evasions. Those are neither the wisest nor the bravest Conservatives, whose "trust in Providence" allows them to sit on safety-valves and smoke pipes of peace amongst open powder-barrels. "To look danger calmly in the face," says Alison, "and make preparation to meet it when still afar off, is the mark not of a timid but a resolute mind. The greater part of the want of previous arrangements, which so often doubles the weight of misfortunes to nations" (and parties), "as well as

individuals, is the result of mental cowardice. They are afraid of being afraid, and therefore do nothing till the evil day has arrived, just as they delay making their wills till it is too late." Swaggering talk about not being afraid to extend the franchise when the fullness of time arrives, is either humbug, or the result of ignorance of the Conservative party's strength and weakness. No man who knows the social and economical antagonisms of England can believe that the party would have had a majority at the last election, if the right of suffrage in the counties had been previously assimilated to that in the boroughs. It is notorious that the county constituencies are at present the Conservative stronghold, and it ought to be equally notorious that in the towns of England even—still more in those of the smaller kingdoms, the Opposition has a decided majority. And if the counties are assimilated to the towns by extension of the franchise, in the crude manner which alone seems to be contemplated by anybody at present, the Ministry can hardly escape dismissal at the very next election. Farm-labourers will rarely, if ever, be found on the same side with farmers and landlords, and the poaching miners and manufacturing villagers—who are together more numerous than the purely agricultural men of their class—will set their faces (and fists) flintily against those whom they regard as social tyrants. Even if the party persists in refusing the concession, it will be equally exposed to defeat at the next election, by the sympathy of the town-work-

men with their fellow-workmen in the country. The Ministers must therefore be satisfied with one or two years of rose-coloured prospects and perorations, and now buckle on their harness to fight their way out of a ruinous dilemma. The sooner the attempt, the easier the victory. They ought to deal with this deadly danger in precedence of all other business, and save themselves while their party is strong, united, and in the flush of victory: when consequently it can impose conditions while conceding to demands.

A Fabian policy on the part of Conservatives always ends in unconditional surrender, when the act of submission cannot even be made with grace, and is not in the least likely to be rewarded with gratitude and confidence. Like most other dangers, this will be less if taken at its outset, when the agitators are inclined to save themselves from trouble by coming to a compromise, than when at a later period they know that they have merely to wait a little longer before their efforts will be crowned with complete success. If the Ministers are resolute, they will be able to mould the suffrage-laws of the United Kingdom as clay is moulded by the hand of the potter. Some few half-Conservatives may openly rebel, but nineteen-twentieths of the party will obey the whip—some of them groaning and staring, it may be, at the startling innovations, but still obedient. The Opposition, moreover, would not be united in opposing the Ministry, and would send over many of its ablest members to counterbalance the Ministerial losses by

desertion. Mr. Lowe, Mr. Horsman, Mr. Roebuck, Mr. Fitzjames Stephen, if he gains a seat, and probably Sir William Vernon Harcourt, would become supporters of Mr. Disraeli. The eminent historian, Freeman, might on this occasion be expected to add the weight of his opinion to the side of his ordinary antagonists. He says that "Democracy in the sense of Perikles demands for every freeman a voice in the management of public affairs : it does not necessarily demand an equal voice."\* If that is the meaning attached to the word by those who use it lovingly, then the Advanced Tory and the Philosophic Radical can shake hands as brother Democrats. Henceforward the first must confine his denunciations to ochlocracy, and the other reserve all his invective for oligarchy. Graduated Suffrage is not inconsistent with Democracy, and Universal Suffrage is not inconsistent with Aristocracy. And to crown all, Aristocracy is not only consistent with Democracy, but is a species of which Democracy is the genus. Truly Righteousness and Peace have kissed each other, and the Lion has lain down with the Lamb! Order is comfortably stowed away inside of Freedom. What does not Mr. Freeman deserve for accomplishing this magnificent reconciliation?

The fury of the Unphilosophic Radical Opposition would possibly be somewhat baffled, and the assent of the old-fashioned Conservatives less sullen, if the Bill were proposed for seven years,

\* "Growth of the English Constitution," p. 11.

following the precedent of the Ballot Act. The extremely "practical" denouncers of the project as impracticable could not with very good grace object to so moderate a demand, for opportunity of confuting them in the only decisive way, by trying it in practice. Unless they could adduce reasons for thinking the Bill dangerous, equal in distinctness to the reasons adduced by its supporters for thinking it powerless for evil and mighty in promise of good, they would lay themselves open to the effective charge of wantonly and wickedly obstructing that course of safe experiments which is necessary to the perfecting of the political art. The advocates have at least made out a case for trial. The Act could not do much mischief in seven years, and if it did no good it would quietly expire. If it should incur popular detestation, and cause great practical inconvenience, as the opponents would allege, surely that "Will of the People," which they profess to believe omnipotent, could lay an arresting hand on a Parliament favouring renewal. Its friends would, however, rest in assured confidence that it would be renewed just as certainly as the Ballot Act will be renewed. Graduated Suffrage is just one of those extremely practicable institutions, which are so thoroughly in harmony with the established maxims of ordinary human conduct, that if men once see them in operation, everybody will wonder how he could have been such a simpleton as to endure any other systems. But reasons are the very last things which the opponents would attempt to bring forward. They know

very well that the principle is impregnable to direct and honest assault. Stale cavils, hazy misrepresentation, distorted applications, parade of imaginary and exaggerated exceptions, and threatened appeals to vulgar jealousy and lust of power, would be the substitutes for argument, as they have been always hitherto. Masters of the art of sarcastic exposure, such as Mr. Disraeli, and his friends on the other side of the House, would feel only a scornful confidence in tilting against foes armed merely with such weapons as these.

The Ministers would have to endure a host of Noodle's Orations against principles inconsistent with the glorious liberties of freeborn Britons. They would hear dull men of routine, whose most cherished institutions had been made practical not long ago by dead and buried generations of despised "visionaries" and "theorists," crying out "impracticable" to a scheme recommended by Archbishop Whately, the most businesslike of humankind. But these creatures would not be very dangerous. The men who called Mr. Mill unpractical for his nobility in choosing to lead forlorn hopes, were the sordid safe men who take good care always to be strong on the side of the strongest. The Ministry would only need to show its firm determination to be the strongest. A little doggedness in a man, behold how good a thing it is! "Practical" obstructives must be treated as a wise man treats a marauding ghost. He lets the ghost see plainly that he intends to smash it if it does not take its stupid carcase out

of the way. The ghost suddenly recollects a pressing engagement in some other place. Just so the opposition of the stagnant "practicals" would collapse like a pricked bladder at sight of the Ministers with set teeth, girt-up loins, and eyes of flame, grimly determined to send the Bill smashing through all obstructions, in spite of all hazards. The threat of a dissolution, with its attendant worries and expenses, would cower many Radicals, and reduce refractory Conservatives to abject obedience. And as without Graduated Suffrage the Ministerial party must be utterly wrecked in 1880, the Ministers could not lose much, even if an obstinate House of Commons should force them to take the risk of defeat in 1876. They could have small pleasure in holding office for three or four years with a sword hanging over them by a rapidly thinning cord. But the danger of dissolution is visionary indeed. The "practical" politician is a servile creature. As typified in Sir Robert Peel, and defined by his biographer, he is a man who denounces every proposal as impracticable until he sees that it will soon be carried into practice in spite of his resistance. Then he adroitly changes front, reaps the fruit of other men's labours, and adds injury to insult by filching the credit due to the victims of his gibes and sneers. He always swims with the tide against struggling projects, and when the tide turns he sneaks round to come in at the head of those men whom he has been buffeting back, and to steal away the laurels which their courage has earned. His sole principle is to be always, at any cost of character, on



the side which is strongest for the day; his sole test of a Bill's goodness or badness is its likelihood of speedy success. He cannot or will not take the trouble to appreciate anything else. But he has a keen eye for his own test. And a Tory Ministry with a majority in both Houses will, therefore, have only itself to blame, if it cannot make him see clearly that its side must be the winning side even in the present Parliament—much more in the Convention, where all the Indian members, and most of the Colonial, would be at its back.

Of course some answer must be made to the wordy attacks. Fallacies and sophisms are not self-evident to most of mankind. Trenchant exposure is continually needed, for ill weeds have marvellous vitality. "This principle is all very well in theory, but will not do in practice." We would hear *ad nauseam* that poor old cloak for ignorance of facts, inability to grasp principles, and other consequences of mental laziness or imbecility. The answer would be easy. The phrase is self-contradictory. If a principle is good in theory it must be good in practice also, if men can only find the right way of carrying it into practice. Mature men of average sanity, who have devoted their strenuous attention to the study of the right way, have a right to patient and detailed criticism of their proposals, and vague general objections by mental slovens, who have never taken the trouble to form accurate scientific notions of the subject and its issues, are just so much irrelevant impudence. If I bring forward a

plan for embodying in action a principle confessedly good, you who object are bound to show that it is a bad plan, or to propose a better, or to acknowledge that you oppose without having a reason. It is quite true that no experiment can ever be successful if nobody ever tries or is ever allowed to try. But are there no legislators in England who are willing and able to try? As Mr. Mill pungently says,\* there is no difficulty in proving that any principle whatever will work ill, if we suppose universal idiocy to be conjoined with it. Is the character of British legislators anything approaching to universal idiocy? The complexity which is so dreadful to your listless mind is almost universally a prime condition of legal excellence. The justice of a law varies to no small extent directly with its complexity, with its adaptation to varying circumstances. Fact is the basis of right, and as the facts of human nature are extremely various and complex, troublesome complexity must be a characteristic of every good classification of human rights. Troublesome toil is by a law of the universe inseparable from the obtaining of every great good. In all private affairs you cheerfully admit the maxim that nothing is worth much which can be got with little trouble. How then can you prefer the least trouble to the greatest good in the most important department of human activity, and still expect to be treated as a rational being? You think no expenditure of time and trouble too great

\* Utilitarianism, 35.

to bestow upon arrangement of the details of post-office work, or upon a railway-time-table, or a scheme of insurance-rates. Yet you cry out against expending a small fraction of the time and trouble devoted to these matters, on that infinitely more important matter, a scale of political rights.

Says another noodle, "Your proposal is impracticable, because you can never get a perfectly accurate standard of political capacity." Most potent, grave, and reverend noodle ! nobody proposes to attempt anything so foolish, nobody but yourself has been thinking of such a thing. No such standard is needed in political, more than in any other practical adjustments of human affairs in active life. The wisest men are satisfied with approximations to perfection in steering their intricate way through a world of imperfection. In common life we do not deem it a waste of time to estimate men's values, though we cannot be sure of doing so with perfect accuracy. If we did not do it, common business would be involved in confusion. That we cannot do quite so much as we would like to do is no reason for contented idleness. Surely three-quarters of a loaf are better than no bread ! For the required measurements of political capacity we have the close approximation to a perfect standard, which is furnished by combination of the three mutually corrective and supplementary standards of age, property, and education. We all use them already in estimating the capacities of men for private business,

and you will admit that they serve you with tolerable accuracy, even in your rough and hurried applications. Is it then impossible that calm scientific legislators can frame a tolerably accurate scale of human political capacity, which would deal out substantial justice to the electors as a whole? Isolated cases of injustice must always occur under human laws, if only because our imperfect knowledge does not enable us to accommodate them accurately to divine laws. The complex science of human nature is in a very imperfect state, and we do not yet know all the limitations of its general rules, still less the subsidiary exceptions to these very limitations.

Many opponents come so far on the right road as to admit that the nearest approach to a perfectly just distribution of political power will be found in some form of graduated suffrage. But they rate the difficulty of the task so highly and the capacity of British legislators so lightly, as to think that any new system of suffrage would be no better, and probably much more unjust than the old, though in a different way. That is a matter of opinion. The theory of universal idiocy over again! But your opinion, my friends, is not that of those who know most about the work and the workmen. They think that the data and the men are practically sufficient for a considerable work of improvement. To give to you an opportunity of showing your fitness to pronounce an opinion, I challenge you to prove considerable flaws in the schemes propounded in this book. Do not think that you have answered my challenge, when you have

pointed out cases exceptional to my rules. You have no right whatever to object to those rules unless you can give good reasons for deeming the exceptional more numerous than the normal cases, or can suggest better rules devised by yourself or some other person. It is quite true that a Scotch fishwife could thrash a French private of the line, but that fact does not dethrone the general rule that men are stronger than women. You may say that some men are as wise at twenty-one as others are at fifty, but you have no right to reject the standard of age until you can substitute most for some. You may say that a paragon mechanic is wiser than a young bachelor of arts, but until you can prove that men who have had a liberal education are as a rule no wiser than those who have not, you have no right to say that the standard of education does not correspond to facts of human nature. *En passant* compare nine average borough-members with the nine university-members, six of whom are privy-councillors and seven of whom have been found worthy to hold high offices under this and preceding Governments. You may sneer as much as you like at mere wealth, but the standard of property remains fixed on a rock which you do not attempt to shake, on the almost invariable connection of wealth with leisure to think, means of study, opportunities of imbibing wisdom by contact with highly cultured men, and a comfortable frame of mind well disposed to entertain tolerant and liberal sentiments.

At least you may permit an experiment. Can you

give good specific reasons for thinking that any probable system of graduated suffrage would be attended with more injustice and consequent ill-feeling than the present system of equal suffrage? Formal exclusion even would be less grievous to the lower classes than virtual exclusion is to the upper, because the latter have more sensitiveness and more just pride to be wounded. Oligarchy is by its nature more tolerant and tolerable than ochlocracy. Many of its members are always men of gentle feelings and liberal sympathies. It dares not go to great lengths of tyranny because it cannot command the ultimate physical force of the nation. Fear of the populace is an effective check to oligarchical excesses. But *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes*. There is no physical force in reserve to check the sovereign mob from dragging everything down to its own sordid level. To say that fear of mob-tyranny is fear of a phantom, on the ground that the newly enfranchised populace of the English towns has not yet shaken off its habits of respectful subordination, is merely to utter a most paltry and childish cavil. The wolf will come at last and do all the more mischief because smiling optimists have lulled everybody into false security. And we have the glaring examples of America and Australia before our eyes to warn us of what we may expect when our lower classes have come to know their own strength, to be inflated with a sense of their own supremacy, and to be intoxicated by the wilful and capricious exercise of absolute power. The election of Dr.

Kenealy is a nice foretaste of what we may soon have in abundance.

The invidious assertion of an unnatural equality is a standing insult to every class but the lowest. That is one good answer to those unmitigated Radicals who denounce graduated suffrage as an outrage on manhood, an artificial degradation of the essence below its mere accessories and accidents. Not the only one, however. Wealth and learning are not generally accidental, and accessories as in the case of paints are sometimes at least more valuable than such a groundwork as their canvas. But let that pass. The artificiality is altogether on the side of equal suffrage. Electoral equality is an anomaly in the universe. There is nothing like it in the order of nature, in social arrangements, in the estimation of evidence, in the choice of agents. Nobody in his common life and ordinary business acts upon the principles that all men are equal, and that one man is as good as another. These are just as far from being established maxims of human conduct, as are the statements, that all the Mammalia are equal, and that one vertebrate animal is as good as another. There is nothing intrinsically invidious in human inequality. Social, moral, and intellectual inequalities are cheerfully recognised by all men in every relation of life except the political, and no men but morbid misanthropes feel insulted by mention of them, except when recognition is demanded in an insolent manner. Neither will anybody feel insulted by electoral in-

equality, when it has once been fairly established on an intelligible basis. Nobody would even now feel insulted by the proposal, if Radical incendiaries would only let men alone and cease from their railing false accusations. What is proposed is merely to reform our antiquated laws by taking away the element of arbitrary and artificial interference with universal inequality. The end of suffrage-laws is not the levelling of inequalities or the correction of evils, but simply the expression of every man's opinion in political action according to the natural measure of his powers. If directly used as means of education they are abused by perversion to an unnatural purpose, while graduated suffrage offers all the indirect educational advantages of equal suffrage without its liability to abuse. The perfection of an electoral law lies in its concurrence with facts of human nature as they are, not as men may think that they ought to be. I follow nature and recognise facts. Human inequality I see is a great glaring fact, and our laws are glaring contradictions of that great fact. I wish, therefore, that positive law should be harmonized with natural facts by political recognition of natural inequality. Graduated suffrage equally with equal suffrage is a recognition of the great fact of manhood as the groundwork and necessary condition of electoral power. But a foundation is not the best part of a house. Manhood is the basis of the highest share of voting power, just as bottlehood is the basis of the highest-priced dozen of wine. But bare humanity, like



empty bottlehood, is a very poor thing. All men, considered simply as men, are equal or nearly equal, just as all bottles, considered simply as bottles, are nearly equal in pettiness of value. The value of bottles depends chiefly on what is put into them by the wine-merchant, and just so the value of men depends chiefly on what is put into them by experience of men and things, acquisition of formulated knowledge, and all the educating influences which consciously or unconsciously modify the possessor of wealth. And after something has been put into them men differ from each other in political value, just as much as a bottle of small beer differs in price from a bottle of Imperial Tokay. The right of every mature law-obeying, self-supporting man to a share in the government of his country is one thing; a thing which I am as ready to admit as any Radical in England. But the claim of every man to an equal share is another and altogether different thing: a thing which I cannot regard as anything more than a piece of ridiculous impudence. Government by the majority is right and necessary: but only when the majority is a majority of mental quality, not merely of physical quantity; of human value, not of human units of different values; of brains, not of flesh and bone.

Arguments like these may be made perfectly intelligible to working men. They have distinctions of persons already amongst themselves, and none of those established by graduated suffrage are naturally likely to offend them. There would be no broad

invidious line of demarcation cutting them off from other men as a quite separate and degraded caste. On the contrary the strata of political power would be as numerous as the gradations of the social scale, and shade into one another as insensibly. Still better, they would sometimes not coincide with social strata, but break through them, and gratify ambitious workingmen by lifting them politically above their social superiors. Most of them would have plural votes, and a middle-aged skilled artisan earning £2 a week, or living in a house rented at 8s., would have more votes than a young officer in the army. The latter would have only five or six or seven votes, while the former would have at least eight, and might increase the number to twenty, if he should devote his evenings to study and pass the third public examination. There would be no sting in such a system as that. Poor men revolt at distinctions of kind: not at distinctions of degree. The standard of age would excite no envy. Everybody could hope to reach the highest rungs of that ladder. The standard of education would be gladly accepted by able working men as a spur to self-improvement and a mean of attaining a higher political status. Nor would the property-standard be so "odious" as Mr. Mill seems to have thought. Working men have sense enough to know that the best of them get the best wages, and that greater wealth is presumptive proof of greater wisdom to understand political affairs, and conclusive proof of greater interest in the maintenance and wel-

fare of government. There is nothing which they can more easily comprehend than the argument that as the State is a joint-stock institution for protecting life and property, those members ought to have the greatest share of control who contribute most of the stock and have most property to be protected. They can be made to see the injustice of giving more control over the affairs of a joint-stock company to twenty individual shillings paid for a single share than to nineteen individual sovereigns paid for nineteen shares. They will readily admit that those who pay the piper ought to have the power of choosing the dance.

We need not be frightened by Radical threats of a grand uprising of the People (with a very big P) in all its majesty against this flagitious scheme of insult and robbery. Those who believe them must think that the working men of England are "such fools as to be incapable of having a scheme of representation which is founded on reason and justice explained to them, or such scoundrels as to set it at nought after they have become acquainted with it." Riots and ferocious agitation would indeed be the result of an attempt to take away the right of suffrage. But they can easily be made to see that in the case of the country workmen there cannot be any taking away at all from those who have got nothing; and that in the case of the town workmen there will be only the taking away of something entirely different from the right of suffrage—the power of everywhere excluding their superiors from representation. It is not extravagant

to hope that the discussion of the subject in Parliament will at least half-persuade them that they have no divine right to so tremendous a power. Most men are somewhat reluctant to give up even powers which they know to be unrighteous. The working men may therefore be somewhat sulky at the loss of their present control of the town constituencies, and their prospect of controlling all the constituencies. But they have not yet been spoiled by long possession and capricious exercise of absolute power. They have still some amount of sweet reasonableness in their nature. They are not capable of violent indignation and revolt against a reform supported by reasons, which they must admit to be strong if not sufficient, which are not insulting to them, and which involve no exclusion or degradation of anybody from political status. The rights and dignities of citizenship are evidently bestowed for the first time by that reform on one half of their number, and remain intact for the other half.

Nevertheless, Cheap John and his apes cannot afford to lose their clap-trap, and will of course yell out that the Ministry is taking back with one hand what it gives with the other to the present non-electors in the counties. For the moment, before the practical operation of the Act confutes them, the sophistic epigram might be as mischievous as a bombshell among weak minds not able to see that it is also as hollow. Herds of ill-informed, inconsiderate, and essentially childish intellects would regard the balanced phrase as a brilliant argument. For their sake I shall now rip it open and

expose the lie which is sole tenant of its belly, in the illustrative style adapted to such as are of weaker capacity. Once upon a time I went to my brother's house, loaded as to my coat tails with three red apples. On the appearance of Charley, aged ten, I put one of the apples into his hand, and had the pleasure of seeing him look happy in the conscious possession of his uncle's kindly regards. Needing to attend to something else for a few minutes, I overlooked the presence of Bobby, aged five. Bobby had the uncomfortable feeling of being left out in the cold, and was sore at the thought that his uncle had no such esteem for him as for Charley, and did not think him worthy of any notice. I took out another apple, and instantly brightened the little fellow's face with the feeling that he had come in from the cold outside, and was no longer excluded from the warm circle of affectionate esteem. At the same time, with the other hand, I gave the third apple to Charley. Did Bobby feel that I had taken from him with one hand what I had given with the other? No, thank heaven, he is not one of the odious little greedies who look upon anything done for another child as a wrong done to them! He did not think that he had lost his place in my regards and been put out into the cold again. He would have liked another apple, indeed, but he was quite content with one, when I explained that Charley got two because he had a larger organism with a double capacity for assimilation. *De te fabula narratur*, I hope, O virtuous peasant, O sturdy miner! You will have

some of Bobby's sweet reasonableness? The epigram will surely not deceive the working men, who get and keep the vote, which the talking men will try to make them believe Mr. Disraeli has juggled away. They may join in the talking men's cry with hope of frightening Parliament into giving something more than a vote. But when the Bill has become an Act, they will rest content with what they have got. Think of what a great thing it is which they will get! Satisfaction of their aspirations to the place of a recognized citizen! Relief from the galling sense of inferiority in kind to their neighbours in farmhouse and town! Rescue from a depressing feeling of exclusion from the highest of ordinary human ambitions, from having a share in the government of their country! The self-respect of men who have public rights and duties, whose voices are heard in the determination of public affairs! They will no longer be political nullities whose wishes and opinions are things of no importance, but freeborn Britons, able to swagger up to the polling-booths and record their secret votes, with all the gravity and deliberation due to such momentous proceedings. They will be able to listen to the humble solicitations of fine gentlemen at elections, with all the dignity of a man who has a favour to confer. They themselves will be addressed as gentlemen from crowded and brilliant platforms. Will all these things be nothings to men who feel themselves despised outcasts; and will they believe in spite of all their five senses that Mr. Disraeli has only been playing some of his tricks

and has left them no better than they were? All these things come with their votes, even to those who get no more than one vote, and do not go away because their superior neighbours get additional votes. The secret reason of the Radical's fury is not that anything is taken away, but because something is not given, which, above all things, *alone perhaps*, he really desired. He is angry, not because the reform will take away citizenship from any working man, but because it will not invest the lower classes with absolute power of doing as they choose with the empire. He cares little for the social and moral elevation of the poor, which citizenship indirectly helps to effect. What he wants to do is to demoralise those who have the weakest heads and least regulated passions in the nation, by suddenly thrusting upon them the intoxicating draught of unlimited power. Then he will, he hopes, be able to lure them on with flattery, excitement of jealousy, and promise of plunder, to gratify the social and religious grudges which he cherishes in his own benevolent bosom. That hope is the main-spring of all his desperate ragings against graduated suffrage. He wishes to make the poor masters of England, not because he loves them, but because he hopes to make them the tools of his now impotent malignity.

The only argument against graduated suffrage, which is in the least degree respectable, is the statement that Age, Intelligence, Wealth, and other forms of social superiority are already represented

indirectly by their influence on the inferior electors, and that direct representation in addition would consequently be unnecessary and unjust. There are, however, only a few grains of truth in the premise, and none at all in the inference. The political opinions of old and young are notoriously and often violently different. Almost the only persons who sufficiently respect great learning and wisdom are those few who have leisure and ability to appreciate it, and who therefore have least need of guidance. Highly educated and thoughtful men have few opportunities of coming into contact with those inferiors who need enlightenment, and can influence only those who are of the same class with themselves, and who would vote in exactly the same way if left quite alone. Mr. Carlyle and Mr. Froude have hardly any more political influence in Chelsea than their most common-place neighbours. Oxford and Edinburgh have long been overflowing hot-beds of the meanest and least intellectual type of extreme Radicalism. The Scotch University-men are predominantly Tory, yet four Scotchmen out of every five are Whigs, or worse. Every election-agent knows that the learning and wisdom of a candidate, or of his supporters, go for nothing appreciable in a parliamentary election. Mr. Mill's statement, that moral influences are exactly expressed by universal suffrage, is irrelevant but true, because it is merely an identical statement. The supporters of graduated suffrage contend for recognition of moral superiority, a thing mightily different from moral influence, and indeed often varying inversely with it. Mr. Mill con-



founds what ought to be with what is. Because A is wiser, more learned, in every way more estimable than B, C, and D, it does not follow that any one of the latter will guide his opinions by those of the former. To make an impression you must have not only an impressive agent, but a correspondingly impressible object. There is such a thing as casting pearls before swine, and it is rather the rule than the exception in regard to the matter in hand. Besides how can excellence have much effect on those with whom it is not brought into close and frequent contact? What do scavengers know or care about the political opinions of scholars and savants?

The only kind of natural superiority which at present obtains any appreciable amount of political recognition is superior wealth. But the recognition is restricted to certain sorts of wealth, employed in some few particulars ways which bring their owners constantly into intimate relations with large masses of men on a footing of predominance, and not possessed by the majority of men who are in comfortable pecuniary circumstances. Their possessors are not even coincident with all or nearly all of the most wealthy members of the community, and are very far indeed from being the chief possessors of the resultant elevation and refinement of thought and feeling, which render men with comfortable incomes best fitted to hold political power. Name landowners and manufacturers, and you name almost the only men whose wealth enables them to direct the votes of other men. Their more numerous social equals may enjoy as

much social consideration, but seldom command a vote beyond their own. Poor men are not influenced by rich men who are not masters. Are not Marylebone and Chelsea notoriously the most Radical of the Metropolitan Boroughs, though nine-tenths of the rates are paid by Conservatives? Social deference is not political deference, even under the practice of open voting. A nobleman may often be treated with respect and kindness by an individual Radical, when the two meet as individuals. If left to himself the latter might not feel very anxious to humiliate his aristocratic neighbour. But when men act politically, they act in masses, their individuality is merged, and a class-hatred is often generated to the displacement of soberer, gentler, and more judicial private feelings. Class-opinion and clique-opinion displace individual opinion, and the former are almost always formed by those members of the class who are most self-asserting, most envious, and most intolerant of the claims of real superiority.

The actual indirect representation of property, moreover, is not only irregular, unfairly distributed, and miserably inadequate, but also extremely precarious, and continually growing smaller. The Ballot Act took away a great part of it, and in time, with the growing love of independence in classes long torpidly submissive, will take it away almost entirely. Besides, it is immoral and dangerous to the public weal, because it is a violation of the spirit of the law, and thus brings the law as a whole into contempt. The preca-

riousness and immorality of this additional political power actually adhering to property, combine with its inadequacy to urge on the substitution of direct for indirect representation of its natural powers. The result would not at all justify the inference that property would get too much representation, in being represented both directly and indirectly. It would cease to be represented indirectly. Gentlemen now use their money-power to get something like that share of political power, to which they have a divine right, but no legal right. The public opinion of their class now permits violations of the spirit of an unjust law, just as the public opinion of the lower classes recognises the poacher as still an honourable man, because it regards the laws which he violates as unjust and oppressive. Give legal recognition to the divine rights. Provide open and legitimate modes of giving proportional expression to natural powers in political action. Sense of honour will then constrain every gentleman to abandon his present illegitimate and half-concealed modes of finding expression for natural powers so large as to be only insulted by the bestowal of a single vote. Faggot-voting, bribery, significant importunity, intimidation, are only reasonable reprisals made by men whom the the present laws keep out of their just political powers. The public opinion of the educated classes does not now regard these expedients as dishonourable, but it would quickly make an end of them, if those just political powers were fully conceded. The establishment of graduated suffrage, would immediately put every

gentleman on his honour to abstain from all attempts to influence the use of another man's vote, and legal rights of suffrage would correspond to divine rights, not informally and imperfectly, but with nearly complete equality in letter as well as in spirit.

I close this discussion of practical statesmanship, with an intensely practical parting shot. Under the present suffrage-laws, householders and lodgers have much trouble in proving their claims, much litigation goes on before Revising Barristers, and many vexatious exclusions are continually being made on the most paltry grounds. Nearly all these troubles would cease under the simple requirements of the proposed Act in regard to residence. And no troubles of equal intensity would take their vacated places. Nothing is easier, or more easily understood, than the production of evidence of age, tax-payments, and education. Everybody understands the nature and necessity of extracts from birth-registers, receipts for house-tax or income-tax, examination certificates, and university diplomas. Detection of fraud would be so easy and inexpensive that none would venture to incur its penalties. The only difficulty connected with the subject is in framing a scale, and that would trouble none but the ministers themselves.

## CHAPTER V.

### THE POLICY OF ANNEXATION.

THE establishment of an imperial senate would remove the chief present objection to extension of the British Empire. Her Majesty's British Cabinet could no longer plead over-work and want of time as reasons for not extending to other dark places of the earth those "blessings of British rule" which Sir Wilfrid Lawson mentions so lightly, and every candid friend of civilization values so highly. For the legislature of the Empire would be mercifully relieved from the knagging drudgery of local English legislation, and would have plenty of time to attend to the affairs of the wide world beyond the four seas. The many reasons for enlarging the borders of Britain would then, perhaps, for the first time be fairly considered and acknowledged by active British statesmen. We can surely hope that they will despise the antique homilies on the decline and fall of the Roman Empire in consequence of too great extension. It would be much more reasonable to say that Rome fell because she did not conquer enough, but left an outer world of unsoftened barbarians, whose rude vigour was sufficient for her destruction. She fell to pieces not because she was unwieldily big, but because she became rotten-hearted, and therefore foul-blooded.

While Britain is sound at the core, her body will only grow stronger by growing larger. We have no strong reason to fear degeneration, and many strong reasons to hope for improvement. The conditions of these latter days of Britain are radically different from the conditions of the latter days of Rome. Then there was little religion and less morality, and both were rapidly hastening from bad to worse. Now religious faith is here growing stronger and clearer day by day, and morality growing more refined, more intense, and more comprehensive in its influence on human feelings and on the details of human life and conversation. The duty of Britain to take a large part of the outer world under her management is not practically limited by the condition of competence to manage so much. She can never "have enough," and the more she has the more good she will be able to do. She is now, and is likely to remain, quite competent for any duty which she may be called to perform. Folk who talk sneeringly about "visionary schemes," need to be reminded that she has already accomplished tasks more difficult than any which can test her in the future. Let them read again the first page of Macaulay's Essay on Clive, and recall the prophecies of the sage Dr. Lardner. Let them still further reduce themselves to a wholesome state of humility, by reflecting that they belong to the same brood of wiseacres, who ridiculed the project of an Atlantic cable, and derided the Suez Canal as the dream of a magnificent madman. Men who

prate that Britain has already as much as she can manage, seem to imagine that she has only one brain and one pair of hands for political work, and cannot do more by greater division of labour. But nobody proposes to add anything to the work of those whose attention is already sufficiently occupied. It will not be difficult to find new officers fit for the new work, from additional corporals to additional Colonial Secretaries. The British Islands and their colonies in the southern hemisphere contain an inexhaustible store, actual and potential, of soldiers, civilians, and "captains of industry," as good as any who are already in the field. Nothing is wanted but similar preparation evoked by similar opportunity. There will be no lack of volunteers to run all the risk and take all the trouble, while the timid obstructives may sit at home in perfect ease of mind and body, without even needing to put their hands in their pockets except for their own private purposes.

Foreign Secretaries and Colonial Secretaries may try to shirk moral responsibility, and avoid the very appearance of formal obligation. But they, as stewards for the British nation, cannot cast off its divine responsibility for making the best use of its pre-eminent and peculiar talents. They cannot relieve it or themselves by a careless official "*non possumus*" from the sacred obligations to act as Justice-General of the world's peace, and schoolmaster of inferior tribes, which are imposed upon it by its general superiority. Such a policy as the timid obstructives

are prone to favour, might suit a nation of niggards, sluggards, and cowards. But the world has a right to expect something better from the "hereditary nobility of mankind." *Noblesse oblige*. The powers of the Anglo-Saxon race have not been given for its own insular glory and gratification. To squander the energies of an imperial people in petty local work would be an unpardonable outrage on the divine order of nature. Lives sacrificed to duty are not losses to the world. They have not been lived in vain. They cannot be better spent than in leading the forlorn hopes of humanity, in reclaiming savage men and dangerous lands, in sowing broadcast the seeds of good, and watering them, even though it be with English blood. That blood will speak eloquently to stir the blood of all true men who follow. On some men must lie the duty of developing that greatest happiness of the greatest number; which, as Radical philanthropists need often to be reminded, may not be the greatest happiness of the greatest number presently existing. Some nursing-fathers are needed for the savages and stagnant half-civilized peoples who cannot well walk forward without leading strings. Dazed as they will be by the inevitable movement from darkness into the blazing light of modern civilization, they must not be allowed to stumble to and fro into sloughs and over precipices under the guidance of blind leaders chosen by the blind. Any natural process of change among such beings must be erratic or interrupted, and is less likely to end in good



than in some new form of evil. The operation of trade and intercourse with Europe is not by itself an unmingled benefit. As we may at this moment see in Fiji, the earliest commercial adventurers in an unorganized country are not remarkable for culture, or for any virtue but courage. The effects of intercourse with such cannot be very beneficial, and have in many cases been positively degrading, positively obstructive to the entrance of civilized notions and habits, and ruinous to trade itself. Even when the country recovers from or resists the mischievous influences of the first contact, its unaided growth must be like that of England—tedious, fitful, and painful. From such suffering, such waste of time and strength; from the long-drawn misery of a lonely, self-directed upward struggle, we can save it, and in so doing benefit our traders, all ourselves, all the world. It is the duty, the high privilege of us who have painfully learnt the lesson of order, to teach the weaker brethren who would have to spend a long time indeed in puzzling it out for themselves. We deem it wrong to leave the wild children of our cities to their natural processes of development. Is it not equally wrong to leave the wild peoples of the earth? For most nations civilization has been, and must be, a grafted, not a natural fruit. Peaceful intercourse on equal terms has not done a tithe of as much as has been done for culture by the imposition of a conqueror's stricter order and superior usages. But for the formation of the vast Roman Empire we would never

have seen the astonishing development of modern Europe. And as it has been in the past for Europe, so must it be in the future for Asia, Africa, and tropical America. "Great is the power of what is good," some will say, "it must prevail everywhere sooner or later." Why not sooner rather than later? Virtue may be strong even in its nakedness. But how much stronger when clothed in the garb of public power, and speaking with the voice of legal authority! When can the arts of peace spread so fast, and root themselves so deeply, as when the competent hand of an enlightened ruler guarantees that the peace shall not be broken? Does not the presence of the European magistrate add tenfold efficacy to the labour of the merchant, the planter, the schoolmaster, and even the missionary? And are not the number and character of the former three incalculably improved by his protection and control? The qualities of the English race are just such as pre-eminently fit it for the work which some, nevertheless, now adjure us to prosecute no further. Its enterprising spirit and steady industry make it the best developer of wild and thinly-peopled regions; its religious uprightness and political talents make it the best body of managers of the progress of inferior races. No other people is comparable to it in fitness for the discharge of imperial functions. Divine providence seems to have made a special disposal of historic conditions, mental and material, to cultivate in Englishmen those special qualities which justly command the

allegiance of inferior races. No other country has been so favoured with that pure religion from which most human uprightness and kindness have their origin and nourishment. Nowhere else has society preserved so much of the tone of the chivalrous ages, of that sense of honour which so powerfully inculcates devotion to duty, and is in the absence of confirmed Christian principles the great ensurer of judicial purity, official integrity, and commercial honesty. Our long and unique political training has produced not only political institutions, but also a national public character of unique excellence. The British constitution, sturdy by long natural growth, and yet plastic by long habituation to modifying influences, is a slowly elaborated model in which above all others—perhaps, in which alone—has stability been made compatible with progress, and dignity with active efficiency. In it alone are found the mutually necessary and mutually corrective elements of a wealthy commonalty, a liberal aristocracy, and a Crown strong both by ancient right and by popular choice—the three legs of a healthy commonwealth. The English people in their public character are also in many ways an example deserving to be brought home to the rest of the world. Nowhere are public morality and capacity so high as in it, equally among the governors and the governed. In no other people are the political talents and virtues so generally diffused. And nowhere else has reverence for law been so strongly developed, not only in no opposition to, but in

harmony with, a spirit of individual enterprise, self-reliance, and steadiness of purpose. And that spirit has formed those maritime habits, and given that maritime supremacy, which most conspicuously declare England's fitness for the leadership of an almost world-wide federation. The acquisition of such a position will be far easier to her than to any nation likely to be her competitor. No other has so many convenient bases for extended operations. To no other can such a policy seem so natural, either in her own eyes or in those of her neighbours.

Yet we have been more than once taunted with grasping unfairness to other European nations in our imperial career, and many generous souls are therefore ready to stigmatize further acquisitions as the acts of a greedy gobbler, whose blind voracious envy will not permit others to do for themselves a tithe of as much as he has done for himself in the field of colonial enterprise. They jump at the slightest excuse to fasten upon us a charge of insatiable and unscrupulous lust for power and wealth, in a field where there is plenty of room for all, and thinking that we have already enough and more than enough, bid us leave the rest of the world to the devices of our neighbours. The taunt and the advice are alike irrational. If any profit is to be gained from subordinate territories, surely those have the best right to it who are willing and able to render the greatest services in return. And that is and always has been the character of England. Her history affords no

cases analogous to the long systematic plunder of South America by Spain, and Java by Holland. Her administration has in general been honestly framed with a view to the welfare of her subjects, and in many parts of Africa established for directly philanthropic ends. In the light of past colonial experience England's supreme fitness for the leadership of inferiors is quite unquestionable. Why then question the rightfulness of the utmost use of her beneficent powers? What good can be done by burying some of her talents in the earth? What right has she to hand over to inferior workers the task which none can do so well as she, while still having within her widened bounds an exhaustless supply of energy, of men clearly marked out by nature to be the officers of the industrial brigades of the great equatorial regions? It is a strange kind of generosity which allows other men to spoil work which you yourself can do perfectly well if you only choose to try. It is a sin and a shame.

The great duty is one which ought to be shared with others in as slight a degree as is consistent with the avoidance of war with a very powerful neighbour. We clearly cannot get all the uncivilised and unappropriated world under our umbrella, though we may get a very large part. That we can do it better is alone a sufficient reason for keeping the work out of the hands of others. That makes it our duty to get and keep territory wherever we can. That will justify us in anticipating Ger-

many and in inducing Holland by payment of a million or two and the aid of our Asiatic fleets and armies against the obstinate Achinis, to cede her large claims and small settlements in those great islands, Borneo and Papua, which are already partly British. When the best has been said, these Protestant and Monarchical countries are decidedly inferior to England and Scotland in religion, in morals, and in the political virtues and talents. Far stronger is the obligation to save the world from tutelage by nations imbued with Popish or Ochlocratic superstitions, the two disastrous extremes of social tendencies, and above all from France, where the extremes meet. The ascendancy of France, Italy, Spain, or the United States, would be a misfortune to any country, however bad its present state may be. Not much beyond a varnishing of mechanical civilisation would be gained. France has done little or nothing to improve in any way the large districts which she holds in Algeria, Cochin-China, and New Caledonia, but has been guilty of many acts of cruelty and oppression in very modern times. The religious effects, such as they may be, of French supremacy will not atone for the political. Frenchmen do not like Ultramontaniam for themselves, but they are willing enough to impose it upon others. They will displace a Pagan by a Papal superstition, not much better in itself, and much more impervious to the influence of rational Christianity. Not content with that they will probably persecute Protestant converts already

made, as they have done in Tahiti and are now doing in the Loyalty Islands. From imminent danger of similar treatment it is the urgent duty of the First Protestant Power to rescue Madagascar and Tonga, and more especially the Presbyterian New Hebrides, lying so perilously near to New Caledonia, so conveniently near to Fiji. France is notoriously hungry for colonial conquests, and none can doubt that if our policy of indifference continues she will very soon be mistress not only of Northern Africa, Senegambia, and Indo-China, but also of Madagascar and the larger part of Polynesia. The first two and the greater part of the third we cannot, indeed, save without open war, and must therefore abandon to their fate. Algeria is already French and is out of all relations with us, while Tunis, Tripoli, and perhaps Morocco we must leave at her mercy in order to save something more important. Cession of Bathurst and all our forts in Senegambia north of Sierra Leone, is necessary to complete our control of Guinea by the acquisition in a fair exchange of the French stations on the Gold Coast and the Gaboon River. The Gallic Eagle has already fixed his claws so deeply in the Empire of Anam that we cannot now deprive him of his prey. But we can at least save the neighbouring kingdom of Siam from a similar fate by enrolling it among the protected States of India. There is nothing to prevent us from saving Tonga, Rarotonga, the New Hebrides, and the Solomon Islands, by immediately annexing them to

Fiji. Madagascar is too conspicuous to be treated so unceremoniously while we have a quieter but equally effectual way of procuring her deliverance. We can so work on Malagasy fears of the French as to induce the Queen to acknowledge the imperial sovereignty of the Queen of Britain, in return for a guarantee of protection by British soldiers and sailors against her most dreaded enemy. To ask more than such an acknowledgment would not at first be politic, but more would inevitably follow. A protected state when once fairly entangled with a great federal kingdom cannot but gravitate to a condition of federal subordination. The device of a protectorate is moreover applicable advantageously elsewhere than in Madagascar. In Siam, as already mentioned, and also in Persia, in Egypt, in Arabia, and even in America, it may be used to extend the area of British power without the troublesome necessity of conquest. The intimacy of the connection ought to vary for different states as well as at different times. Some, like the Native States of India, would be occupied by British troops ; others would not. A wise British Government would be exceedingly liberal to them in matters both of privilege and of finance. It would, at least, in the beginning, allow them to keep up separate armies and engage to defend them for a very small annual payment ; would let them have a share of central legislative powers, but yet not make Acts of Senate binding on them unless confirmed by the local legislature ; and would admit them to all or most of the privileges



of British citizenship, while troubling them with few or none of its responsibilities and restraints. Of course, however, they would immediately cede to the imperial sovereign the power of declaring war and concluding peace, and even reluctant Madagascar would soon, if not immediately, have to yield full local rights to all members of the Empire. The consequent influx of Anglo-Saxons would very soon assimilate the Protected States to the ordinary parts of the British Federation. Surely this will be a policy much less troublesome, and much more profitable to ourselves and to mankind, than any more paltry patching up of equal alliances with the flighty and faithless occupants of rickety chairs of State.

Italy has not yet any colonies, and has not tried to get them. If she does try she ought to be instantly thwarted. The wisdom shown in her management of her own affairs is certainly not such as to promise much for any distant subjects. As for Spain no one can seriously contemplate her interference as capable of benefiting anybody anywhere. She has the faults of France in a worse degree, with ignorance and sloth in addition. Happily she cannot just now try to grab anything, and we will not be concerned with her at all. Portugal is ambitious enough in Africa, as she showed with a good deal of spiteful sulkiness at the time of our war with the Ashantis. Her dominion, unprofitable to herself and superficial as it is, is no small curse to both sides of Southern Africa, and in the interest of everybody,

ought to be brought to a speedy end. As she owes her independent existence to us we have another strong justification for very peremptory dealing. The recent quarrel about Delagoa Bay might have been so used as to force a sale of her rickety forts on the whole coast of Mozambique, and thus place the great Zambezi river, as the fitness of things demands, under the control of a really commercial nation. She has established her hold more firmly on the Western Coasts, but does so little in any way that nobody can have much of excuse for calling us very wicked, if the imperial Senate votes a handsome payment for enforced concession. At any rate we must have the Congo, which late discoveries have shown to be so important a water-highway, and as the north bank is still in the hands of independent savages, there is nothing to prevent us from occupying it without delay.

In the United States nobody but the falling President shows any intention or desire of going beyond North America, and perhaps some of the adjacent isles. But even there our vigilance will be useful. They appear already to have got some hold of Samoa, but the Sandwich Islands, Hispaniola, and Mexico are still as open to us as to them. We can and we ought to do something in the way of anticipating the movements of the slipshod parody of orderly and enlightened England. The extension of its power will be fraught, not indeed with the same religious, but with many of the same civil and social mischiefs

which accompany the ascendancy of the French. Its so-called government is nothing but a gathering up of all the folly, paltriness, dirtiness, and roguery of the country into a position of predominance over its sweetness and light—the supremacy of the *nouvelles couches sociales* with a vengeance—“ignorance making a merit of its meanness, and meanness making a merit of its ignorance.” Truly a nation of shopkeepers, with no notion of progress beyond the multiplication of turbulent man-flesh and the unscrupulous accumulation of inelegant wealth! They have all the public vices of the Cisatlantic republicans. The same incompetence, dishonesty, and venality, in many places the same tyranny on the part of officials. The same meanness, ignorance, corruption, jealousy of eminence, and contempt of law on the part of the people; a contempt not indeed very surprising, when we consider the contemptible creatures by whom their laws are made and administered. Can any good thing come out of a country whose ignorant roughs elect roughs not much better informed, to misrule its wealth and intelligence; where the classes socially and morally last are politically first or everything, and the classes socially and morally first are politically last or nothing? Can a nation be fit for political supervision of others, when its own respectable members habitually use the word “politician” as a term of reproach? We must judge them by the total absence of decency and good sense from the management of their internal affairs, by their rasping and

malignant oppression of the conquered South, and by their continuous plunder and slaughter of their Red Indian subjects: and then we can pronounce no other sentence than that of utter unfitness for any new responsibility.


Prevention is within our power when once England's neck is freed from the Canadian millstone. Oh for the joys of being free to snap our fingers in the faces of the Yankees, on that glorious day of emancipation! They will after that, think once, twice, and even thrice before they allow their insolent and touchy vanity to carry them into a war which must be entirely naval on their part, and in which, therefore, they could not fail to get that jolly good thrashing which they have needed so much ever since they began to flaunt the star-spangled banner. They will not make it a *casus belli* that the King of the Sandwich Islands acknowledges the Queen of Britain as his imperial sovereign. They will not feel in honour bound to resist our acquisition of control over their rejected Hispaniola, separated as it is from their territory by the long group of British Bahamas and surrounded by islands already in European hands. The republic of Santo Domingo, which contains the largest and finest part of the island, is not very eager to maintain its independence, has already sought admission into the United States, and would probably be very glad to be protected by the United Kingdom. At any rate it will not demand anything exorbitant for ceding Samana Bay,

one of the most important harbours in the world, and necessary, like Egypt, the Sandwich Islands, and either Nicaragua or Darien, to the power which wishes to be really mistress of the seas, able to maintain fleets and secure uninterrupted passage for its trade on every important portion of the globe's aqueous surface. Nicaragua will be the most difficult of all to acquire. That wretched product of Whiggish weakness—worse even than the Ashburton Treaty—the Clayton - Bulwer Treaty of 1850, as revised in 1859, surrendered our protectorate of the Mosquito Coast, and tied our hands against annexation of Central America, or obtaining control of that great western gateway of war and commerce. But as the Yankees have violated their engagement, in spirit if not in letter, by successfully negotiating for the sole right of making and using a canal through the isthmus of Darien, we have a very plausible ground for demanding another revision of the treaty and perhaps release from our engagement. The Yankees have no more commercial interest in, or natural connection with, the Central American trade-route, than we have. It is too much, therefore, that they should have full command of one of two possible canals, and be able to prevent us from using the other in time of war. Having a disbanded army, a dismantled navy, a large population of disaffected subjects, and no Canada to attack, they will be much more willing than in 1859 to listen to reason. Though they may chafe at our progress, they will not be so eaten up with zeal for the Monroe Doctrine as to prefer a war

to a fair division of two canal-routes between two great commercial nations. They may be soothed, too, by permission to seize the coveted northern provinces of Mexico, when in the exercise of our creditor's right we assume management of the estates of that impudent and profligate bankrupt. We have never got satisfaction for the outrages which led to the abortive joint-expedition of 1861, and we must now take it with our own hands alone. Under our management the enormous agricultural and mineral resources will soon be so developed as to pay off the debt, besides paying the expenses of government, and when we have got satisfaction, a plebiscite of owners of property in the Clerical south will secure our management in perpetuity. In like manner we may deal, if we choose, with Honduras, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and especially Hayti and Uruguay. These so-called states are mere territorial conspiracies of swindlers and banditti, which have none at all of the moral attributes of governments. We will incur no odium with well-informed persons by displacing such organised brigandage. And on the other hand we will get enough of solid pudding to comfort us under the empty blame of the empty-headed sentimentals. We could not be quiet in Santo Domingo, if the rascally Haytians should retain their independence; while Venezuela and Uruguay will be splendid stock-farms for the British army and navy, nearer and cheaper than Australia.

The present moment is, indeed, a galaxy of golden

opportunities for extending the area of internal good government and international peace. The half-civilized states (so-called) have not yet got a thoroughly recognized political standing. With Mexico, the largest of all, except Turkey, no Government but that of the United States has any diplomatic relations. Doubtless much jealousy will be felt, and openly or covertly expressed in Europe and America. Let them be jealous ! Though there may be much barking, no biting will ever be attempted. If the British bull-dog shows his teeth with significant decision, the growling curs will be glad enough to let him take most of what he wants, and to profess themselves satisfied with the very smallest scraps. What would be the result of a war, a naval war as it could not but be, between the British Empire and any other power, except the Russian, or indeed any two other powers ? Simply that we would give it a sound thrashing, and like Germany in 1871, make it pay the costs of its lesson in the duty of not interfering with its superiors. Spain is barely able to maintain an equal contest with Cubans and Carlists. Italy has as yet no grounds for colonial pretensions, and if she had, could not fight for them. Her immense armaments have rendered her powerless for offence. By lavish indulgence of her military vanity in time of peace she has sapped the vigour of her sinews of war. She is a silly child, who has long been overstraining herself to hold up a giant's club. The very first attempt to use her unwieldy weapon would burst her lungs and break her back.



Brazil is not strong, and is already gorged with territory, having a square mile for every group of three Brazilians. Austria and Russia, as I shall soon show, will be consenting and profiting parties, in so far as concerned with our imperial operations. The attention of France and Germany is concentrated in intense mutual jealousy, and their strength all reserved for the expected gratification of their mutual hatred. Neither can afford to have the luxury of another enemy. Germany has as yet no colonial interests to give excuse for meddling with us, and such colonial ambition as she may have she will soon be able to satisfy without crossing our path. She will soon swallow up Holland, and thus gain command of the Moluccas, the Sunda Islands, and of Dutch Guiana. France is frantically ambitious, and will not allow us to act, especially in Egypt and Madagascar, without vehement protests and vigorous machinations. Everywhere she will look upon us with a jealous eye and try to counteract us by ingenious plots. But if we are careful to spare her vanity, and avoid formal *casus belli*, while steadily accomplishing our purposes, she will hesitate to pick a quarrel in her present shattered, disorganized, and debt-laden condition. Her means, happily, do not correspond to her ideas. The apelement in her nature undoubtedly retains all its efficiency, but the tiger is toothless, and the only result of a petulant attack on the British Lion would be the loss of those foreign provinces which she might otherwise be allowed to keep in her claws. If she remains a good quiet child, she may be permitted to slake her



thirst for military glory and exercise her brilliant talents of constitution-making in Anam, Senegambia, and Northern Africa. Let her rest and be thankful with these.

Many will cry out against these acquisitions as quite useless and very costly to the rest of the empire. Thoughtless creatures! Nearly every one of the countries marked out as proper objects of annexation will soon add considerably to the wealth and strength of Britain—add more than enough to pay for the additional cost of its own defence; while all together will thus add more than enough to pay for the new small military and naval stations. For a year or two indeed, till the new order has been firmly fixed and has established confidence, the revenue may not be sufficient for the expenditure. Such is the case of Fiji. But in a few years, when British intelligence, British capital, and Asiatic labourers have flowed into the land, Fiji will have a public income more than sufficient for all necessary outlay. In most new private enterprises merchants know that they must incur present loss for the sake of great future gain. They are very ready to cast their bread upon the waters, expecting to find it after many days; and why are so many statesmen in this “nation of shopkeepers,” unwilling to imitate the practical far-sightedness of their constituents? What will happen in Fiji will also happen in those parts of Africa, of Malaysia, of Tropical America, which ought also to be annexed. They are naturally as rich as Fiji, and they are very much bigger. The speedy development of the great and

various capacities of these abused and neglected lands will soon furnish an elastic and overflowing revenue. The rich rocks of many, the rich soil of most, are waiting only for the establishment of a state of society in which industry and enterprise can get and keep their just reward. Then they will lay their treasures at the feet of astonished mankind. Many of these countries are indeed morally burdened with debts, the interest of which at present they cannot easily pay. But under British management these debts would become mere trifles, not merely from the great increase of revenue, but from the entirely just reduction of interest. Most of the stock was issued at a discount of 30 per cent. or more, and the rates of interest per cent. are far above the 4 which India and Australia find sufficiently attractive. After annexation, of course interest would be paid at 4 per cent. only, and only on the amount actually received by the borrower. Turkey, for instance, pays £10,000,000 a year in interest. If under Britain, as India is, she would pay at the most, only 5 or 6 millions. That would give the holders quite as much as they could equitably claim. In other countries the payment would fall not merely to a-half, but to a third or even a fourth of the amount promised by the original distrusted borrowers. It must be remembered also that the money is due to creditors chiefly British, and that by thus making herself responsible for it Britain will be adding directly to her own wealth. She will be preventing destruction of British capital, and securing payment to British tax-payers of

large sums of interest, out of which they are likely soon to be partly or completely defrauded. In the same countries, moreover, English owners of capital will have vast fields for secure investment of their new and embarrassing accumulations. Under a less firm and honest Government than that of Britain, they would not dare to send much capital into such places, and could not send their little without very great risk. But after annexation they can scarcely send too much. They will need to fear no Railway Rings, no Revolutions, and no Repudiation, and will not be troubled even by rumours of wars. Thus the rate of interest and of profit will be raised for all British capital, and the wealth of the great nation will go on steadily and permanently increasing by the possibility of greater saving.

Much of the new acquisition will be nothing more than extension of the boundaries of British colonies already existing, but too small to be profitable, expansion of what appear as mere points in the map of the world into surfaces having conspicuous magnitude. Such are Belize, the Gold Coast, Labuan, and even the Straits Settlements. Extend them, following the recent example of wise Sir Andrew Clarke in the Malay Peninsula, and then they will soon be wiped out of the list of those parts of the Empire, which give nothing to the federal treasury, and draw out much for defence. Such colonies as Central America, Guinea, Borneo, and Malacca in whole, would add nothing to the cost of defence incurred by the other members of

the federation, while immensely increasing the federal resources. The Empire at present is too bony and skinny. It needs more flesh to protect its joints and its vital organs. It is far too straggling, and needs to be made more compact. Hardly any extension could weaken it for defence, and such extension as is here recommended would certainly strengthen. Its parts are already so widely scattered, its presence so generally diffused, that even now it maintains a navy with a squadron for almost every sea. No greater increase of ships would be required than is required at this present moment to maintain Britain's historic mastery of the ocean. On land the effect of extension would be a help rather than a hindrance to defence. Now many parts of the empire might be occupied and held securely without resistance, if a considerable hostile force should suddenly attack. Then almost every part would be able to levy and equip a formidable body of defenders, who would not permit the enemy to occupy more than a small portion of the country, and would make his position extremely uncomfortable and extremely insecure. Very few more English troops would be needed than are stationed at present in Africa and other tropical countries. Cheap and hardy armies of Africans or Asiatics led by European officers would be quite sufficient. Where disaffection might be suspected, or even regarded as possible, it would not indeed be wise to lean upon a strictly native army for the maintenance of our authority. But in a greatly extended empire we could follow the wise example of

the ancient imperial people, and change or exchange the places of troops native to different subject provinces. Ruling, like the Romans, a great variety of kindreds and peoples, we might imitate them in playing off diversities of race, creed, and custom against each other, to ensure the fidelity of either our subjects or our servants. That would almost entirely save the empire from the expense of the serious local revolts which some profess to dread as the result of tropical annexations. Neither would the newly-acquired territory be rendered unprofitable by wars with savage neighbours. The most warlike Africans have already felt the weight of our arms, and will not only remain quiet, but communicate their dread to tribes more remote. Very soon, indeed, no independent savages would be left to trouble us, all being reduced under the rule of Britain, France, Russia, or some other civilized power. Free and benighted barbarians may be turned into British subjects by very short, cheap, and easy methods. A mere formal display of force, the appearance of a few gunboats in a harbour or river will make a beginning, and the rest of the work may be done to suit the advance of cultivation, by an armed police force gradually spreading its fortified stations back from the coast and along the river highways. The proposed East African Company may safely build its railway to the central lakes as soon as the British flag has been hoisted opposite Zanzibar. Here and there a rough tribe may compel a petty war like that with the Ashantis. But from the beginning

the peaceful pagans of Papua, Borneo, and the Soudan will be the obedient friends of their English deliverers from Sulu pirates and Fellata marauders. The cost of consolidating a larger and more compact British Empire by conquest of savage African and Asiatic countries would, therefore, make no serious addition to the expenses of their Governments. And even the half-savage countries of Central and Southern America would not probably be so foolish as to add to their debts by futile resistance; Mexico perhaps excepted. But Mexico has so much easily tangible wealth underground, that she would in a few years hardly feel the burdens of a war of conquest, even if it had cost as much as the Abyssinian expedition. Nowhere would the industry evoked by British maintenance of order and enforcement of obligations, be crowned with more magnificent results. But everywhere, the industrious classes would make us welcome, and everywhere, in some degree at least, the final and not long delayed result of inclusion in the British Empire would be profit to the people of the locality, profit to the whole people of the Empire, profit to the whole of mankind.

## CHAPTER VI.

### EUTHIANASIA FOR THE SICK MAN.

INCREASE of British territory in America is desirable only, and may safely be neglected. But increase of British territory in Africa and Southern Asia is essential—essential to the welfare and safety of India as part of Britain—essential to the continuance of British greatness, and not to be neglected without great and already imminent danger.

The difficulty of subjugating Affghanistan must be met and overcome before it becomes greater still. It is a thorn in the side of India which will go on rankling worse and worse, if we delay the effort to extract. The extraction may indeed be costly, on account of the aid rendered by the cold, rugged, barren nature of the land to the obstinate valour and bigotry of the people; and our own folly has lately added to all these elements of strength the possession of improved European weapons. Doubly foolish; because with the aim of strengthening ourselves against Russia. Russia, even under present circumstances, will be no hindrance to our annexation of Affghanistan. She cannot but recognize the reasonableness of our occupation of a country whose chief

river is a tributary of the Indus, and which has so much historical connection with the affairs of India. It is a necessary appendage, a necessary outwork, of an Indian Empire. British India has at present no proper boundary, no tenable line of defence, on its western edge. Leaving out of sight all danger from Russia, or any other Power, while the military key of India lies free to be turned by any hostile hand, we must remember that our complete control of Affghanistan is necessary to the internal peace of our great dominion. Its border-tribes cannot be prevented from harassing Sind and the Derajat, till we have both sides of the Suliman mountains. Besides, it is just now a hot-bed of Muslim conspiracy, a camp of refuge where the disaffected from all parts of India unite to nurse their wrath and hatch their plots in company with the fanatic external enemies of England. The peaceful and progressive Panjab is liable at any moment to an outburst of plundering and murdering Mahometan bigots. To subdue Affghanistan at all hazards is therefore a military and political necessity—a policy imperatively demanded to make an end of present and prospective worries. The hazards will not be so great as those imagine who have heard of nothing but the disaster of the Kurd Kabul Pass. That disaster was only the result of one blunder in a career of easy success. At that time, also, Sind and the Panjab were independent, and even hostile countries, and our position in a nest of hornets was therefore difficult, on account of its isolation from the



mass of our territory. But now, when the whole Indian frontier is ours, and studded with our strongly-garrisoned fortresses, that difficulty has vanished, and we have at our command more than one near and secure base for aggressive operations. Undoubtedly the Afghans will fight better now, because they are better armed. But they are as much as ever divided against themselves. Half of the population is made up of Persians, Hindus, and Kaffirs, hated by the pure Afghans, and therefore friendly to us. It is doubtful whether even half of the pure Afghans could be got to unite against the invaders. And this is a moment peculiarly favourable to invasion, because the hopes of England's fanatic enemies have been sorely shaken by the recent alliance of the British and Russian royal families. Of course occupation of a country filled with such unruly inhabitants could not go on without a powerful garrison. But that necessity ought not to be such a bugbear as it seems to be. The great garrisons of the Indus would then no longer be necessary, and the larger part of the troops thus employed at present might therefore be moved westward to the new line of defence, to supply an army of occupation involving no additional cost to the Indian Treasury. Afghanistan is a poor country, but it will very nearly be able to pay for the expenses of its civil government, when for some few years the valleys of Herat and Kandahar have enjoyed peace and security. Probably it will be best to follow Sir Henry Rawlinson's advice, and occupy only those valleys, together with

the great passes and some stations in the Suliman Mountains, leaving waspish Kabul in nominal independence. But we must place some kind of check on the Kabulis, if only to preserve those semi-Christian Kaffirs who are willing to become our most faithful and valuable allies. The first use which the Amir made of his new English rifles was to furnish matter for the four pleas of the Crown among those innocent mountaineers. If, therefore, we do not immediately secure Shir Ali's good behaviour by a handsome subsidy, conditional on that brutal savage's total abstinence from worrying his neighbours, our friends will soon be converted to the Koran by the eloquence of the alternative sword, and the door will be barred against Christianity by the flinty and fiendish religion of the false prophet. That, also, is what will happen in the greater part of Africa if we allow the Fellatas and Egyptians to pursue their mischievous career. If we make haste, however, we may not only prevent further mischief, but undo much which has already been done. Forced professors of Islam may often be induced to make another change of religion, if subjected to other influences before the Arab creed has had time to soak them through and through, and imbue them with its characteristic indomitable ferocity.

There is also another reason for taking Central and Southern Africa into the British Empire, a reason arising from the circumstances of India. As the Hindus cannot now practise infanticide, and have not yet come under moral restraints on the gratifying of

their appetites, they are increasing to an extent most uncomfortable to themselves and most alarming to their rulers. The Ganges Valley especially is becoming so overstocked, and the consequent rise of the cost of living has been so great, that serious disaffection is to be feared for that reason alone. Fortunately they are willing to emigrate, and if we provide an outlet for them on the great African continent, we will both raise Africa to the prosperous condition of the Mauritius, and entirely relieve India from dangerous pressure, till men have become enlightened enough to limit the establishment of brat-factories, and restrain them from working recklessly up to their full powers of production.

Similar provision must be made in annexing not only Africa, but Papua, Borneo, and perhaps Mexico, if we try to get and keep China as we intend to keep India. That intention gives rise to more than one reason why we should try ; and to one reason at least which is fiercely imperative. Men are just beginning to awake to the knowledge that India is exposed to a danger from the east, compared with which all conceivable dangers from the west are utterly insignificant. If the Chinese Empire is allowed to live much longer, borrowing the material but not the moral results of European progress, the world will be menaced by an enormous heathen Power, as wealthy as all Europe combined, with 500,000,000 of men in a huge and compact territory, strong with all the physical strength of civilization, and quite un-

restrained in the use of that strength by any of the sentiments which civilization has engendered in Europe. It is a grave peril, and especially a peril to India. Nothing is more likely than that the Chinese should be smitten with a desire of conquering the rich neighbouring country, and twenty years hence neither India nor England could offer any effectual resistance. Ten millions of men, completely armed and disciplined, might easily be set in motion by a word of command from Peking, and would sweep our weak forces like chaff before them from the Chinese border of Assam, westward to Karachi, and southward to Cape Komorin. We can save India from such a fate only by stifling the dreaded monster while it is yet comparatively feeble, and while England and Russia are quite competent to conquer and make a partition.

Another reason also deserves mention. At present the British Empire is lop-sided. India contains four-fifths of the total population, and the Hindus are, therefore, if this state of things continues, likely to become too much inflated with a sense of their own importance, and to think that they ought to rule the Empire, holding other parts as mere appendages. Annexation of regions like Mexico, Africa, Western Asia, and still more, Southern China, is the only preventive of the "bumptious" discontent which may arise in India, if she remains unbalanced by similarly extensive and populous countries, like herself practically subordinate to little but vigorous England.

Second only to the need of annexing China, and, indeed, hardly at all less urgent, is the need of annex-

ing Egypt and Western Asia, also for India's sake. They interrupt and command the two great highways between England and Southern Asia, and we cannot safely allow them to continue any longer in other hands than ours. While the Turkish gang keeps Syria and the valley of the Euphrates without anything deserving the name of government the Beirut railway is impossible. In regard to the eastern half of the line there will be no great difficulty. Beluchistan is already feudally subordinate, and the Shah of Persia would not dare to refuse to cede his Gulf-provinces in return for a fixed annual pension. But the work cannot be completed until we have broken up the obstructive and rotten fabric of the Ottoman Empire. Egypt commands the marine route and is even more necessary than Syria to the masters of Southern Asia. All the world except France would recognise the European nation possessing India, as the nation having the best claims to the key of communication between India and Europe. Few, indeed, would deny our moral right to take by force a country so intimately connected with the interests of an infinitely more important country in the Far East. But though English trade with and through Egypt is tenfold greater than that of France, and though the English language is displacing all others in the commercial cities of the Levant, yet the political influence of France is already greater than ours, and our insane non-interference is enabling her to make her hold insidiously stronger. She has made such progress that she has now become bold enough to propose what

she calls the "neutralization" of Egypt, just as if she with her paltry trade and petty Asiatic possessions had an equal interest in the matter. Things have indeed come to a pretty pass, when she can thus talk about preventing England from sending troops through the canal to quell an Indian Mutiny, or prosecute a war in Afghanistan or China. But Englishmen have only themselves to blame. They have allowed their statesmen to play into the hands of the French through a crazy jealousy of Russia. During the last thirty years English public opinion, talk, and action in regard to Russia have truly been most exquisitely absurd. Newspaper-writers and public speakers have gone on denouncing the dark, deep, and wicked designs of Russia, crying out monotonously that something must be done to keep her from India, and yet, whenever anybody proposes to do anything, almost invariably holding up hands in dismay at such audacity. Afghanistan, Southern Persia, Egypt, and the parts of Turkey south of Armenia, are the only Western Asiatic countries which are at all important to India. They have never been the objects of Russian attacks and intrigues, and are far separated from Russian territory by mountains, deserts, or wide intervening fertile regions. They are not half so formidable in their own strength as the Sikh and Maratta kingdoms which we conquered in India without any very great expense. Yet men sneer at "visionary schemes," and affix the epithets "dangerous," "impracticable," "Utopian," to any proposal

for annexing these necessary appendages of a British Indian Empire. Russia cannot prevent us from taking the only countries which we are interested in keeping out of European hands other than ours, and it is in the last degree unlikely that she will try. The only motive which could lead her to such wanton hostility would be resentment at the equally wanton hostility directed by England against her in 1854. The only danger has therefore been created by the very men who shriek about it in such an exaggerated manner. For they have not quite invariably followed the policy of what they call masterly inactivity. Once they deviated ; when by acting they could do least at the greatest cost. The countries commanding the two great highways to India they thought too dear at the price of a petty war with undisciplined Asiatics. But they were willing to fling away £100,000,000, to keep out the first military power in the world from countries with which India has no more concern than with the man in the moon. And how, in the name of good sense, is England concerned, whether Constantinople and the adjoining countries are in the hands of Turks or of Russians? She has nothing to do with the Bosphorus and the Black Sea except in trading with the already Russian port of Odessa. But still, ever since the Crimean *fiasco*, even after the tearing up of the treaty made with such waste of blood and treasure, English writers and speakers have been going on in their old senseless way, idly shrieking out bad names at Russia. No attempt do they ever make

to solve that Eastern Question which seems to worry them so much. The whole outcome of their wordy activity has been England's adoption of the womanish motto, "sit still and scream." Russia is not a baby to be frightened by tactics which might be formidable in a nursery. She goes on calmly taking what she wants in Central Asia, and very soon will do likewise on the shores of the Black Sea. What grain of reason is there why we should wish her to do otherwise in either case? If we make ourselves safe behind the Hindu Kush, what do we need to care about what goes on in the valley of the Amu? And how could we under the present, or under any circumstances, use a railroad running through Constantinople as a mean of communication with India in time of war, whether war with Russians or war with Asiatics? Doubtless possession of Rumilia and Asia Minor would make Russia stronger against us if she chose to pick a quarrel. But by letting her take them we would put an end to the only circumstances which make a quarrel likely. Russia is not so wantonly and foolishly aggressive as to attack Egypt and other places which are vitally necessary to another great empire. They would be of no use to her unless she should be prepared to fight for India also against all the forces of Britain. She wants only those contiguous parts of Asia and Europe, possession of which will release her from the commercial and political trammels of her inland position, while it can be of little or no use to any other civilised power. There



is nothing to prevent perpetual relations of the most kindly character between Britain and Russia, except the snarling of those English dogs, who will persist in lying in the Turkish mangers, and keeping up that irreformable system of unmitigated iniquity, called by courtesy the Turkish Government. Thank God, there have lately been indications of a disposition to acknowledge this fact and to doubt the wisdom of the orthodox Eastern policy, on the part of some of the abler English political writers. Said the *Pall Mall Gazette*, on December 9th, 1874, "We may believe, and we have already expressed our opinion to that effect, that we once missed a fine opportunity when we declined to listen to the proposals of the Emperor Nicholas. The Emperor Nicholas was a shrewd statesman, though somewhat too fond of short methods; and recognising the elements of standing disturbances in the Eastern question he would have had the two great countries that were directly interested, step in and settle it to his satisfaction and ours. We let the opportunity go by once; it is just possible it may come back to us again. . . . The St. Petersburg press may rest assured, however, that we have no intention of committing ourselves to perpetual non-intervention. . . . But we do not forget that the opening of the Suez Canal gives us even a deeper concern than before in seeing that nothing endangers our supremacy in the Mediterranean and our communications with India; and it may well happen that in the course of events we,

too, may have unanswerable arguments to offer for some satisfactory understanding with the great military Empire of the East." Said the *Saturday Review*, February 6th, 1875, "Of course we cannot suddenly abandon a great traditional policy because the Turks have disappointed us. We cannot allow sentiment or philanthropy to persuade us to hand over Constantinople to the Russians. We cannot be content unless we have a very large share in the settlement of that future which is to replace the miserable present on both sides of the Hellespont. But we must work, however cautiously, to some end, and that end cannot be the perpetual upholding of Turkish misgovernment." The writers of these sentences are still, however, visibly halting between two opinions. They have not yet wholly cast off those old clothes of flabbiness and timidity, which during the last fifteen years have exposed English foreign and colonial policy to the contempt of the world, and made clear-sighted Englishmen writhe with regret for lost and misused opportunities. They show far too much of the spirit of the sedentary man who is morbidly alive to the dangers of activity in swimming, riding, and gymnastics, while obstinately deaf to all warnings that continued bodily inactivity will make indigestion run its natural course to some chronic and incurable disease. Caution is not one of the cardinal virtues in a master of many legions. The Emperor Nicholas showed his high statesmanlike capacity most conspicuously in his fondness for short methods. He

had a wholesome horror of wasting time, and an equally wholesome contempt for useless and mischievous moral sentiments. We can make the opportunity come back to us as soon as we choose. Not sentiment nor philanthropy, but the most enlightened self-love ought to persuade us to hand over Constantinople to the Russians. Why cannot we suddenly abandon a great traditional policy, when we have found that it has been traditional impolicy, indeed one long act of egregious traditional folly, unsupported from beginning to end by a single atom of reason? When a man has for a long time been making a consummate ass of himself, making enemies out of his best friends, and doing his best to cut his own throat, is not a sudden abandonment of his traditional policy the very best thing which he can find to do? A fig for consistency! What is there to hinder us from throwing our Jonah overboard to-morrow by an instant reversal of our Eastern Impolicy? I defy any one to give a single good reason for delay, and I can point out more than one very good reason for immediate action. If we wait, the French will have time to manœuvre so as to get their greedy fingers into the pie to an inconvenient depth, and the Turks may be encouraged to organise some scheme of resistance. What but laziness can hinder the simultaneous despatch of the English and Austrian Mediterranean fleets to meet the Russian Black Sea fleet at Constantinople, after a secret arrangement made in brief correspondence between

the Foreign Ministers of the three great Eastern Powers? Let the fleets bear to the Sultan a curt diplomatic note saying in effect that his day of grace is past, that he is a mischievous anachronism which Europe can tolerate no longer, "an irreclaimable old savage" blocking the path of civilisation, and an insufferable nuisance to both his subjects and his neighbours; that he must consent to retire from the stage where he has strutted and played at government so long, or take the alternative of being completely smashed and going without the comfortable shelf, which he would have got if he had abstained from giving useless trouble. No resistance would be offered. The Commander of the Faithful would bow to the will of Allah, and accept the offer of £500,000 a year for himself and a moderate provision for his descendants. The fleet, the treasury, the public records, and all public property would be handed over with the powers of State to Commissioners appointed by the allies. An open treaty of partition might then be made, and in a few months it could come into effect. The Adriatic Provinces with the suzerainty of Servia, and perhaps of Roumania, ought to go to Austria. The valleys of the Euphrates and Tigris, Syria, Arabia, Cyprus, and perhaps Cilicia, with the suzerainty of Egypt, ought to go to Britain. None but the three allied powers ought to be allowed to have a voice in the arrangements, but as an act of grace, Thessaly, Epirus, and Crete, might be given to Greece. We cannot afford to listen to any com-

promise in regard to Egypt, and France must therefore be rigorously excluded from the counsels of the partitioners ; but it will be well to humour her and appease her murmurs in some degree, by letting her have the suzerainty of Tunis and Tripoli. She will find it convenient to regard her "honour" as satisfied by that concession. Germany has no excuse for interfering in the affair, and cannot afford to quarrel with Russia. Russia ought, therefore, to get the rest of the Turkish territory, including Rumilia, Bulgaria, Asia Minor, and part of Armenia. She ought also to get the fleet and the public property of the Ottoman Empire at head-quarters, in consideration of undertaking to maintain the deposed royal family. The debt might be equitably divided in accordance with the revenues at present derived from the five portions respectively, and most of it would therefore fall to the share of Russia as owner of what are now the most wealthy districts. Britain would not be responsible for more than £1,500,000 a year at the utmost, and half of that would be paid from the Egyptian tribute, without at all burdening Syria and the countries directly under British management. Thus can we cut the Gordian knot of Eastern Policy, and get rid by one bold stroke of all its attendant worries and perplexities. No more fears of Russia ! By making the Black Sea a Russian lake we bind our most powerful enemy fast and sure in eternal ties of grateful friendship. Now, indeed, it is high time to throw overboard that insane jealousy

which has so long delayed the march of civilisation in the Great East. In the Turkish Partition we will have an opportunity of blotting out the unlovely past and beginning a new system of relations wherein there will be no place for enmity. Nothing but our dog-in-the-manger policy has prevented both parties from being perfectly comfortable and friendly. Let the two great nations deal frankly with each other. Let us give up the preaching of non-interference, and let them give up their pretences of similar moral disapproval of aggression and similar indisposition to increase what, in order to humour our virtuous indignation, they call their overgrown territory. Henceforward let neither party annex, as if unwilling to benefit itself, and ashamed to benefit mankind. Let us have no more of this doing good by stealth, and blushing at acts which in future ages will find fame. Let there be a new Holy Alliance for the holy work of redeeming the greatest of continents from the long curse of barbarian abuse. Let England and Russia make a covenant to divide Asia between them. A line running along the top of the great southern watershed and giving to Russia the northern slopes and the great central basins, together with Asia Minor, part of Northern Persia, Manchuria, Korea, and Northern China would make a just and commodious partition. From the end of Taurus, opposite Cyprus, that line would run through the north of Armenia, separating the valley of the Euphrates from that of the Aras, and thence through

Persia, either to the south-western corner of the Caspian, or further south along the Caspian watershed. Further on, whether it should go to the north or to the south of the Atrek is not an important matter, but it must not go south of the range dividing the Murghab from the Heri-Rud, and Herat. Then it would run along the topmost ridges of the Hindu Kush, and having skirted Thibet, go forward on the ridge shutting in the Yang-tse-kiang from the cold north, to find an end at last on the shores of the Yellow Sea.

Russia is our Natural Ally. Rather than Germany; though there is nothing to prevent alliances with both. But from Germany we have little either to hope or fear. Russia and Britain are the two great powers who can do most good and most harm to each other, and therefore the two who have most reason to be friendly. They have everything to gain by mutual friendship and nothing whatever to lose. United they will be strong enough to keep more than half of the world in peace, and in security from all attack, even when the rowdy Colossus of the West has grown up to his full belligerent stature. If Russia be with us, who will dare to be against us; or against her! Alliance with her is the condition of our imperial success. in the vital matters of guarding against Chinese and Egyptain dangers to India. Let Englishmen, therefore, not be too fastidious. Russian culture and morality are indeed not up to the German level, and in some respects below the French or American. But Russia's

faults are those of raw youth, not of old corruption. She is conscious of her deficiencies, and willing to learn from her elders. She is eminently the most progressive of continental European countries. And above all, she tends more than any other country to progress on English lines and learn from English examples. By no other nation are English language, science, and institutions so extensively and admiringly studied, and we may hope that one of the happy consequences of the late auspicious union of royal families will be a greater love and greater knowledge of everything English, which will give a triumphant impetus to the most hopeful tendency of Russian character. That of course can be, only if we pull up and throw away the root of bitterness which our folly has planted. Now, therefore is the time for breaking down the barriers of political jealousy, and agreeing to bury remembrance of the unhappy by-gones, which have so long kept asunder those whom God has clearly made for each other. Do so; and in two or three generations, Russia, who has hardly any national civilization of her own, will become very like another England.

Russia is our Natural Ally. Not the nation of boys on the other side of the Channel. They cannot hurt us, and cannot be of any use. Even in trade we need to have little to do with them. Russia supplies us with the staff of life; France with mere luxuries and frivolities, most of which we can get nearly as good from some other place. We and the French have not a single important interest in common. In the article



in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, from which sentences have already been quoted, it is truly said: "As for France, supposing her to be her own mistress to-morrow, and as strong as ever, she has no real motive to join us in crusading in the East. And if French and English interests scarcely lie in parallel lines at all when they tend towards Turkey, they diverge most decidedly when we approach the confines of the Egyptian question". France will never forgive us for what we must do to disappoint her in Egypt and Madagascar.

Russia is our Natural Ally. Not the arithmetical and much-conjecturing nation on the other side of the big herring-pond. Let us take our friendship to a market where we will get at least thanks, not kicks and highwayman's requests for pecuniary and territorial accommodation. Are we to go with our eyes open into a leonine partnership, in which the lion-partner will certainly not be British? Forbid it universal experience of Yankee sayings and doings! Not to go too far back, have we not had a sickening sufficiency of Yankee notions in the impudent bluster about the Alabama, the subsequent Geneva swindle, and the flagrant partizanship of the mixed Commission at Washington in regard to the burning of Columbia? Mr. Forster, and other advocates of English slavery, profess also a severe reverence for International Law. That is pretty cool, in view of the consistent Yankee practice of flying, whenever they dare, in the face of that code of international morality which they pretend

to admire and observe in common with the rest of the civilised world. Nothing but want of power prevents them from callously bullying and robbing the whole Un-Yankee world. Just think for a moment of their brazen-faced beginnings with the Trent and the Florida ! Then think of the trickery with which they sneaked out of reparation in the cases of the Florida and the Virginius, when they found that they had gone a little too fast, and were not just yet to be allowed to have everything exactly in their own way ! Truly the common assent of nations will have a firm hold on slippery customers like these, when they are not 40,000,000, but 400,000,000 ! If England does not strengthen herself with the strength of Australia and South Africa, she and all Europe will yet rue the day when she rejected Mr. Roebuck's advice, and lost a splendid opportunity of dividing what will soon be a colossal fabric of aggressive barbarism. Are we to go smilingly arm in arm with the fellows who slyly helped and egged on Fenian cut-throats to break into peaceful Canada ? Are we to be seen in company with men who wantonly waged the most cruelly-conducted of modern wars, and are guilty of the most ingeniously agonizing abuse of conquest ever made by a nation fighting in civilized clothes with civilized weapons ? When we conquer, we put black savages under white gentlemen. When the Yankees conquered, they put white gentlemen under black savages. The heroic bombarder of Vicksburg hospitals ; the philanthropic devastator of the Shenandoah

Valley; the soldier whom European flunkys of the bloated republic call a great general, because with 200,000 well-fed, well-clad, thoroughly-equipped Federals, he crushed 70,000 half-naked, half-famished, half-armed Confederates; the chief magistrate who stuffs ballot-boxes, falsifies election-returns, and purges refractory parliaments after the fashion of Colonel Pride, to gorge his light-fingered relatives with the public spoils of Louisiana; is it with this dirty little despot that our pure-hearted and high-minded Constitutional Queen is to associate on terms of amity and equality? Or is Buckingham Palace to be made a house of entertainment, not only for man, but also for Beast; and is the House of Commons prepared to vote an increased annual appropriation for the maintenance of the royal spoons?

The United States, indeed, as our ally! Because, as we are gushingly told by fraternally-minded declaimers, the two nations are one in race, in law, in language, and in religion. There is a substratum of facts for the plea. But let us take them for just what they are worth and not a bit more. Is John Bull to take to his arms a bold-faced scapegrace who has been, is, and will be evermore trying to rob and insult him in every possible way—because the fellow is a son or a brother, and calls himself such when he wishes for a moment to make folks think him respectable? Does any sane man in private life regard his impenitent relative as a more eligible friend than his neighbour with whom he has had a very doubtful

quarrel? It might seem very pretty to some people, if Brother Jonathan should say "Let bygones be bygones;" but when all the bygones are on one side such a proposal is, to say the least, very like an insult. As to law; English law is not exactly the perfect expression of the highest human wisdom, and we need not go into ecstasies over Transatlantic retention of its mediæval jargon and seventeenth-century maxims. As to language, we must admit that the Yankees do use a form of speech which may by a stretch of courtesy be called English. But so do many Russians, and so will many more of them when the new Holy Alliance has been established. As to religion, the case is stronger. Protestant religion, and immense stores of natural wealth which as yet make it easy for everybody to be physically comfortable, are the only things which keep all the United States from being like the sink of anarchy which New York has already become. But the case is not so strong as Englishmen suppose, when they look only at the intense activity of some few American Christians. The religion of perhaps most Yankees is very like that peculiar species of nutmeg in the manufacture of which they have attained to so peculiar an excellence. At any rate it has mightily little influence on their political conduct; and that is the matter with which political allies are chiefly concerned. "Voting well comes by voting often," says Mr. Beecher. It is an instructive commentary on this cherished republican delusion that, after experience

of ninety years his countrymen go on voting with worse and worse ignorance, violence, and corruption. It will not do to say that the foreign immigrants have been the cause of this progress backwards. The public character of the United States was never so low as it has been during the last decade and a half, and during all that period the party in power has been the Republican party, the party which the Irish and Germans all abhor, the party of native Americans. A few months ago symptoms of reaction, indeed, appeared. But who can tell whether the caprice of King Mob will not return to the Republicans, before the end of the two years which must elapse before the Democrats can execute or even legislate? Let us keep at a respectful distance—out of self-respect. We can set a good example from afar. The Yankees, degenerate as they are, are still so like us that we would have to dread imitation and infection for our weaker members, if we should come to close quarters. A good apple is in more danger of going to the bad through keeping company with a rotten apple than with a rotten cabbage-head. Let us, therefore, cleave to those who are wise enough to let their manners be improved by our good communications, and not likely to seduce us into evil ways of their own.

I must be prepared for some bursts of indignation at the proposed uncereemonious treatment of the Turkish Government and other things of the same character. On the ground of specific circumstances alone, though I am not afraid of a fight on general

principles, I think that such action is fully justifiable. The things to be attacked in Turkey, in Afghanistan, in Zanzibar, in Mexico, in Central, and in Southern America have none of the moral attributes of a government, and, therefore, none of its claims to respect. They have no rights, because they discharge no duties, either to their own subjects or to foreigners. They plunder both and protect neither. They are mere conspiracies of robbers, in the East taking the shape of stable and graduated systems, in the West mere shifting gangs and cliques squabbling in the name of liberty, fraternity, and equality. The so-called Turkish Government is nothing but a huge horse-leech, squatting at the junction of Europe and Asia, draining the life-blood from some of the fairest countries of both continents, and sending forth dozens of insatiable daughters to cry "Give! Give!" in the tortured and fainting provinces. It is nothing but an agency for providing the Sultan and his beastly crew with whatever may minister to the lusts of the flesh, the lusts of the eye, and the pride of life. Hardly a penny of what is called the public revenue is devoted to public purposes. One half goes to build marble palaces and fill them with regiments of concubines, to half-pay regiments of dissolute soldiers, and to buy enormous costly ironclads to look pretty and rot in front of the palace-windows. The other half (which will soon become the whole) goes to pay the interest of money borrowed to be similarly wasted. Hardly even a pretence of service is rendered in return for

the tremendous exactions to which the inhabitants of Turkey are subjected. They are just so many cows to be milked and then turned adrift to look out for themselves. Nothing is done for roads, bridges, railways, or light-houses. There is no police, no public justice, no security for life, limb, or property. Turkish officials are only Sultans in miniature, called judges and governors, but discharging no other function than that of squeezing their subjects, first for their master and then for themselves. That is the kind of "Government" which philanthropic England is keeping up, from stupid jealousy of Russia! That, too, is the kind of "Government" which Christian England allows to persecute Turkish Christians of all kinds, and especially Turkish Protestant converts. No signs of improvement are visible, and the approaching bankruptcy of the Ottoman Empire is one of those speedily coming events which are already casting very dark shadows before. When it comes we shall be forced to interfere and treat the Sultan as a *caput lupinum*. But why not do so now, and save both trouble to ourselves and misery to his victims? He never deserved to be regarded by Europe as anything else than a wolf's head, an Ishmaelite whose hand is against everybody so far as it can be, and against whom, therefore, everybody's hand ought to be free to act without regard to international or any other kind of morality. His so-called nation never has been worthy of admission into the pale of those civilised nations by whose consent International Law has been

formed. Nor will it ever be. There is, indeed, no such thing as a Turkish nation. There is nothing but a hodge-podge of motley serfs and robbers : a chaos of mutually irreconcilable elements. A large Christian population is trampled upon by a robber-tribe far inferior in number, in religion, and in civilisation, and these two classes of inhabitants necessarily hate each other with perfect and unappeasable hatred. We would have little national pride to contend against in the Jews, and Coptic, Syrian, and Armenian Christians, whom we would come to place in a position of equality with their insolent Muslim neighbours and rulers. The Arabs of Egypt, Syria, and the valley of the Euphrates hate the Turkish horde nearly as much as if they were not fellow-Muslims. How can they be very eager to maintain a mock-government which is efficient for oppression alone ? The starving Anatolians would even eagerly transfer their allegiance to the Power which has shown both ability and willingness to rob an Indian famine of its sting. And so would the squalid drudges of the glittering Shah. Western Asia has at all times been ruled by strangers of some kind ; and why rather by Turks than by Englishmen ? To treat Turkey, then, as England would rightly expect to be treated, would, therefore, be a ridiculous piece of blind legal pedantry. There is only a most superficial resemblance as a reason for similar treatment of the two things called the English Government and the Turkish Government. It is a resemblance in nothing but name ; for



the two things are as different as day and night. In the one case the name rightly suggests national life and public service; in the other, the associations of the name are entirely delusive. Throughout Africa and Asia, except perhaps in China, the feeling of nationality is very rudimentary. There is nothing to deserve respect as intelligent territorial patriotism. Even Sir Charles Dilke\* says, "As the sentiment of nationality clearly has no existence in Abyssinia and Affghanistan the abstract injustice of annexation cannot be said to exist." And if there is no national sentiment in fiery Affghanistan, there certainly is none in sleepy Turkey, compared with which Affghanistan is a very homogenous country. There is nothing in Asia or Africa, China excepted, which at all resembles such a sentiment, except the family feeling of a petty tribe not big enough to be fit for insubordinate existence, the bond of common religious bigotry, and the pride of a small predatory race tyrannizing over one or two races of indigenous serfs or plebeians. Break the rod of the tyrant, and the serf will become the grateful and loyal subject of Britain. In Egypt and Western Asia, as in Audh and in the Panjab already, the disaffected will be not the oppressed many, but the few oppressors whom we will have shorn of the powers which they are unfit to use. The industrious classes will not hate us, but greatly prefer us to their former useless or worse than useless superiors. Peasants and traders soon see that they

\* *Greater Britain*, ii., 392.

clearly and greatly gain, when the black mail levied by great and little thieves is replaced by regular taxes, however heavy, paid for the honest and diligent services of their English rulers and instructors. In fact we will take a much smaller proportionate sum from the income of the people than is taken by its present masters : to say nothing of what we will preserve from loss by robbery, through the stricter order which we will maintain. Our ouster of native mock-government will be an unmixed blessing to the great majority, and the majority will immediately perceive the fact. Kings and chiefs, with their satellites and servants, will of course be strongly averse from the loss of their mischievous power, but their subjects will, at the worst, regard the transfer with calm indifference. The case against China is not so strong on these grounds. Her government discharges some functions with considerable efficiency, and the sentiment of nationality has been considerably developed in her people. But for the deficiency of argument on such grounds against her continued national existence we have ample compensation in the all-excusing necessity of self-preservation. Rational fear of appalling future danger is in itself a sufficient justification for the partition by which alone that danger can be averted. Against the republics of Central and Southern America, however, the case is just as strong as against the despotisms of Asia and Africa. There is just as little nationality in the mixed multitudes of Spaniards, Negroes, and Red Indians which people

Mexico and Venezuela as in the motley population of Turkey. The so-called governments just as little deserve the name, the chief differences being, that they rather let the robbery be done privately by their servants and partisans than do it publicly by state-machinery, and that the state of the country is rendered rather less comfortable than that of a steady Asiatic monarchy by a yearly revolution with its attendant slaughter and burning. The industrious classes would be as ready to welcome us and obey us as in Turkey and Persia, and are indeed eager for some stranger to establish the peace and security which their turbulent countrymen will not allow them to have. In regard to treatment of foreigners the Western conspiracies are certainly a long way ahead of the Eastern in the extent and audacity of their plundering. They are nearly all bankrupt already, and if we concede their impudent claim to continued independence under such circumstances, we will, indeed, be poor spiritless fools quite deserving all the kicks we get. Any rational system of international morality would pronounce them all *capita lupina* without more ado.

Of course undisputed barbarians and in half-civilised countries the military, official, and other predatory classes have a repugnance to peace and progress. But to talk about the cruelty of suppressing national existence, outraging national feelings, and imposing heavy taxes and severe laws to keep up an odious alien domination, is a truly ridiculous flight of

pedantic moral sentimentality, when these amiable creatures are the sufferers held in view. Savages who cannot or will not govern themselves have no right to choose whether they will or will not be well governed by their betters. The great duty of every man is to make the most of himself and his race. He ought to eat his bread in the honest sweat of his brow, or eat none at all. He ought to live peaceably, live soberly, live industriously, or live not at all. No man can have a right to live like a hog or like a wolf. No man has a right to stay on God's earth, unless he tries to glorify God by fulfilling the end of his being in continual progress towards perfection. And every man who is not a beast or a brute has a divine right to "improve" stagnation and brutality from off the face of the earth. It is not merely his right. It is a sacred duty which lies on him as it lay on his forefathers, and will lie on his heirs from generation to generation till the great work is accomplished. And it is pre-eminently the duty of the man best fitted for the work by temper and training: which man is the Englishman. Therefore is it our duty to put an end as quickly as we can to the miserable and mischievous existence of the great "sick man" of the East, and mete out the same measure to his rickety congeners in the West and South. They have been unlovely and unpleasant in their lives, and in their deaths let them not be divided. Cut them down. Why cumber they the ground? They have been unjust, unprofitable servants. There-

fore their bishoprics let another take. Kurds, Afghans, Arabs, Fellatas, and Mexicans may be uneasy and impatient under the yoke. But we ought to pay no more regard to the impatience of these wild, new subjects than to a child's horror of its lessons. They are our godsons, and we their godfathers ought to exercise paternal authority as well as show paternal kindness. It is our right to make them learn their lessons, go through improving exercises, and do whatever seems to us to be for their good. It is our duty to make them wash their skins, do their work, and keep the ten commandments, in spite of all their collective and individual preferences for dirty, lazy, and disorderly independence. Whether disagreeable or not to these future subjects, our right founded on our duty to annex remains the same. They are not competent to judge good and evil for themselves, and as our rule will certainly be beneficial, its good effect will be reason enough for our action and their submission. The British heaven cannot so quickly and so well leaven the lump of the world unless the two are forcibly and thoroughly mixed. Our mutually advantageous interference will immensely increase mankind's material capital and moral happiness. Without it many tribes will long remain steeped in barbarism, or will be made worse than they are by the perverted flow of innovations and progressive tendencies introduced without check among unprepared and ill-regulated minds. And without it, therefore, the development of vast countries will be delayed

for ages, and in the plastic youth of nations ignorant impatience, political quackery, and commercial rapacity will do mischiefs which centuries may not be able to repair.

Doubtless nationality, as decided as that of European countries at present, would grow up after some fitful and scrambling fashion in many countries now quite stupidly savage, if they were left to themselves for a sufficient time. But why—on what general principles—ought we to leave them to themselves, and look on the development of nationality with feelings of complacency? It will be exceedingly difficult to find any reason for such a course. What need has the world of more nationalities? It has quite enough already to secure the amount of variety which is necessary for the completeness and beauty of mankind's development. The Curse of Babel is still a curse, as well as a blessing, and we ought yet in the interests of the human race to do much to limit its extent. Especially ought we to prevent its increase, by preventing the growth of rude peoples occupying even definite portions of rude territory into nations properly so called. More nations will bring more jealousies, rivalries, and prejudices to distract mankind; more diplomatic expenses and worries; more obstructions to commerce; more wars, and consequently more slaughter of men and destruction of capital. Savage incipient governments and nations have therefore no divine right to continued existence and development. Their inutility is too conspicuous.

It is time, moreover, for some one to begin a protest on grounds of general principle against the absurdly exaggerated notion of the sanctity of separate governments and national existences, which pretentious philosophers have for a long time been trying so hard to force into general acceptance. The root of the nonsense is an exaggerated estimate of the force and scope of that as yet very weakly sanctioned system of morality, which is dignified with the stringent title of International Law. One of its leading maxims asserts that human groups and organizations, which happen to be independent at any given time, ought to treat each other as if they were human individuals subject to the legal and moral duties usually imposed in an enlightened nation. I see little reason for believing that General Utility demands the formation of a moral sentiment based on this dictum. The propriety of the analogy is very questionable indeed. What is called national life ought not to be regarded as equally sacred with the life of a man, because it is not nearly so distinct, isolated, and unmanageable a thing. The feelings which make it up are susceptible of infinite modification, of fusion with those of another such life, of inclusion in a larger national life, and of transference without loss of force to entirely new objects. Except when the object is very large, it is generally undesirable to cultivate such feelings. Attachment to some not very extensive locality and its people is useful enough when kept within certain bounds. But as a rule it exceeds those

bounds when it reaches the intensity of the sentiment of national independence. The smaller the nation, the more vain, irritable, crotchety, selfish, obstructive, and quarrelsome is it likely to be, whenever it dares, towards the rest of the world. A capacity of feeling has been dwarfed and embittered by concentration on something small and singular. The emotions of pride in national independence need to be elevated, mellowed, and made more liberal by such an object as a great and diversified empire. National feeling would then be free from most of its local selfishness, narrowness, and bitterness, while local attachments would remain as graceful and picturesque variations in the collective life of a comprehensive nation, giving piquancy to friendly provincial rivalry. What has happened in Scotland is a conspicuous illustration of the absurdity of the theory that the independence of nations and governments ought to be regarded as a sacred thing. No nation ever was so fierce in its nationality as the Scotch, and yet that nationality has been forcibly suppressed with such happy results to Scotland herself—and, indeed, to the whole world—that nobody ever dreams of a possible revival. When conquered nations have no other than a sentimental grievance, the intenser elements of their feeling of common life are soon attracted to the larger bodies of which they have been made to form parts. When national independence has died, the feelings connected with it rise from its ashes in dual life, as a larger and more liberal patriotism, and as a mild affection for the peculiar



characteristics of some subordinate locality. Nobody suffers much pain, and neither the world nor any individual loses anything worth keeping. This being so, the unwillingness of a nation to merge its nationality ought not to be regarded as in itself a thing deserving any great consideration.

Still less rational is the analogy drawn between acts of conquest and acts of private theft. Laws and moral sentiments to restrain the latter are absolutely essential to human happiness and progress. But no such necessity exists to justify the moral sentiment which supposes a divine right to govern, belonging to individuals or bodies at present exercising sovereign powers. Such a sentiment cannot be pronounced necessary to secure that amount of variety and competition in human society and public life which is desirable to save civilization from dreary and perhaps stagnant uniformity, by giving more facilities for the trial of experiments. We have far more nations, or things so called, than are sufficient for such a purpose, and the superfluity is rendered mischievous by the obstruction to trade and liability to war; which its existence renders so unjustifiably greater than they would otherwise be.

“ The good old rule, the simple plan,  
That those should take who have the power,  
And those should keep who can,”

is quite sufficient for the welfare of the world in so far as the relations of separate governments are concerned. Peace will be best secured by extinction of

most petty governments. They are the elements of discord in the world. Big States will not be very prone to enter into wars with other big States which they cannot be sure of beating. The governments of nearly all nations really worth preservation, as capable of making valuable contributions to men's experience and culture, are quite strong enough to keep their legs in any likely political storms. They are so strong materially, and the national sentiments of their peoples are so strongly developed, that no one could conquer them without a tremendous expenditure far outweighing any conceivable advantage; and, with the exception of China, none of them is, or will be, at once so strong and so likely to be cruel, as to rouse the hostility of allied neighbours fearing for their own safety. The fittest will survive. A dekadarchy of Britain, Russia, the United States of America, Germany, Austro-Hungary, France, Spain, Italy, Japan, and Brazil, would provide the world with enough of the beauty of variety in religion, language, art, social habits, and political institutions. There is no reason why Holland should remain separate from Germany, or Portugal from Spain. But Belgium may need to be kept up as a buffer between France and Germany, and poor little Greece and Switzerland would probably be kept in life for somewhat similar reasons, as well as from a kindly historic interest in political curiosities. Sweden and Denmark are geographically and in language marked out by nature to be independent of their neighbours, and may yet form

a strong Scandinavian kingdom, if the mineral resources of the former are more enterprisingly developed. Chili is isolated from contact, and defended by earthquakes, and as she has behaved pretty decently, might well be allowed to survive as the exponent of whatever dormant possibilities there may be in Spanish American civilization. But if Britain and the Great Powers openly cast aside the stupid sentiment which makes them profess to regard the independence of petty or barbaric governments or nations as something too sacred to be rudely touched, these five will be the only relics of the present superabundance.

As a matter of fact, the sentiment is only professed. Its advocates have got most men to agree to it in theory, and when they are indifferent. But practically very few men feel it. Governments disregard it whenever power and strong temptation concur. And neither their subjects nor their neighbours show by their conduct that they at all believe the action wicked, or really think worse of the actors. The good sense of mankind has in all ages refused practical recognition of the maxim that conquest is theft. Even those who profess to be its special advocates, and are indeed always laying it down as law for other men—the “Peace Party” and other Radical doctrinaires—do not in their own hearts fully believe and accept it. They, like other men, have particular prejudices and antagonisms, and whenever the application of the maxim would interfere with the gratification

of some special hatred, they show in a most edifying manner that—

“ A merciful Providence fashioned us hollow,  
On purpose that we might our principles swallow.”

There is hardly a man of them who did not approve the unprovoked overthrow of the independent Papal Government by the troops of Italy in 1871, and the conquest of the Southern United States in 1865; who does not approve the suppression of Irish nationality by England, in spite of the undiminished desire of the Irish for independence; or who has the slightest sympathy with the Basques, contending for their *fueros*. The cases are quite relevant. The Pope's Government was as independent as that of Turkey or a South American republic, much older and more civilized, and not at all less acceptable to the industrious part of the people. National sentiment was far stronger in the Southern States than it is in China even, much more than in the other countries whose annexation by Britain I have been proposing in this and the preceding chapters. Nearly as much may be said for Ireland. Of course some one will object that Ireland has not, and the Southern States had not, independent governments, or separate national existence. But they have the sentiment of nationality in its intensest form. A nation is a number of territorial groups of men held together by a will to be one; and the vast majority of Irishmen, and the whole of the Southerners, have just such a will at this moment.

The mere fact that they are at present nominally members of larger nations, and really placed under governments not their own, is surely no sufficient reason for outraging their national feelings. The existence of a state of things is indeed an argument for its own continuance, but a very weak argument, and surely no argument at all, when it runs counter to the "precious and holy" sentiment of nationality. The only thing in which they differ from France or Italy is in the absence of national organization; and this superficial difference is accounted sufficient to debar them from all the rights of a nationality! Not to debar others like them, however. The Radical Doctrinaires cannot be consistent in anything. They concede to Poland rising to get away from monarchical Russia, what they refuse to Virginia and Carolina trying to get away from republican New England. The reason is plain. They have a concrete antipathy in the one case to despotism, in the other to slavery, and throw overboard, therefore, the inconvenient abstract principles of international morality. General Utility, only, can justify England, Russia, Italy, or the Northern States. And General Utility will furnish all the same reasons, but the weak one already mentioned, to justify conquest of nations now independent. The mental and physical pain would not be greater in the latter class of cases than in the former, and might be much smaller, as when a small state surrenders without resistance to an overwhelming force, while a powerful and sustained insur-

rection is slowly and cruelly crushed. Neither is the argument of self-preservation stronger. Disaffected subjects, if frankly allowed to follow the devices of their own hearts, are not all more likely to be annoying neighbours than were the neighbours previously independent. Between territorial insurrections and ordinary wars with neighbours the difference is superficial; but between territorial insurrections and class or party revolts there is a great gulf of difference in real nature, though the two are vulgarly lumped together as rebellions. Utility justifies the suppression of the revolts by the severest treatment. They strike at the root of man's social existence. But a body can live and thrive after deprivation of a limb, though it cannot when disease is invading its centre. Neither England nor Spain would lose anything which is properly and healthily her own by allowing the Irish or the Basques to go off with a blessing. Still less the Northern States by not preventing the withdrawal of the Southern from a partnership not formed for a definite time. In each of the three cases the struggling nation occupies a territory geographically distinct; in the first it is further distinguished in religion; in the second by language; in the third by commercial interests, and also by social habits and institutions which but for Northern forcible interference would have continued to be more peculiar than they are. Insurrections generally, if successful, will at the worst merely add to the obstructions of the world's progress by increasing the number of separate

political organizations, and preventing those developments of social life which can accrue only by combined action on a very large scale. The affinities of the suppression of them are clearly, therefore, not with the quelling of Jacobite or Communard seditions, but with the proposed action of Britain in Turkey and tropical America. Those who approve the first are logically estopped from denouncing the last on grounds of general principle. They may, if they choose, show that in certain cases it would be inexpedient, by reason of particular circumstances. But to raise their hands and voices in holy horror at British annexations, after hounding on the Yankees to crush the Southerners, is to take up a position at the extreme height of the most audacious hypocrisy.

## CHAPTER VII.

### WHAT WILL HINDER ?

I HAVE advocated Federation and Extension in a concrete rather than an abstract manner, proposing definite acts of legislation and executive action in preference to merely recommending a policy in vague general terms. I have done so because what is to be done must be done quickly, and because the most taking and catching means must therefore be employed in trying to draw men's most vivid attention to the all-important matter. Every one who has sought to impress his notions on the minds of a popular audience knows the immensely superior effectiveness of the concrete in comparison with the abstract, both in argument and in exhortation. He knows how much more likely his counsels are to be heeded, when he says that certain specified things ought to be done in certain specified ways, than where he deals only with general principles. I have, therefore, sought to draw thoroughly awakened attention to a matter of life and death, by saying something about it which may provoke and facilitate lively discussion, because said in such a way as to be, I hope, both interesting and intelligible, at least to everybody who is at all interested either in India or the Colonies. I



wish to help men to understand in details what the necessities of the case really are, and what is to be done to meet them, so that Federation may be no longer a misty floating far-off dream, but a clear full-bodied specific proposal inviting detailed inspection at this very moment, a question requiring immediate decision on data systematically arranged and ready for every one who wishes to frame a well-considered answer. I wish to help men to see that this great business, like all great businesses when attended to in good time, is not really so difficult as most imagine. They are frightened perhaps at the supposition of some tremendous revolution which will overturn things in general and worry everybody for an indefinite number of years. I have sought to show that on the contrary the establishment of the Federal Constitution would probably cause less disturbance than either the first Reform Bill or the second, and perhaps no more than was caused by the petty Public Worship Bill less than a year ago.

I have done so also to take some of the wind out of the sails of those cavillers who are always harping on the supposed inconsistency of theory with practice. I have taken pains to show how the theories propounded may be carried into practice. After doing so I shall not need to answer those vague sloppy assertions, that the scheme set forth is Utopian and "more ingenious than practical," which will probably be bandied about by loose, and lazy men who have nothing else to say, because unable to form a definite

notion of the execution of any plan more complex than that of a good dinner. Such gratuitous impertinence does not prove that its object is "unpractical," and does prove that the utterer is not a gentleman. But there will also be a class of less irrational objectors, who will make specific allegations of circumstances which, as they suppose, will render the scheme impracticable. Many minds, which have a kind of sharpness just because they are so very narrow, are capable of considerable skill in their sole art of discovering, inventing, and conjuring up difficulties. It is therefore advisable that I should take the freshness of edge from their weapons, by conjuring up the difficulties in anticipation and explaining their ill-siveness.

The distance of many parts of the federation from the seat of the Federal government has become an antiquated argument during the last ten or twelve years. A Senator could even now reach England from Australia in less than a couple of months ; while the telegraph would furnish his constituents with immediate knowledge of his important sayings and doings, and enable him to obtain information for his guidance, almost as easily as if he were at the Antipodes. When a railway is built from the Mediterranean to Natal the journey may be accomplished in less than one month, and when telegraphic communication becomes as cheap as we have reason to expect that it will soon be, Senatorial speeches may be read in Sydney on the very morning after delivery.

The possible opposition of colonial legislatures needs not be regarded. It is likely only in Victoria, New South Wales, or the Cape Colony. In most places delight at the prospect of federation will drive every other feeling out of sight. Even in the ambitious three it is highly unlikely that the opposition will be serious and resolute. As in Nova Scotia lately with regard to Canadian Confederation, cheerful acquiescence will soon take the place of sulkiness, when the thing has been once decisively done, in however high-handed a manner. Even in Victoria a majority of the population is too enthusiastic for the maintenance of connection with England to think of forcible resistance to a kind of closer connection which they may not altogether approve, at the cost of complete separation in the event of success. That, as they know, would involve heavy, diplomatic, military, and naval expenses, would check the influx of capital and population, and would expose to insult and conquest by France or some other quarrelsome and ambitious Power.

India cannot object.

The English people is not so like the French as to prefer hollow dignity to substantial grandeur, the high-sounding name of power to the solid reality, the nominal and only nominal sole sovereignty of the Empire, to practical control of federal action as one of several joint sovereigns, in conjunction with exclusive power of meddling with the peculiar and cherished institutions of England. Englishmen can be made to see that the danger of being dragged into distasteful

wars and foreign relations, by majorities of Indian and Colonial Senators overriding their own, is quite chimerical if we get rid of Canada and enter into close alliance with Russia. Danger of wars on account of India and the other colonies is much greater now than it would be then. They can be made to see that the Colonial peoples will have then what they have not now, the same motive to avoid war which now restrains the English themselves; and that England will gain positive relief from a continually increasing share of the war-taxation which she alone bears at present for the whole Empire, except India, Ceylon, and the Mauritius. Finally, they can be made to see that the alternatives before them are federation or dissolution of the empire. I am confident that they will not choose the latter. Thus also falls the objection that the proposal of federation would necessitate a dissolution of Parliament, and that, therefore, the House of Commons would shrink from entertaining the bill. Dissolution would by no means be necessary. An announcement at the close of the present session, and a full statement laid before the people, would enable to estimate the weights of public opinion. If a formidable amount of fundamental opposition, not mere half-hearted preference for delay, were clearly evoked, then dissolution of the House or abandonment of the bill would be necessary. Otherwise the former course would clearly be superfluous and the latter absurd. I am unwilling to think so meanly of the present House of Commons, as to

believe that it would refuse to establish a federal legislation from mere selfish clutching of its own powers and dignity. I believe it capable of sacrificing some of its own importance for the common good of England herself along with the other parts of the empire. The abler members, indeed, nearly half of the whole number, could expect to get seats in the new Senate either for English or more distant constituencies. Mr. Senator Smith would be quite as fine a name as Mr. Smith, M.P. The well-drilled ministerial party would probably with few exceptions follow its usual leaders into the division-lobby. The bill would survive the assaults of Sir Wilfrid Lawson's clumsy buffoonery, and Sir Charles Dilke's peculiar talents of misrepresentation. Cincinnatus might perhaps come down from his Cambrian farm, to save his country from the profane hands of the Hindu and the Australian. But he is no longer dictator of the Radical party: much less of the House of Commons. The fifty Home-rulers would go eagerly into the ministerial lobby, to pass an act which would undoubtedly facilitate the concession of local government to Ireland. The Whig and Radical officials are, indeed, generally in favour of letting the empire drift to dissolution, but that policy does not find anything like general acceptance among the rank and file of their party. It is doubtful whether they could get half of their 250 ordinary followers to vote against the Government, at least on grounds of general principle. Mr. Hugessen, Mr. Jenkins, Mr.

Macarthur, and many others would follow the example of the Home-rulers, and vote against the theory of Little Britain. In the Upper House the opposition would be weaker still. Only such watery speakers as Earl Granville and the Earl of Kimberley would be there to fight against the Marquis of Salisbury and his legions, reinforced by Earl Grey, and perhaps by the Duke of Argyll.

Will the Ministry take up the matter in earnest? There are good reasons for thinking that they will. They have individually and in a body expressed a determination to make every effort to prevent the dissolution of the empire. In his last Mansion-House speech the Prime Minister officially declared that, "We are resolved to consolidate and confirm that empire. Our policy rests on establishing an identity of interests and sympathy, which will be a help alike to colonists themselves and to those in the mother-country." Good! and how can the Ministers establish any such identity if not by federation? They cannot be so blind as not to see, that the natural tendency of the present state of things is to run on to an inevitable separation of all the principal territories now owning Her Majesty's sovereignty. Mere sentiment will not maintain the present loose and slippery connection of Australia and the Cape Colony with England. A Colonial Council in Downing Street would be a farce. With no powers of legislation or taxation, what could it do to combat the disruptive forces? If it had such powers, (which its advocates

do not propose), it would still be unable to establish the "identity of interests and sympathies." Between England and the Colonies there would still be a great gulf fixed. The bonds must be drawn much tighter, if they are to be of any use at all; and the sooner the better for England. If she consents to abdicate now, she can do so on conditions dictated by herself. If she delays till after another decade or even till another parliament, the larger colonies will have grown strong enough to insist on having a very decided and very inconvenient voice in the arrangement. To consent to federation now will seem in many respects an act of grace on the part of England. Consent to it then will seem very like a concession wrung by fear from her unwilling hands, and may even seem an act of grace on the part of the wealthier colonies. They will know, and will not scruple to say, that she cannot very well do without them and must take them on their own terms. But now the Earl of Carnarvon can very safely do what he chooses with them. He can treat them very much as clay is treated by the potter, or colts by the horse-breaker.

I do not think that the notion of federation will be distasteful to the Ministers personally. They will indeed have to undertake much work for a time. But on the other hand they will gain great relief for the future from the nagging worry of local English business, and be free to devote themselves to more interesting matters of imperial importance; though,

of course, those who might care for local politics could have seats both in the local and the imperial legislatures, which for their sakes might be made to sit at separate seasons. They would have further consolation for present toil in a not inconsiderable increase of both dignity and power. And lastly, for very shame they may be expected to try to do at least one great thing, to show that the Conservative Reaction was not a mere turning over to sleep on the part of the well-to-do sloth, cowardice, and stupidity of the nation. In some of the flabbier spirits it is indeed possible that all such considerations might fail to overcome natural shrinking from present work and motion. That will not be an unmitigated misfortune, if the leaders just determine to leave the laggards and procrastinators behind, and fill their places with progressive men like Mr. Fitzjames Stephen, Sir Henry Maine, and Sir Bartle Frere, three of the ablest members of the Whig party, and in different ways, three of the best Tories in England. There is, indeed, one possible advocate of procrastination, who is too powerful to be treated so cavalierly. The generous wine of the Stanley blood has been strangely dashed with a too liberal deal of Whiggish half-and-half in the veins of the present head of the family. His great powers are lamentably clouded by an unfortunate temperament which is certainly not hereditary. But I will not believe that the son of the Rupert



of Debate is so lost to all sense of honour, that he will take the insidious and insulting advice, now so freely showered upon him from so many quarters. I will not believe that he will keep himself tied to the apron-strings of that grinning Gallio, who declared (with charming candour) that he would rather let Fiji go to the devil than trouble himself with looking after its affairs. It is probable that the Earl of Derby will be more opposed to Extension than to Federation. But he must remember that he, or his leader and colleagues for him, promised a spirited foreign policy, and he ought to feel in honour bound to redeem that promise, especially when the most spirited and yet safest of all foreign policies is submitted to him in the proposal to make an alliance with Russia and a consequent partition of Turkey and China. If his moral and other objections are insuperable, he will at least have the grace to escape from the difficulty by giving up the management of British political relations with the two great Eastern Empires, and placing those countries like Persia and Zanzibar in direct communication with the Government of India. India now pays very much less for diplomacy than she would pay if independent, and it is only just that she should have to bear the charges of the Turkish and Chinese Embassies as well as the Persian. As for the other three Ministers principally concerned, we need have no fears.

The Earl of Carnarvon has probably by this time so far progressed in convalescence, as to be out of danger of relapse into that state of temporary delirium, in which he let slip the unworthy and alarming words quoted at the beginning of this book. Large schemes of Federation and Extension will, we may without presumption anticipate, be thoroughly congenial to the ardent and daring spirit of the Secretary for India, and not less to the grandly imaginative and splendour-loving nature of the Prime Minister. We may with confidence look to him as one both able and willing to play out Lord Wellesley's Great Game on a larger stage, and make Britain not merely the Paramount Power of the Indian Peninsula, but the Paramount Power of the shores of the Indian Ocean, and beyond all rivalry the First Power on the face of the earth. It is a mighty task, and he must perhaps shorten his life in trying to fulfil it. But he ought not to care for that. He will already have passed man's allotted span, and what are some few more inglorious years of gouty grandeur in comparison with the deathless glory of firmly fixing the British Empire on foundations which can never fail? His political career is already the most honourable and memorable in modern times, that of Bismark alone excepted. But if he consolidates his sovereign's dominions and extends them as he can and ought, on every great sea and on every continent but Europe, his

fame will as much excel that of the German Chancellor as the German Empire would be exceeded by a Kingdom of Britain covering 16,000,000 of square miles and peopled by 600,000,000 of human beings.

What he does, he must do quickly. If he goes on "waiting for indications of Providence," he will soon get practical indications of the withdrawal of Providential favours from statesmen who have no "go" in them at all, but are always in an attitude of elegant impotence and judicial indecision, always hesitating to accept manifest duties, always letting the grandest opportunities slip through their irresolute fingers.

"Those who will not, when they may :  
When they will, they shall have nay."

Every year of delay is a nail knocked into England's coffin; and the retirement of Mr. Disraeli after the next election will be the final extinction of hope, in the return to power of that precious pair who did so much during the late administration to loosen the ties of the British Empire. It is time for Englishmen to awake to a vivid perception that the early closing of the Suez Canal is a matter more urgently concerning them—even such of them as are cockneys—than the early closing of the Bull and Mouth, or the Goat and Compasses. Cannot the two great Tory statesmen toss aside their frivolous difference of opinion about the eastward position, and unite to make a final settlement of the great Eastern

Question ? Cannot the whole Conservative ministry take a little trouble to conserve the British Empire, by lifting it out of the rut in which it is running to dissolution ? If there is one maxim which, above all others, they need at this moment to ponder, it is surely this—that Caution is the thief of opportunities.













